Essays in Labour Economics and Economics of Education by Hámori, Szilvia
  
 
 
 
 
Essays in Labour Economics and Economics of 
Education 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität 
Mannheim 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von  
Szilvia Hámori 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dezember 2007 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent: Prof. Bernd Fitzenberger, Ph.D. 
Korreferent: PD Dr. Friedhelm Pfeiffer 
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Grüner 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 18. April 2008 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
To Tilmann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Bernd Fitzenberger for his support and 
encouragement. I benefited greatly from his numerous helpful suggestions, detailed comments 
and discussions. In am also grateful to Friedhelm Pfeiffer for being the second supervisor of 
my dissertation. 
 
I have also benefited from the stimulating research environment and the graduate education at 
the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE). I had the opportunity to spend time at 
the Economics Department at Central European University (CEU) and the Institute of 
Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The hospitality of these Institutions is gratefully 
acknowledged. I would like to thank the Institute of Economics for the provision of the 
“Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey”, on which two chapters of the 
dissertation are based. 
 
I am grateful to the participants of the Doctoral Seminar at Bernd Fitzenberger’s Chair for 
helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions of my work. I would also like to thank 
János Köllő for valuable discussions, Lena Calahorrano, Alia Gizatulina, Zsuzsanna Gulybán, 
Zoltán Hermann, Andrea Mühlenweg and Sava Savov. 
 
The financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG), the “Senatskommission 
zur Förderung der gleichberechtigten Entfaltung von Frauen in Studium, Forschung und 
Lehre der Universität Mannheim” and the European Commission Marie Curie program has 
enabled me to write this dissertation and is therefore gratefully acknowledged.  
 
I owe thanks to my parents for their continuous support during my graduate education. 
Finally, I am grateful to my husband Tilmann for his encouragement, patience and emotional 
support and to my five-year-old son Dávid for being such a wonderful child. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 11 
1 A comparative analysis of the returns to human capital in Germany and Hungary (2000) .. 15 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 15 
1.2 Empirical framework for estimating the returns to human capital ................................. 20 
1.2.1 Mincer earnings equation ........................................................................................ 20 
1.2.2 Problems with estimating the returns to human capital .......................................... 21 
1.2.2.1 Measurement error ........................................................................................... 21 
1.2.2.2 Omitted ability bias .......................................................................................... 22 
1.2.2.3 Self-selection bias ............................................................................................ 23 
1.2.3 Ordinary least squares vs. quantile regression ........................................................ 24 
1.3 Description of the education systems in Germany and Hungary ................................... 26 
1.3.1 The German education system ................................................................................ 26 
1.3.2 The Hungarian education system ............................................................................ 29 
1.3.3 System for comparison of the German and Hungarian education systems ............. 31 
1.4 Data and descriptive statistics ........................................................................................ 36 
1.4.1 Data for Germany .................................................................................................... 36 
1.4.2 Data for Hungary ..................................................................................................... 38 
1.4.3 Cross-country comparison ....................................................................................... 40 
1.5 Results ............................................................................................................................ 41 
1.5.1 Results for Germany ................................................................................................ 41 
1.5.2 Results for Hungary ................................................................................................ 44 
1.5.3 Cross-country comparison ....................................................................................... 48 
1.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 49 
1.7 References ...................................................................................................................... 53 
1.8 Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 56 
1.8.1 Education systems ................................................................................................... 56 
1.8.2 Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................ 59 
1.8.3 Estimation results for Germany ............................................................................... 63 
1.8.4 Estimation results for Hungary ............................................................................... 68 
1.8.5 Generation of field of study groups in Germany ..................................................... 75 
1.8.6 Generation of field of study groups in Hungary ..................................................... 76 
2 An analysis of the earnings structures in the public and private sectors in Hungary ............ 78 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 78 
 6 
2.2 Data and descriptive evidence ........................................................................................ 87 
2.2.1 Data ......................................................................................................................... 87 
2.2.2 Differences in educational attainment across sectors .............................................. 89 
2.2.3 Evolution of earnings 1994 – 2003 ............................................................................. 89 
2.2.4 Evolution of earnings by education groups 1994 – 2003 ........................................ 91 
2.3 Empirical framework...................................................................................................... 94 
2.4 Results ............................................................................................................................ 95 
2.4.1 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap .......................................................... 95 
2.4.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap by education groups ........................ 98 
2.4.2.1 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Unskilled ................................. 98 
2.4.2.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Low-skilled ............................. 99 
2.4.2.3 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Middle-skilled ....................... 100 
2.4.2.4 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, High-skilled ........................... 101 
2.4.3 Results for the private sector ................................................................................. 101 
2.4.4 Results for the public sector .................................................................................. 105 
2.4.5 Cross-sector comparison ....................................................................................... 107 
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 108 
2.6 References .................................................................................................................... 114 
2.7 Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 118 
2.7.1 Descriptive statistics .............................................................................................. 118 
2.7.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 2003 .................................. 121 
2.7.2 Estimation results for the private and public sectors, 1994 – 2003....................... 129 
2.7.4 Estimated cross-section experience profiles, 1994 – 2003 ................................... 134 
3 The effect of school starting age on academic performance in Hungary ............................ 157 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 157 
3.2 Data and descriptive evidence ...................................................................................... 161 
3.2.1 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), 2001 ........................ 161 
3.2.2 Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 2003 .................................. 163 
3.3 Estimation strategy ....................................................................................................... 164 
3.3.1 Ordinary least squares ........................................................................................... 164 
3.3.2 Instrumental variables estimation .......................................................................... 165 
3.3.3 Control function approach ..................................................................................... 166 
3.4 Estimation results ......................................................................................................... 172 
3.4.1 PIRLS – OLS results ............................................................................................. 172 
 7 
3.4.2 PIRLS – Control function approach results .......................................................... 173 
3.4.3 TIMMS, Mathematics – OLS results .................................................................... 174 
3.4.4 TIMMS, Mathematics – Control function approach results ................................. 174 
3.4.5 TIMMS, Science – OLS results ............................................................................ 175 
3.4.6 TIMMS, Science – Control function approach results .......................................... 175 
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 176 
3.6 References .................................................................................................................... 181 
3.7 Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 183 
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics .............................................................................................. 183 
3.7.2 Estimation results, PIRLS ..................................................................................... 186 
3.7.3 Estimation results, TIMMS, Mathematics ............................................................ 188 
3.7.4 Estimation results, TIMMS, Science ..................................................................... 189 
 
Tables 
Table 1.1  Six schooling categories for Germany and Hungary  
Table 1.2  Descriptive statistics for Germany, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics for Germany, subgroup of university graduates belonging 
to the occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
Table 1.4  Descriptive statistics for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.5 Descriptive statistics for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging 
to the occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
Table 1.6  Estimation results for Germany, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.7  Estimation results for Germany, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.8 Estimation results for Germany, subgroup of university graduates belonging to 
the occupational group of “Professionals” 
Table 1.9  Estimation results for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.10  Estimation results for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
Table 1.11 Estimation results for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging to 
the occupational group of “Professionals” 
Table 1.12  Estimation results for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging to       
the occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
Table 1.13  Field of study groups in Germany and Hungary 
Table 1.14  Occupational composition of the eight field of study groups 
Table 1.15  Occupational composition (%) of “Other professionals” 
 8 
Table 1.16  Major occupational composition of all university graduates 
Table 2.1  Education groups used in the empirical analysis 
Table 2.2  Descriptive statistics for 1994 and 2003 
Table 2.3  Estimation results, 1994 
Table 2.4  Estimation results, 1995 
Table 2.5   Estimation results, 1996 
Table 2.6  Estimation results, 1997 
Table 2.7  Estimation results, 1998 
Table 2.8   Estimation results, 1999 
Table 2.9   Estimation results, 2000 
Table 2.10  Estimation results, 2001 
Table 2.11   Estimation results, 2002 
Table 2.12   Estimation results, 2003 
Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics, PIRLS, 2001 
Table 3.2  Descriptive statistics, TIMSS, 2003 
Table 3.3  OLS regression results, PIRLS, 2001 
Table 3.4  First-stage and second-stage regression results, PIRLS, 2001 
Table 3.5  OLS regression results, TIMSS, Mathematics, 2003 
Table 3.6          First-stage and second-stage regression results, TIMSS, Mathematics, 2003 
Table 3.7  OLS regression results, TIMSS, Science, 2003 
Table 3.9 Control function approach regression results with interaction terms between 
expected school starting age and month of birth for PIRLS (2001), TIMSS, 
Mathematics (2003) and  TIMSS, Science (2003) 
 
Figures 
Figure 1.1  The German education system 
Figure 1.2  The Hungarian education system 
Figure 1.3  Experience profiles for Germany, full sample 
Figure 1.4  Experience profiles for Germany, males 
Figure 1.5  Experience profiles for Germany, females 
Figure 1.6  Experience profiles for Hungary, full sample 
Figure 1.7  Experience profiles for Hungary, males 
Figure 1.8  Experience profiles for Hungary, females 
Figure 2.1  Evolution of unconditional average monthly gross earnings in the private and          
public sectors and evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003 
 9 
Figure 2.2  Evolution of conditional average monthly gross earnings in the private sector 
and evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003  
Figure 2.3  Evolution of conditional average monthly gross earnings in the public sector 
and evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003 
Figure 2.4 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997  
Figure 2.5  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000  
Figure 2.6  Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003  
Figure 2.7  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Unskilled 
Figure 2.8  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Unskilled 
Figure 2.9  Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Unskilled 
Figure 2.10  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Low-skilled 
Figure 2.11  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Low-skilled 
Figure 2.12 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Low-skilled 
Figure 2.13  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Middle-skilled 
Figure 2.14  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Middle-skilled 
Figure 2.15  Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Middle-skilled 
Figure 2.16  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, High-skilled 
Figure 2.17  Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, High-skilled 
Figure 2.18  Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, High-skilled 
Figure 2.19  Experience profiles, private sector, 1994 
Figure 2.20  Experience profiles, private sector, 1995 
Figure 2.21  Experience profiles, private sector, 1996 
Figure 2.22  Experience profiles, private sector, 1997 
Figure 2.23  Experience profiles, private sector, 1998 
Figure 2.24  Experience profiles, private sector, 1999 
Figure 2.25  Experience profiles, private sector, 2000 
Figure 2.26  Experience profiles, private sector, 2001 
Figure 2.27  Experience profiles, private sector, 2002 
Figure 2.28  Experience profiles, private sector, 2003 
Figure 2.29  Experience profiles, public sector, 1994 
Figure 2.30  Experience profiles, public sector, 1995 
Figure 2.31  Experience profiles, public sector, 1996 
Figure 2.32  Experience profiles, public sector, 1997 
Figure 2.33  Experience profiles, public sector, 1998 
 10 
Figure 2.34  Experience profiles, public sector, 1999 
Figure 2.35  Experience profiles, public sector, 2000 
Figure 2.36  Experience profiles, public sector, 2001 
Figure 2.37  Experience profiles, public sector, 2002 
Figure 2.38  Experience profiles, public sector, 2003 
Figure 2.39  Experience profiles, private sector, 2003, Low-skilled 
Figure 2.40  Experience profiles, private sector, 2003, Middle-skilled 
Figure 2.41  Experience profiles, public sector, 2003, High-skilled 
Figure 2.42  Experience profiles, private sector, 1994, High-skilled 
Figure 2.43  Experience profiles, private sector, 1995, High-skilled 
Figure 2.44  Experience profiles, private sector, 1996, High-skilled 
Figure 2.45  Experience profiles, private sector, 1997, High-skilled 
Figure 2.46  Experience profiles, private sector, 1998, High-skilled 
Figure 2.47  Experience profiles, private sector, 1999, High-skilled 
Figure 2.48  Experience profiles, private sector, 2000, High-skilled 
Figure 2.49  Experience profiles, private sector, 2001, High-skilled 
Figure 2.50  Experience profiles, private sector, 2002, High-skilled 
Figure 2.51  Experience profiles, public sector, 1994, High-skilled 
Figure 2.52  Experience profiles, public sector, 1995, High-skilled 
Figure 2.53  Experience profiles, public sector, 1996, High-skilled 
Figure 2.54  Experience profiles, public sector, 1997, High-skilled 
Figure 2.55  Experience profiles, public sector, 1998, High-skilled 
Figure 2.56  Experience profiles, public sector, 1999, High-skilled 
Figure 2.57  Experience profiles, public sector, 2000, High-skilled 
Figure 2.58  Experience profiles, public sector, 2001, High-skilled 
Figure 2.59  Experience profiles, public sector, 2002, High-skilled 
Figure 2.60  Experience profiles, public sector, 2003, High-skilled 
Figure 3.1  Actual school starting age vs. expected school starting age (PIRLS 2001) 
Figure 3.2  Actual school starting age vs. expected school starting age (TIMSS 2003) 
 11 
Introduction 
Socialist wage policy in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries tried to diminish 
wage differentials, that is, workers were not rewarded according to skill or productivity and 
the returns to education were set centrally and were low. Not surprisingly, transition brought 
with itself an increase in earnings inequality attributed to (among other things) widening 
earnings differentials across education groups, which has been documented by numerous 
studies on the CEE countries (for example, Kertesi and Köllő (1999), Keane and Prasad 
(2001), Munich et al. (2002), Orazem and Vodopivec (1998) and Noorkôiv et al. (1997)). 
Despite the quantitative differences across the CEE countries, the cross-country consensus 
(based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Mincer earnings equations) indicates that 
relative to primary school or less, the average premium to high school and university 
education rose dramatically while the average (relative) return to vocational education 
remained constant or even declined during the 1990s.  
 
The first two chapters of the dissertation investigate earnings differentials in Hungary from 
two perspectives. Whereas the emphasis of the first chapter lies on the cross-country 
comparison – between Germany and Hungary – of the returns to education (and other 
variables of interest), the second chapter focuses on the evolution of earnings in the 
Hungarian private and public sectors of employment during the decade of 1994 – 2003. 
Before describing the content of the first two chapters in more detail, one point in terms of the 
main goal of the first two chapters, which goes hand in hand with the estimation method, 
merits comment. The purpose of the first two chapters is purely descriptive. That is, the aim is 
to analyse both between- and within-group earnings differentials given the existing 
international evidence that aggregate earnings inequality arises from differences between as 
well as within groups (Fitzenberger et al. (2001)), coupled with the fact that within-group 
differentials have not been the center of attention in Hungary for the period under analysis. 
Accordingly, the first two chapters use quantile regression (Koenker and Basset (1978)), the 
usefulness of which in applied econometrics has been stressed by a collection of studies in 
Fitzenberger et al. (2001).  
 
Chapter 1 focuses on the returns to education in Hungary and Germany in 2000. The data for 
the empirical analysis is drawn form the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey” 
and from the “German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP)” for Hungary and Germany 
 12 
respectively. The recent extensive educational information for the two countries – which are 
characterised by similar education systems – lends itself very well to a differentiated 
comparative analysis. The empirical analysis based on differentiated schooling categories is 
more informative than if only the years of schooling were used as a proxy for the formal 
component of human capital since both countries under analysis have multiple education 
streams at certain levels of education, and subsequently a year of schooling in itself does not 
necessarily convey the true value of education neither in the respective country nor in a cross-
country comparison. Therefore, as a first step, the study develops a system for comparison of 
the German and Hungarian education systems, which can be used in the empirical analysis to 
compare the returns to education across the two countries in a meaningful way.  
  
In the empirical analysis, Mincer earnings equations (1974) are estimated using OLS 
regression – in order to provide a benchmark for comparison with existing estimates for 
Hungary – and quantile regression. For each country, additional specifications are estimated 
which are augmented with interaction terms between gender and the other control variables in 
order to highlight the differences in the estimates between the two genders. Finally, the 
returns to different fields of study are estimated using the subgroup of Professionals of the 
university graduates for the two countries. For Hungary, the estimation results not only 
document the pattern of earnings premia to different fields of study but also offer some 
explanation for the observed earnings advantage of males at the university level.  
 
It is the analysis of the private-public sector earnings gap in Hungary for the decade of 1994 – 
2003 which Chapter 2 of the dissertation proceeds with. This time period is particularly 
interesting not only from the perspective of transition but also given the wage reforms in the 
early 2000s: (a) the level of the minimum wage was increased twice, first on 01.01.2001 from 
25,500 Hungarian Forints (HUF) to 40,000 HUF and then on 01.01.2002 to 50,000 HUF and 
(b) between September 2002 and 2003, there was a 50 percent average increase in public 
sector nominal wages, affecting different groups of public sector employees in different 
magnitudes – as the public sector wages were lagging behind the wages of the private sector 
throughout the decade of transition. In Chapter 2 (as in Chapter 1) the data is drawn from the 
“Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey” in order to examine (a) the evolution of 
the private-public earnings gap for full-time male employees, (b) the evolution of the private-
public earnings gap for four groups of full-time male employees distinguished by education 
(unskilled, low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled) and (c) the evolution of the returns to 
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education in the private and public sectors separately – as the emphasis for the decade of 
transition has been placed on the private sector.   
 
Chapter 3 departs from the descriptive analysis of earnings inequality in Germany and 
Hungary and focuses on the effect of school starting age and socio-economic factors on 
academic performance for Hungarian grade four students. This is an important empirical 
question since research in education provides mixed theories and evidence on the optimal age 
at which children should start school: whereas proponents of late school starting age argue 
that that starting school at an older age ensures that children have sufficient time to acquire 
the human capital necessary for educational success, opponents of delayed school entry argue 
that (a) the advantage of late school entry may be modest and transitory and (b) the emphasis 
should be placed on “making schools ready for children rather than making children ready for 
school” (Stipek (2000)).  
 
The challenge in estimating the effect of school starting age on academic performance arises 
from the fact that given a choice regarding enrolment decision, despite the cut-off date 
regulation, the group of students with early / delayed entry does not represent a random 
sample. That is, late (early) entrants may come from the pool of lower (higher) ability 
children and potentially from wealthier families (for whom the burden of additional childcare 
costs may be irrelevant). Given this non-random selection, late starters may be, on average, 
lower ability children and thus regressing academic performance on actual school starting age 
by OLS may generate a downward biased estimate of the age effect on academic 
performance. There exists an extensive recent empirical literature which focuses on 
instrumental variable estimation (IV) in order to overcome the problem of non-random 
selection (Bedard and Dhuey (2005), Fertig and Kluve (2005), Frederikkson and Öckert 
(2005), Leuven et al. (2004), Puhani and Weber (2007) and Strøm (2004)). In these studies 
the “expected school starting age” generated by (1) the cut-off date for enrolment and (2) the 
children’s month of birth is used as an instrument for “actual school starting age”. The 
consensus of the majority of these studies using the IV estimation strategy is that (1) the OLS 
estimate of the association between age and schooling outcomes is negative, attributed to the 
non-random selection of early / late starters, and (2) the IV regression yields a positive age 
effect, which differs in magnitude and across countries. An exception is the study by Fertig 
and Kluve (2005) who provide evidence that there is no effect of age at school entry on 
educational outcomes in Germany.  
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The aim of this final chapter is to estimate the effect of school starting age on academic 
performance in Hungary – a country for which, despite the vast recent international evidence, 
such analysis has not been carried out to this date – based on data from the “Progress in 
International Reading and Literacy Study (PIRLS)” and the “Trends in Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS)”. In addition to the standard OLS regressions, the study uses an 
extension to the IV strategy, namely, the control function approach, proposed by Garen 
(1984) and Heckman and Robb (1985). The effect of the other explanatory variables for the 
three areas of academic performance, such as gender, parental education, family size, and 
proxies for economic wealth are also investigated. 
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1 A comparative analysis of the returns to human capital in Germany 
and Hungary (2000) 
1.1 Introduction 
Cross-country comparisons of the returns to education
1
 are often conducted within the 
European Union. Although such studies shed light on the interplay between education and 
earnings inequality across countries, there is a danger that, unless the empirical analysis is 
based on differentiated schooling categories, the results may not be very informative. For 
instance, if only the years of schooling is used as a proxy for the formal component of human 
capital, cross-country comparisons can be misleading if one of the countries under analysis 
has multiple education streams at some level of education and subsequently a year of 
schooling in itself does not necessarily convey the true value of education neither in the 
respective country nor in a cross-country comparison.  
 
Therefore, one of the objectives of this paper is to develop a system for comparison of the 
German and Hungarian education systems, which can be used to compare the returns to the 
education across the two countries in a meaningful way.
2
 Given Hungary’s recent EU 
accession this study has its relevance in analysing how the returns to education in a “new” EU 
member state compare to that of an “older” member state. Germany as an “older” EU member 
state is chosen because (a) Germany is a country with a stable wage structure in a cross-
country comparison (despite the increase in wage inequality since 1993 / 94)
3
 and (b) the two 
countries have similar education systems, which allows for a differentiated cross-country 
comparison.
4
 In fact, from a historical perspective, the influence of the German education 
system on the Hungarian one has its roots in the 16
th
 century. The high level of similarity is 
already apparent at the secondary level. That is, the traditional differentiation among the three 
types of lower secondary schools, according to “theoretical” (Gymnasium), “theoretical-
practical” (Realschule) and “practical” (Hauptschule)” in Germany, which continue at the 
upper secondary level, also exists in Hungary. Namely, in Hungary the gimnázim is the 
                                                 
1
 Note that in this context (and in the rest of the paper), the term returns to education does not refer to an analysis 
of the causal effect of education on earnings, but to estimated earnings differentials between (and within) 
education groups.  
2
 Note that “German” refers to the “West German” education system throughout the chapter. 
3
 For descriptive evidence on wage inequality in Germany, among others, see Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger 
et al. (2001), Abraham and Houseman (1995) in Freeman and Katz (Eds.), Krueger and Pischke (1995) in 
Freeman and Katz (Eds.) (with an emphasis on a East and West German comparison) and Pereira and Martins 
(2000) (with an emphasis on international comparison). 
4
 Note also that there are strong economic ties between the two countries, i.e. by the mid-1990s Germany became 
Hungary's most important trading partner. 
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“theoretical”, the szakközépiskola the “theoretical-practical” and the szakmunkásképző the 
“practical” form of upper secondary education.5 The curricula of the academically most 
challenging institutions, the Gymnasium and the gimnázim in Germany and Hungary 
respectively have common traditions as the Hungarian model is based on the Austrian one.
6
 
 
The model for vocational education is also similar in the two countries, that is, vocational 
training traditionally has both a practical and a general element. The German apprentice 
training (i.e. Duales System), which has its roots in the apprenticeship system for artisans in 
middle ages, was supplemented with part-time attendance in schools (the predecessors of the 
part-time schools, i.e. Berufsschule) at the end of the nineteenth century and between 1919 
and 1938 part-time attendance at these schools became compulsory until the age of 18. In 
Hungary apprentice training schools were founded later than in Germany, namely in the 
1870s, and the Education Act of 1949 established the szakmunkásképző, which is the 
vocational institution offering both practical and general education (similar to the German 
Duales System).  
 
It is important to note, that the purpose of this chapter is purely descriptive. That is to say, the 
aim is not to deal with the problems of measuring the causal impact of education on earnings, 
namely, measurement error, omitted ability bias and self-selection bias. Instead, the purpose is 
to provide a comprehensive picture of earnings differentials in the two countries, that is, to 
analyse both “between- and within-educational-levels earnings differentials”, given the 
existing evidence that aggregate earnings inequality arises from differences between as well 
as within educational groups, due to the heterogeneity of the labour force.
7
 Moreover, it must 
be noted, that this study extends on the existing literature on the Hungarian labour market as, 
to the best of my knowledge, for Hungary “within-educational-levels earnings differentials” 
have not been estimated so far. Furthermore, in order to provide a more comprehensive 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that the Hungarian education system always retained its traditional structure of 
differentiation (as opposed to East Germany). In particular, prior to 1945 the Hungarian education system was 
identical to the West German one in the sense that the differentiation (according to the different branches of 
education) started after the first four years of primary school. It was only after 1945 that the first stage of 
education was extended to last eight years and so the differentiation started after the completion of the eight 
years of primary school (i.e. at the upper secondary level). The beginning of transition marked the revival of 
differentiation at an earlier stage with the re-establishment of the six and eight year gimnázium, i.e. The 1990 
Amendment to the 1985 Education Act authorised the six and eight year gimnázium.  
6
 Phillips (1995), pp 243 – 247 offers an extensive discussion of the common traditions of the secondary 
education in Germany and Hungary (and other Central and Eastern European countries). 
7
 See for example Pereira and Martins (2000). 
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picture to the returns to university education, the returns to specific fields of study at 
university are estimated.  
 
Subsequently, in the empirical analysis standard Mincer earnings equations (regressions of the 
logarithm of monthly gross earnings on education, potential labour market experience and its 
square, gender, sector of employment) are estimated using both ordinary least squares 
estimation (OLS) and quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett (1978)). The advantage of 
quantile regression over OLS estimation is that quantile regressions allow for the full 
characterisation of the conditional earnings distribution, thereby providing a more 
comprehensive picture of the returns to education. In other words, whereas OLS estimation 
only reveals the differences in mean earnings associated with different education levels (i.e. 
“between-educational-levels earnings differentials”), quantile regression allows for the 
analysis of the differences in returns to education within educational groups (“within-
educational-levels earnings differences”). That is, using quantile regression techniques, one 
can analyse, for instance, whether individuals at higher positions of the conditional earnings 
distribution enjoy higher returns to education than individuals at lower positions of the 
conditional earnings distribution.  
 
The data for the empirical analysis is drawn form the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s 
Wage Survey” and from the “German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP)” for Hungary and 
Germany respectively. The analysis is restricted to the year 2000 in order to take advantage of 
the extensive educational information in the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage 
Survey” and of the newly surveyed educational information in the GSOEP which became 
available in 1996 and 2000 respectively. This recent educational information for the two 
countries lends itself very well to a differentiated comparative analysis.  
 
There is a further reason for starting the analysis in 2000. Namely, at the outset of this study 
there were numerous studies focusing on the returns to human capital in Hungary for the 
transition period and for the years prior to transition (the years prior to transition being limited 
by the availability of the data). However, the studies did not go beyond the year 1999. 
Subsequently, this study aimed to augment the existing literature on the Hungarian labour 
market not only in terms of technique of estimation but also in terms of the time period in 
analysis. At this point, it is important provide a brief (and selective) review of the evolution of 
the returns to human capital in Hungary for the decade of 1989 – 1999. Socialist wage policy 
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tried to diminish wage differentials, i.e. workers were not rewarded according to skill or 
productivity and the returns to education were set centrally and were low. Not surprisingly, 
transition brought with itself an increase in earnings inequality attributed to the widening 
earnings differentials across education groups. More specifically, studies on the Hungarian 
labour market for the time period of 1989 – 1999 find evidence for rising returns to education 
– in terms of increasing returns to general and vocational secondary school education and 
tertiary education relative to primary school education – and falling returns to (potential) 
labour market experience (i.e. a devaluation of labour market experience gained under 
socialism). As opposed to secondary and tertiary education, the (relative) return to vocational 
education did not increase during the decade. The “devaluation” of vocational training is 
partially due to the fact that prior to transition, the structure of vocational training was 
adjusted to the needs of the planned economy (especially concentrating on the heavy 
industry). Therefore, the skill composition of the skilled workers could not meet the demands 
of the economy during transition. Moreover, there is evidence for a widening wage gap 
between the public and private sectors and a narrowing gender wage gap (except for 
occupations requiring high education levels) during the years of transformation. Hungary is 
also characterised by striking regional differences in educational attainment and earnings.
8
  
 
Despite the vast literature on the topic of returns to education and earnings inequality in 
Germany, this study extends the descriptive evidence in the sense that it draws conclusions 
based on (a) more differentiated schooling categories than most existing estimates are based 
on (for instance, it distinguishes between types of tertiary education institutions as well as 
between lower and higher level vocational degrees) and (b) quantile regression 
simultaneously. 
 
The empirical findings provide evidence for the fact that the mean (relative) return
9
 to 
education is not an accurate estimate of the (relative) return to education for the population 
(more specifically, for the selected samples). That is, (a) the estimated (relative) return to all 
five educational levels increases across the quantiles for both genders in Hungary and to high 
school and tertiary education for males in Germany and (b) the within-educational-levels 
dispersion is increasing with the increasing levels of education in Hungary, and is especially 
                                                 
8
 For an extensive discussion of the Hungarian labour market during transition see Köllő (2002) in Fazekas and 
Koltay (Eds.), pp. 70 – 77. 
9
 The returns to education groups are relative to the group of individuals possessing “No formal vocational 
training and no high school degree” (when not stated otherwise). 
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high at the tertiary level. It is important to note that the within-educational-levels earnings 
dispersion is larger in Hungary than in Germany at all levels of education. Another finding 
worth noting is that the (relative) return to tertiary education is substantially larger in Hungary 
than in Germany, i.e. at the top decile the estimated additional return to university education 
is 164 and 78 percent in the two countries respectively. The high valuation of tertiary 
education can be in part attributed to (a) the fact that in Hungary the demand for highly 
qualified labour in 2000, as in the 1990s, is larger than the supply and (b) the earnings 
advantages of those in the occupational group of “Legislators, senior officials and managers”. 
Moreover, the analysis of the subgroup of “Professionals” within the group of university 
graduates suggests that those individuals who have studied technical fields of study (such as 
Science and Computing) and Law enjoy an earnings premium relative to those with non-
technical fields (Social sciences, Humanities and Arts) and relative to those in the teaching 
and medical professions. Finally, it must be emphasized that the effect of the other 
explanatory variables, namely, potential labour market experience, gender and sector, is not 
uniform across the quantiles. For instance, the gender earnings gap narrows and widens in 
Germany and Hungary respectively across the distribution and (b) the earnings gap in favour 
of the public sector (for the full samples) is only positive at the 10
th
 quantile, becomes 
negative at the 25
th
 quantile and increases across the quantiles in both countries reaching 18 
and 48 percent at the top decile in Germany and Hungary respectively.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 describes briefly the 
framework for and (for completeness) the problems associated with measuring the returns to 
human capital, namely, that of measurement error, omitted ability bias and self-selection bias. 
Furthermore, Section 1.2 introduces quantile regression and summarises the advantage of 
using quantile regression over OLS when estimating the returns to education. In Section 1.3 
the German and Hungarian education systems are described, and the system for comparing 
the two education systems is developed. Section 1.4 presents the data sets used in the 
empirical analysis for the two countries and some descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 presents 
the estimation results and Section 1.6 concludes. Tables and Figures are presented in 
Appendix 1.8. 
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1.2 Empirical framework for estimating the returns to human capital 
1.2.1 Mincer earnings equation 
Numerous studies on the returns to human capital are embedded in the framework of the 
Mincer earnings equation (1974): 
 
2
1 2ln ,i i i i i iw S EX EX X                                                                     1,...,i n  (1)  
 
The dependent variable of the Mincer earnings equation is the logarithm of some measure of 
earnings (ln )iw  for individual i , which is explained by some measure of schooling ( )iS , 
actual or potential labour market experience ( )iEX , a vector of other explanatory variables 
( )iX , such as gender and region, and a random disturbance term ( )i , which contains the 
unobserved determinants of earnings. The schooling variable represents the formal component 
of human capital and is either defined as the number of years spent in education or 
alternatively as the highest degree attained. The latter specification for schooling is preferable 
if one wants to relax the assumption that an additional year of schooling yields the same 
return at any degree level. Labour market experience is a proxy for the informal component of 
human capital i.e. learning on the job. The inclusion of the linear and quadratic forms of 
labour market experience is essential in order to capture the concavity of the wage-experience 
profiles, which is due to the depreciation of skills over a worker’s life-cycle. If actual labour 
market experience is not available, Mincer proposed to include potential labour market 
experience in the regression, which is measured as the age of the individual minus years of 
schooling minus school starting age. Using potential labour market experience in the 
specification has a drawback however. Whereas it is a good proxy for male labour market 
experience it may well be an unsuitable proxy for female labour market experience, due to the 
fact that females interrupt their career for child-rearing reasons. In the semi-logarithmic 
specification, the estimated schooling coefficient   is interpreted as the percentage change in 
(monthly / weekly / daily / hourly) wages associated with an additional year of schooling / 
highest grade completed, that is, the private rate of return to schooling. 
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1.2.2 Problems with estimating the returns to human capital 
1.2.2.1 Measurement error 
One of the problems associated with estimating the returns to human capital is that of 
measurement error in the schooling variable, which is expected to lead to a downward bias of 
the OLS estimate of the schooling coefficient. Measurement error of the schooling variable 
may arise due to erroneous self-reporting. For instance, Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and 
Miller et al. (1995), using a sample of American and Australian twins respectively, find the 
level of self-reported schooling (measured as the years of schooling) to be higher than that 
reported by the co-twin. Furthermore, measurement error may arise if actual years of 
schooling is not available in a dataset, and hence the years of schooling are imputed from the 
average number of years required to complete a specific degree, i.e. different individuals may 
take different number of years to complete a degree. For example, Jaeger and Page (1996) 
using a sample of 18,699 individuals from the 1992 Current Population Sample find that 
among the individuals whose highest reported degree was a high school diploma 91 percent 
received exactly 12 years of education, 5 percent took longer than 12 years and the remaining 
4 percent finished high school in less than 12 years. Therefore, degree attainment rather than 
years of schooling is often used as a proxy for the formal component of education in the 
Mincer earnings equation.  
 
The use of an instrument for schooling (a valid instrument is one which is highly correlated 
with schooling but not with the disturbance term, and has no direct effect on earnings, apart 
form the effect through schooling) to fit the Mincer earnings function is a popular way to 
correct for measurement error.
10
 However, valid instruments are difficult to find in practice. 
For instance, given the heterogeneity of the cost and benefit of schooling in the population, 
one must be cautions when a supply-side intervention (e.g. a change in compulsory schooling 
law) is used as an instrument. That is, if the intervention only affects one subsample of the 
population (due to the heterogeneity in the cost and benefit of schooling), the resulting IV 
estimate of the rate of return to schooling will equal the rate of return of that subgroup (i.e. 
may be higher or lower than the OLS estimate of  ).11 
 
                                                 
10
 For an extensive discussion on instrumental variables estimation (IV) to correct for measurement error see 
Card (1999). 
11
 See for example Harmon and Walker (1995). 
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In this study, the motivation for the use of dummies for degree attainment (i.e. the six 
categories are described in Section 1.3) as the measure of the formal component of human 
capital, rather than the years of schooling, is twofold. First, it serves to eliminate the potential 
bias caused by the computational error when the years of schooling is imputed form degree 
attainment (i.e. actual years of schooling is not reported in the Hungarian dataset). Second, as 
both the German and Hungarian education systems have multiple education streams starting 
from the secondary level, “type of schooling” is more suitable for a cross-country comparison 
of the returns to schooling than “year of schooling”. The schooling variable (used in the 
specifications) may nevertheless suffer from measurement error due to reporting error.  
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that years of potential labour market experience is used as the 
proxy for the informal component of human capital for both countries (as actual labour 
market experience is not reported in the Hungarian dataset). Potential labour market 
experience, measured as age minus years of schooling minus school starting age, may suffer 
from measurement error (especially for Germany
12
) as years of schooling is imputed from the 
average number of years taken to complete a degree. Thus, the coefficient estimate needs to 
be interpreted with caution. 
1.2.2.2 Omitted ability bias 
If the Mincer earnings equation is estimated by OLS, a crucial assumption for unbiased 
coefficient estimate of   is that the schooling variable is uncorrelated with the components of 
the disturbance term. It has been argued however that the unobserved (innate) ability in the 
disturbance term is positively correlated with the schooling variable (and earnings). 
Therefore, if innate ability is not controlled for in the regression, the OLS estimate of the rate 
of return to schooling may potentially be biased upwards (“omitted ability bias”). Two 
approaches are commonly used to deal with the problem of omitted ability bias. 
 
The first approach calls for the inclusion of an explicit measure (a proxy) for the unobserved 
ability in the regression equation, such as IQ scores. There are however various drawbacks of 
this technique, as described by Ashenfelter et al. (1999). For example, it is difficult to find a 
perfect proxy for unobserved ability which is not itself correlated with schooling. That is to 
say, the ability measured by most tests is affected by education prior to the test so that the 
                                                 
12
 That is, in Germany there is (potentially) more variability across individuals in the years taken to complete 
vocational degrees (e.g. Lehre) than in Hungary. 
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effect of innate ability on earnings cannot be distinguished from the effect of schooling. The 
consequence of using erroneous measures for ability (imperfect proxies) is a downward 
biased coefficient estimate.  
 
The second method in order to correct for omitted ability bias is the twin approach which 
takes advantage of the fact that monozygotic twins, who have been reared together, are more 
alike than a randomly selected pair of individuals, since they share the same genes and same 
socio-economic background.
13
. Therefore, it is argued that the difference in their income is 
only associated with the difference in their educational levels. Consequently, when the 
difference in wages is regressed on the difference in the education level within a twin pair, the 
estimated coefficient for the rate of return to schooling should not suffer by omitted ability 
bias. Although a popular means to correct for ability bias, the twin approach has often been 
the centre of debate i.e. innate ability might not be perfectly correlated within a twin pair. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the direction of the bias of the OLS estimate of the rate of 
return to schooling is not obvious as there are two opposing effects involved. The downward 
bias due to the measurement error in the schooling variable may be partially offset by the 
upward ability bias, as argued by Grilliches (1977). In fact, Ashenfelter and Zimmerman 
(1993) find evidence that the upward omitted ability bias is about the same size as the 
downward bias due to the measurement error in the schooling variable.
14
  
 
Therefore, it is argued that the parameter estimates provided in the Appendix are reliable 
estimates of the return to education i.e. as discussed above, the use of proxies for unobserved 
ability (and instruments for schooling) is by no means universal due to the problems 
encountered when using invalid proxies (and invalid instruments for schooling such as 
parental background variables), coupled with the opposing effects of the two biases. 
1.2.2.3 Self-selection bias 
The third problem related to estimating the returns to human capital is that of self-selection 
bias. It is assumed that the higher earnings for individuals with higher educational levels are 
caused by their higher educational levels, in which case the estimate of   is not biased and 
reflects the causal effect of education on earnings. However, it may well be that the higher 
                                                 
13
 See Miller et al. (1995), pp. 587 – 588 for the analytical framework for the twin approach.  
14
 See Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) p. 1172. 
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earnings of workers with higher educational levels are caused by the fact that individuals with 
greater earnings capacity choose to acquire more schooling, in which case   suffers from 
self-selection bias.  
 
In addition to self-selection into higher education, self-selection into employment poses a 
problem in this study.
15
 That is, the German and Hungarian samples used for econometric 
analysis in this study include only individuals (males and females) who satisfy the following 
restrictions: (a) are wage and salary earners, (b) are full-time employees and (c) are aged 25 – 
55 years. Therefore, the results must be interpreted conditional on the selected samples, rather 
than for the population as a whole. 
1.2.3 Ordinary least squares vs. quantile regression  
The OLS estimate of   in the benchmark Mincer earnings equation is an estimate of the 
mean return to schooling i.e. the mean earnings premium associated with an additional year of 
schooling (alternatively with an additional degree level). Whereas OLS estimation only 
reveals the differences in mean earnings associated with different education levels (i.e. 
“between-educational-levels earnings differentials”), quantile regression, introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978), allows for the full characterisation of the conditional earnings 
distribution, thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of the returns to human capital. 
Subsequently, quantile regression allows for the analysis of the differences in returns to 
education not just between but also within educational groups (i.e. “within-educational-levels 
earnings differentials”). 
 
The relevance of quantile regression in the returns to education literature can be best 
illustrated by an econometric example. Machado and Mata (2000) estimate Mincer earnings 
equations for Portugal by OLS and quantile regressions for the years 1982 and 1994 . Using 
OLS estimation, they find the coefficient estimate for the rate of return to an additional year 
of schooling to be approximately 8 percent in 1994. Using quantile regressions allows them to 
draw much more interesting conclusions about the rate of return to an additional year of 
schooling for 1994: the rate of return to an additional year of schooling at the 10
th
 quantile is 
merely 4 percent, at the median it increases to around 7 percent and at the 90
th
 qualtile it is as 
high as 11 percent. Moreover, they find that the mean return to education over the twelve-year 
                                                 
15
 The Heckman selectivity bias correction method (1979) is beyond the scope of this study as the dataset for 
Hungary only covers full-time employees i.e. excludes the self-employed, part-time employed, unemployed etc..  
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period increased by only 0.5 percent. Looking at the different quantiles gives another picture 
of the evolution of returns: the return to the low quantiles decreased by almost 2 percent, the 
median return stayed roughly constant and the return to the 90
th
 quantile increased by 3 
percent. The authors hence conclude that schooling is not only more valued for highly paid 
jobs but that this tendency has sharpened over time – a conclusion that could not be seen by 
just running OLS regressions. 
 
The quantile regression model is formulated as: 
 
,
ii i
y x       with ( | )i i iQuant y x x  ,                                                      1,...,i n        (2) 
where iy  is the regression’s dependent variable, ix  is a 1K   vector of regressors, i  is a 
disturbance term and   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The subscript i  indexes 
the individuals in the sample, 1,...,i n . ( | )i iQuant y x denotes the 
th conditional quantile of 
iy , conditional of the regressor vector ix . As one increases   continuously from 0 to 1, one 
traces the entire conditional distribution of y , conditional on x . 
 
The th  regression quantile,  0 1  , is defined as a solution to the problem of minimizing a 
weighted sum of absolute residuals. The th  regression quantile can be computed by:  
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In the framework of the Mincer earnings equation (1), the resulting regression fit ix   
describes the th  quantile of the earnings of individual i  given the characteristics (e.g. 
education level, potential labour market experience, gender etc.) of individual i .  
 
As noted earlier, this study is purely descriptive in nature. I estimate Mincer earnings 
equations (1974) by OLS and quantile regression at five quantiles of the log earnings 
distribution, namely at the 10
th
 quantile, at the 25
th
 quantile, at the median, at the 75
th
 quantile 
and at the 90
th
 quantile. The dependent variable is the log of monthly gross earnings. The set 
of independent variables (see Section 1.4) includes: education, potential labour market and its 
square, sector of employment, gender and interaction terms between education and gender, 
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potential labour market experience and gender and sector of employment and gender. For all 
specifications, weights are used in estimation. Standard errors are obtained by 1000 and 200 
replications for the quantile regressions for Germany and Hungary respectively.  
1.3 Description of the education systems in Germany and Hungary 
1.3.1 The German education system 
This section gives a brief description
16
 of the (West) German education system, relying on the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97) as a guidance. Figure 1.1  
provides a depiction of the German education system.  
  
In Germany, compulsory education starts at the age of six in the primary school, Grundschule, 
(ISCED-97 level 1). After the completion of the four-year-long Grundschule, children are 
screened according to academic ability, and can choose among the three tracks of lower 
secondary education (ISCED-97 level 2), namely, the Hauptschule, the Realschule or the 
Gymnasium. Admission to the different institutions is based on the teachers’ recommendation 
combined with the parents’ approval. 
 
The academically least demanding type of school at the lower secondary level is the lower 
secondary school, Hauptschule, which is five years in duration and grants a general school 
leaving certificate, Hauptschulabschluss. The children are offered general education with a 
vocational orientation, as successful completion of the Hauptschule opens the door to 
vocational training, but not to further academic education (at the upper secondary level).  
 
The six-year-long intermediate secondary school, Realschule, is positioned between the 
Hauptschule and the Gymnasium. Graduation from the Realschule provides the Mittlerer 
Schulabschluss (Realschulabschluss), which grants its holders access to institutions at the 
upper secondary level that provide vocational qualification or higher education entrance 
qualification.  
 
The academically most demanding institution at the lower secondary level is the general 
secondary school, Gymnasium, which lasts six years and prepares its pupils for the upper level 
                                                 
16
 Extensive information on the structure of the German education system can be found, for example, in 
Secretariat for the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (2006). 
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of the general secondary school, Gymnasiale Oberstufe. After completing the Gymnasium, 
children are also free to continue their education at any other institution at the upper 
secondary level (i.e. vocational training). 
The comprehensive school, Gesamtschule, combines all the three tracks described above in 
two possible ways. The first alternative is the cooperative comprehensive school which has 
the three different branches on its premises in order to facilitate transfer from one type of 
school to another. The other alternative is the integrated comprehensive school which 
combines the three different school types in one. That is, children are taught together until the 
beginning of grade seven, and from grade seven onwards certain subjects are taught at 
different levels and the qualifications are awarded accordingly. Therefore, graduates of the 
comprehensive school may either leave with the Hauptschulabschluss, the Mittlerer 
Schulabschluss, or the Allgemeine Hochschulreife (Abitur). 
 
The upper secondary level (ISCED-97 level 3) can be divided along three lines, (1) whether 
pupils obtain a vocational degree, which in itself does not enable them to pursue their studies 
at the tertiary level, (2) whether they obtain a degree, which enables them to continue their 
studies at the practically oriented tertiary institutions only or (3) whether they obtain a general 
higher education entrance qualification, which allows them to pursue further studies at any 
tertiary institution. 
 
The two institutions belonging to the first subcategory at the upper secondary level are the 
dual system, Duales System, and the Berufsfachschule, which are both vocational in 
orientation. The Duales System lasts two to three years and offers an apprenticeship at an 
enterprise combined with general education at the part-time vocational school Berufsschule. 
Its graduates, at the age of 18, obtain the Berufsqualifizierender Abschluss which marks the 
completion of compulsory education and provides direct entry to the labour market or to 
further vocational education. The Duales System is the most common route after the 
completion of the Hauptschule, although graduates of the Realschule and Gymnasium may 
also choose this track. The second type of institution, the Berufsfachschule, is a two- to three-
year-long full-time vocational school, which provides pupils with vocational training as well 
as general education, thereby preparing them for direct entry into the labour market or to 
further vocational education. 
 
 28 
The institutions belonging to the second subcategory at the upper secondary level are those 
offering the Fachhochschulreife, which entitles its holders to further education at the 
practically oriented tertiary institutions. More specifically, the two-year-long upper secondary 
school, Fachoberschule, and the Berufsoberschule
17
 belong to this subcategory. The entrance 
requirement for these institutions is the Mittlerer Schulabschulss.
18
 
 
The route to university is through the third subcategory of upper secondary education, 
namely, the upper level of the general secondary school, Gymnasiale Oberstufe. The 
Gymnasiale Oberstufe is three years in duration, academically oriented, and grants its 
graduates the Allgemeine Hochschulreife, which is the prerequisite for university. The 
Allgemeine Hochschulreife can also be acquired at the Fachgymnasium
19
, under certain 
conditions, at the Berufsoberschule and for adults at the Abendgymnasium or Kolleg.  
 
Accordingly, there is room for further education for the graduates of the three subcategories 
of upper secondary education described above, namely, for those with the 
Berufsqualifizierender Abschluss, those with the Fachhochschulreife and those with the 
Allgemeine Hochschulreife.  
 
The holders of the Berufsqualifizierender Abschluss may only pursue advanced vocational 
education offered at the Fachschule (ISCED-97 level 4). The Fachschule is a post-secondary 
non-tertiary institution of one to three years in duration, which, under certain conditions, 
grants the Fachhochschulreife in addition to a further vocational qualification (i.e. enables its 
graduates to become master craftsman in their field).  
 
Those with a Fachhochschulreife aspire to Fachhochschule (ISCED-97 level 5). Fachschulen 
are more practically oriented tertiary institutions, offering subjects such as engineering, 
business and administration, and are shorter in duration than universities (i.e. three to four 
years).  
 
                                                 
17
 The Berufsoberschule is attended by those who (in addition to the Mittlerer Schulabschluss) have completed 
vocational training or have five years of work experience (Secretariat of the Standing Conference of the 
Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (2006)). 
18
 Note that, under certain conditions, the Fachhochschulreife can be acquired at the Berufsfachschlule 
(Secretariat of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (2006)).  
19
 At the three-year-long Fachgymnasium career-oriented subjects such as business and economics are added to 
the general subjects offered at Gymnasium.  
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Finally, those individuals holding the Allgemeine Hochschulreife (or in some cases 
Fachgebundene Hochschulreife) fulfil the prerequisite for acceptance at university, 
Universität and Technische Hochschule (ISCED-97 level 5), which last at least eight 
semesters, depending on the field of study. Under certain conditions students can pursue 
further research at the second stage of tertiary education (ISCED-97 level 6). 
1.3.2 The Hungarian education system 
From the onset of transition there were significant changes in the structure of the Hungarian 
education system.
20
 To mention one example, the 1993 Public Education Act and the 1996 
Amendment to the Public Education Act extended the end of compulsory education from the 
age of 14 to the age of 16 and to the age of 18 (starting with those who enter primary school 
in the 1998 / 99 school year) respectively. It is important to note that even the youngest 
individuals of the 2000 sample completed their education before these reforms governing the 
structure of education
21
 came into effect. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to provide a 
brief overview of the institutions as attended by the individuals under analysis, using the 
ISCED-97 framework as a guidance, rather than to describe in detail the continuous changes 
in the Hungarian education system which form the present education system. Figure 1.2 
provides a depiction of the Hungarian education system.  
 
Compulsory education in Hungary starts at the age of five in the kindergarten, óvoda, 
(ISCED-97 level 0). At the age of six
22
 children are enrolled in primary school, általános 
iskola, which lasts eight years and consists of two levels, a lower level lasting 4 years, alosó 
tagozat, (ISCED-97 level 1) and an upper level lasting another 4 years,  felső tagozat (ISCED-
97 level 2).
23
  
 
After the completion of primary and lower secondary education, children are screened 
according to ability in order to start one of the five types of upper secondary schools (ISCED-
97 level 3). Admission to upper secondary institutions is based on a selection mechanism 
                                                 
20
 Lannert (2001) offers an extensive discussion on the changes in the structure of the education system after 
transition. 
21
 The exception is the 1990 Amendment to the 1985 Education Act which authorised six and eight year general 
secondary schools. However, from the three alternatives, the dominant institution remained the four year general 
secondary school. 
22
 The legal regulations allow children to start school at the age of five or seven. 
23
 As the 1990 Amendment to the 1985 Education Act which authorised six and eight year general secondary 
schools, children who are to pursue their education in such institutions leave the primary school after six and 
four years respectively.  
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combining performance at the primary school and an entrance exam. There are two main 
categories of institutions at the upper secondary level, those offering a high school degree, 
érettségi, which entitles pupils to continue their education at the tertiary level, and those 
which do not.  
 
The latter institutions have a vocational emphasis and their successful completion allows for 
direct entry to the labour market. The first type, the vocational school, szakiskola, offers two 
years of general and vocational education and grants its students a lower level vocational 
qualification. The apprentice school, szakmunkásképző, is the second, more advanced type of 
vocational institution which does not offer a high school degree. The three-year-long 
education in the apprentice schools takes place both at a firm and in school. Successful 
graduates of the szakmunkásképző obtain a skilled worker’s qualification which allows them 
to work in various sectors including construction, agriculture and trade. 
 
Institutions offering a high school degree, and thereby granting access to further education at 
the tertiary level, have three subdivisions. Vocational secondary schools, szakközépiskola, last 
four or five years and offer a vocational qualification as well as a high school degree. The 
vocational secondary schools have become the most popular institutions at the upper 
secondary level, especially the economic, commercial, catering and trade types. Technical 
schools, technikum, are a special form of secondary vocational schools which last five years 
and provide students with a technician’s qualification in addition to a high school degree. 
General secondary schools, gimnázium, are four, six or eight years in duration (after the 
completion of eight, six or four years of primary school respectively) and offer only a high 
school degree. The various degrees at the upper secondary level can also be acquired via adult 
education.  
 
Tertiary education (ISCED-97 level 5), like upper secondary education, is divided into two 
subdivisions depending on whether a more vocational or a more academic curriculum is 
offered. On the one hand, colleges,  főiskola, offer education at a more practical level and last 
three to four years. Universities, egyetem, on the other hand, offer a more academic 
curriculum and last at least five years, depending on the field of study. After successful 
graduation from university, students can pursue further research leading to an advanced 
research qualification (ISCED-97 level 6). There is a tough mechanism in place for selection 
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at the tertiary level based on performance at the upper secondary level and an entrance exam 
specific to the field of study. 
1.3.3 System for comparison of the German and Hungarian education systems 
The system for comparison of the German and Hungarian education systems, depicted in 
Table 1.1, has been constructed along the lines of the ISCED-97 framework. The six 
categories are based on the available educational information in the GSOEP and the 
“Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey” for Germany and Hungary respectively. 
It is important to note that the level of differentiation of the schooling categories and the 
number of observations in each schooling category had to be traded off, especially at the 
upper secondary level (i.e. the resulting six categories are more aggregated than those 
reported in the datasets due to sample size considerations). For instance, optimally, one would 
want to differentiate between the all types of secondary degrees – with vs. without vocational 
qualification – for Germany, but the small number of cases motivate the aggregation of 
certain degrees. Consequently, the resulting six categories, on the one hand, are broad enough 
to assure the comparability of the degree levels between the two countries and, on the other 
hand, assure a sufficient number of observations for both countries for empirical analysis.  
 
(1) No formal vocational degree and no high school degree: The general idea behind this 
educational group is to merge individuals from the datasets who (a) do not satisfy the 
compulsory (general) schooling requirement or (b) who only satisfy the compulsory (general) 
schooling requirement. These two groups have been merged as the number of observations in 
the former group is not sufficient for independent analysis. At most satisfying the compulsory 
(general) schooling requirement is, in fact, the equivalent of having no formal vocational 
degree and no high school degree in both countries.  
 
In Germany, the compulsory (general) schooling requirement is nine years, that is, it ends 
with the completion of lower secondary education. Therefore, Group (1) consists of those 
individuals who (a) have less than a lower secondary school degree or (b) possess at most a 
lower secondary school degree, namely, Hauptschulabschluss or Realschulabschluss or 
anderer Abschluss. 
 
In Hungary, when the individuals in the 2000 sample attended school, the compulsory 
schooling requirement was marked by the successful completion of the eight years of primary 
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school. Subsequently, for these individuals their primary school degree is accepted as the 
minimum schooling requirement in the labour market. Hence, Group (1) consists of those 
individuals who (a) did not complete primary school or (b) at most possess a primary school 
degree.
 
 
 
(2) Lower level vocational degree and no high school degree: The general idea behind this 
educational group is to cover individuals who have completed a lower level of vocational 
training, which grants them direct access to the labour market but does not in itself enable 
them to continue their studies at the tertiary level.  
 
For Germany, Group (2) is the largest group as it merges individuals with different schooling 
and vocational qualifications. As far as the schooling qualification is concerned, all those 
individuals who do not have a Fachhochschulreife or Abitur (i.e. have a Hauptschulabschluss 
or Realschulabschluss or anderer Abschluss) belong to Group (2). Although the 
Hauptschulabschluss, Realschulabschluss and anderer Abschluss, differ in terms of “quality”, 
they are aggregated for two reasons. Namely, it would be difficult to differentiate between 
these subgroups in a way which (a) assures enough observations per category and (b) has a 
Hungarian equivalent (as in Hungary there is no such differentiation at the lower secondary 
level of education). As far as the vocational qualification is concerned, Group (2) merges all 
those individuals who possess a vocational qualification at the upper secondary level, that is, 
who have completed either the Lehre or Berufsfachschule or Schule des Gesundheitswesens or 
Beamtensausbildung or sostige Ausbildung. It is important to note however that in terms of 
vocational qualification Group (2) is not as heterogeneous as it may first seem. That is, 
approximately 76 percent of all individuals belonging to Group (2) completed the Lehre in the 
sample.  
 
For Hungary, Group (2) merges (a) the graduates of the szakiskola and (b) the graduates of the 
szakmunkásképző. All these individuals posses a vocational qualification which grants them 
direct entry to the labour market but not to any tertiary institution.
 
As for Germany, the 
aggregation of the two vocational qualifications cannot be considered a severe problem as in 
the sample approximately 91 percent of all individuals belonging to Group (2) obtained their 
vocational degree from the szakmunkásképző.  
 
Moreover, the fact that most of the individuals in Group (2) undertook vocational training in 
the framework of the Lehre and in the szakmunkásképző in Germany and Hungary 
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respectively has the advantage that, among all vocational institutions, the Lehre and 
szakmunkásképző are the most similar ones, and so Group (2) is well suited for the cross-
country comparison.  
 
(3) Higher level vocational degree and no high school degree / higher level vocational 
degree: The general idea behind Group (3) is to select those individuals who possess a 
qualification which is of a higher level than the qualifications held by the individuals 
belonging to Group (2).  
 
For Germany, this amounts to subdividing the large group of individuals holding some kind 
of a “vocational degree and no high school degree” (i.e. they make up over half of the 2000 
sample) according to the level of vocational degree held. The Fachschule graduates are 
selected into Group (3) as the Fachschule is the only post-secondary and non-tertiary 
vocational institution (ISCED-97 level 4), and thus education goes beyond that acquired at the 
institutions of vocational education in Group (2). That is, the Fachschule provides advanced 
vocational training for those pupils with initial (upper secondary level) vocational 
qualifications and employment. 
 
For Hungary, the selection criterion for Group (3) is somewhat different than that for 
Germany. That is, the motivation is to subdivide the group of high school graduates
24
, the 
largest group in the 2000 sample in a meaningful way. Subsequently, due to the differences in 
practical / academic curriculum (as well as differences in labour market opportunities), the 
graduates of the technikum are separated from the group of high school graduates i.e. belong 
to Group (3). Note also that the is technikum is an upper secondary institution which, in 
opposition to the four other tracks of upper secondary institutions in Hungary, is of five years 
in duration.
25
  
 
Although the technikum is classified at the upper secondary level (ISCED-97 level 3), it is an 
institution which can be compared to the Fachschule
26
 as graduation from the technikum 
grants a technician’s certificate; a vocational qualification which is more valuable on the 
                                                 
24
 Hence the name “Higher level vocational degree” rather than “Higher level vocational degree and no high 
school degree” for Group (3) for Hungary. 
25
 With the exception of the bilingual general secondary schools and some vocational secondary schools which 
also last 5 years.  
26
 In Hungary, ISCED-97 level 4 institutions for post-secondary vocational training have only been introduced in 
1998 (i.e. the 2000 sample does not contain graduates from such vocational institutions).  
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labour market than that obtained at the other secondary vocational institutions. Moreover, the 
academic level the technikum is superior to the szakiskola and szakmunmásképző (the 
institutions belonging to Group (2)).  
 
(4) High school degree and no tertiary degree: The general idea behind this educational 
category is to combine all those who could potentially pursue their studies at the tertiary level, 
but do not possess a degree at the tertiary level. 
 
For Germany, Group (4) is the most heterogeneous one. First, it merges those who (a) have a 
Fachhochschulreife, hence can only enter the Fachhoschschule (approximately 42 percent), 
and (b) those who have an Abitur, which allows them to enter any tertiary institution 
(approximately 58 percent). Second, this group merges those with and without formal 
vocational training. The aggregation is due to the insufficient number of high school 
graduates (without tertiary degree) for a more differentiated analysis.
 
The heterogeneity is 
mitigated by the fact that the majority of the individuals belonging to Group (4) do posses a 
vocational degree, i.e. approximately 86 percent of the individuals in Group (4) posses some 
kind of a vocational degree in the 2000 sample.  
 
For Hungary, the graduates of (a) the szakközépiskola and (b) of the gimnázium have been 
merged. The aggregation is motivated by the fact that (unlike for the graduates of the 
technikum, who have been separated from Group (4)) the value of completing the 
szakközépiskola and the gimnázium in 2000 are roughly the same, which in turn implies that 
the aggregation of the two groups does not pose a qualitative problem for Hungary for the 
selected year.
27
 Furthermore, the aggregation is in line with the aggregation of the various 
degrees in Group (4) for Germany, hence Group (4) is suitable for cross-country comparison. 
 
It is important to note that there is a fundamental difference between the two countries as far 
as the subgroup “high school degree and vocational qualification” of Group (4) is concerned.  
On the one hand, in Germany, Fachhochschulreife and Abitur holders with a vocational 
qualification (Lehre etc.) are “educated” for over 12 and 13 years respectively. In Hungary, on 
the other hand, those with a “high school degree and vocational qualification”, namely, the 
graduates of the szakközépiskola, do not have further “on-the-job vocational training”, and 
subsequently only undertake a maximum of 13 years of schooling. Despite this difference in 
                                                 
27
 That is, the estimated return for the full sample differs by approximately 1 – 2 percentage points between the 
two groups at all of the estimated quantiles and at the mean. 
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the content and duration of vocational education, this subgroup remains comparable across the 
two countries in the sense that the individuals possess both a academic and an vocational 
qualification i.e. have similar labour market opportunities in both countries.  
 
(5) College degree: The idea behind this educational group is to cover all those individuals 
who have a tertiary qualification which is (a) more applied in curriculum and (b) is shorter in 
duration than university education. 
 
In Germany, Fachhochschule belongs to Group (5).
28
  
 
In Hungary,  főskola belongs to Group (5). 
 
(6) University degree: This educational category merges all university graduates. That is, 
there is no distinction across the first (ISCED-97 level 5) and second stages of university 
education (ISCED-97 level 6), due to the fact that there is no differentiated reporting at the 
university level in neither datasets.  
 
In Germany, Universität and Technische Hochschule  belong to Group (6). 
 
In Hungary, egyetem belongs to Group (6). 
 
Note that whereas the six educational categories for Germany represent a ranking in terms of 
the level of education, this is not (always) true for Hungary where Group (3) is (potentially) of 
a higher level than Group (4). Note also that whereas Groups (1), (2), (5) and (6) are well 
suited for comparison across the two countries, Groups (3) and (4) are (somewhat) less suited 
for a cross-country comparison, due to the cross-country differences in the nature and 
duration of vocational training. Hence, the comparison of the estimated returns to the latter 
two groups across the two countries must be interpreted in light of these differences. 
                                                 
28
 Note that although the equivalent of the Fachhochschule is University of applied sciences (see Secretariat of 
the Standing of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(2006)), the term “college” for Group (5) was chosen for simplicity of the comparative analysis / discussion.  
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1.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
1.4.1 Data for Germany 
The data for Germany is drawn from the “German Socio-Economic Panel” (GSOEP), a 
micro-dataset, which was started in 1984 and since then data collection is carried out on an 
annual basis.
29
 In 1984 around 12,000 individuals, aged over 16, who were either “West 
German Residents” (Sample A) or “Foreigners in West Germany” (Sample B) were 
interviewed. The GSOEP was extended to cover “German Residents in the GDR” (Sample C), 
and “Immigrants” (Sample D) in 1990 and in 1994 respectively. In 1998 a “Refreshment” 
sample (Sample E) and in 2000 an “Innovation” sample (Sample F) were added. Data is 
collected on a large number of socio-economic variables, covering eight main areas, including 
variables representing income, demography, educational attainment, level and sector of 
employment. 
 
As far as educational attainment is concerned, information in the GSOEP is organised in three 
main (generated) categories, namely, secondary school degree, vocational degree and tertiary 
degree. The education level of foreigners and those who obtained their degree in East 
Germany prior to 1991 is integrated into these three main categories as well as reported 
separately. The subdivisions within these three categories are differentiated enough to 
construct variables for the highest degree attained, and to develop a system for comparison 
across the two countries. 
 
In order to assure a sufficient number of observations Samples A through F are used in the 
empirical analysis. Subsequently, the analysis must start in 2000, which marks the first year 
when all of the six samples were available. Starting the analysis in 2000 has a further 
advantage: in 2000, instead of updating previous educational information, an explicit 
educational survey of all respondents was carried out, regardless of whether something has 
changed in the past years. Subsequently, this newly surveyed educational information is used 
in the empirical analysis. Only those individuals with a West German educational background 
are selected for the empirical analysis. This selection assures that the returns to the degrees of 
the Hungarian and West German education systems are compared – which is the aim of the 
study. An alternative to using all six samples would be to use Sample A only, since the 
(majority of the) individuals in Sample A have completed their education in West Germany. 
                                                 
29
 Haicksen-DeNew and Frick (Eds.) (2002) provide an extensive description of the GSOEP.  
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This alternative however has the disadvantage that after the working sample has been 
selected, the number of observations in Sample A is small.
30
 Furthermore, excluding the 
individuals who have (a) completed schooling in West Germany but (b) come from a 
household where the household head is not West German would mean losing relevant 
information in terms of estimating the returns to degrees of the West German education 
system.  
 
The samples are restricted to cover full-time employees (i.e. wage and salary earners, 
excluding the self-employed) of both genders who were (a) full-time employed for 12 months 
and (b) had a non-zero monthly wage for each month of the given year. In all specifications 
and for both countries, the logarithm of monthly gross earnings is used as the dependent 
variable, defined as monthly gross wages plus one twelfth of the sum of all bonuses paid over 
the year.
31
 The logarithm of monthly gross earnings is used as the income measure, rather 
than the logarithm of hourly gross wages, because the only income variable available for 
Hungary is monthly gross earnings.
32
 The choice of income measure subsequently implies 
that throughout the paper (monthly) earnings differentials rather than (hourly) wage 
differentials are estimated. The sample is restricted to consist of individuals aged 25 – 55 
years.
33
  
 
In addition to the standard explanatory variables i.e. (1) schooling, measured as the highest 
degree attained (the six schooling categories are described in detail in Section 1.3.3), (2) 
potential labour market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus six)
34
 
and (3) its square, and (4) gender, a dummy variable indicating the sector of employment, that 
is, “public vs. private” is included (as the level of earnings differs across the sectors of 
employment in both countries). An additional specification is fitted which is augmented with 
                                                 
30
 There are 1,520 individuals in Sample A who satisfy the selection criteria in 2000. 
31
 Bonuses reported explicitly in the GSOEP include “13th month salary”, “14th month salary”, “additional 
Christmas bonus”, “vacation bonus”, “profit-sharing bonuses” and “other bonuses”. 
32
 In the Hungarian dataset, monthly gross wages and the amount / type of bonus paid is not reported separately. 
Furthermore, (actual) hours worked are not reported either, therefore, the hourly wage cannot be calculated. 
33
 Note that the analysis is restricted to those aged at least 25 in both countries instead of 24 and 23 / 24 which 
marks the official end of the first stage of tertiary education in Germany and in Hungary respectively. This is due 
to the fact that (a) there is individual variation in school starting age (e.g. six or seven years old), (b) some fields 
of study (e.g. law and medicine) require longer to complete, (c) coupled with the fact that a fraction of university 
graduates take longer to complete their studies than set out officially. 
34
 Note that although one of the advantages of the GSOEP is that actual labour market experience can be 
calculated using the Biography Spell Data, potential labour market experience is used in this study as a proxy for 
the informal component of human capital in order to assure comparability to the Hungarian specifications, for 
which only potential labour market experience can be calculated (as actual years of schooling is not available in 
the Hungarian dataset). 
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interaction terms between the explanatory variables and gender. Table 1.2 provides summary 
statistics for the full sample under analysis. 
 
For completeness, the returns to three broad fields of university education are estimated. For 
this analysis the (occupational) group of “Professionals” is used because the field of study can 
only be inferred for this occupational group using occupational information (the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88)) provided in the GSOEP.
35
 The three 
categories are more general than the ISCED “Broad fields of university education” due to the 
small number of university graduates in the sample, and are as follows: (1) Education, (2) 
Social sciences, Humanities and Arts (3) Natural sciences. Section 1.8.5 of the Appendix 
describes the generation of the three categories for university education and Table 1.3 
provides summary statistics for the sample of university graduates who belong to the 
(occupational) group of “Professionals” and are used in the analysis. 
1.4.2 Data for Hungary 
The data for Hungary is drawn from the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey”, 
a cross-section dataset, first carried out in May 1986. Until 1992 data was collected every 
three years and from 1992 and 1994 onwards on a yearly basis in the private and public 
sectors of employment respectively. In the private sector, data collection covers firms 
employing at least 20 employees, which provide information on a 10 percent random sample 
of their full-time employees. In the public sector, all institutions independent of size, provide 
information on their full-time employees.
36
 One of the drawbacks of the lack of self-reporting 
specific to this analysis is that actual years of schooling and actual years of labour market 
experience are not available.  
 
The Wage Survey has the advantage of having a large number of observations, ranging from 
130,000 to 220,000, depending on the cross-section. Data is collected (in the month of May) 
on monthly gross earnings, defined as monthly gross wage plus one twelfth of the sum of all 
other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous 
                                                 
35
 Self-reported fields of study would be preferable for the analysis to eliminate potential measurement error due 
to imputation. Due to the lack of such information, the use of the subgroup of university graduates who belong to 
the occupational group of “Professionals” for both the German and Hungarian samples, for whom the fields of 
study can be computed with a fair amount of precision, is considered the next best alternative. 
36
 From 1995 and 2001 onwards, a 20 percent random sample of companies employing at least 10 and at least 5 
employees respectively are included in the Wage Survey, which provide information on all of their full-time 
employees.  
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year, gender, age, educational attainment, occupation, firm size, location, ownership structure, 
sector of employment and industry classification. As for Germany, the analysis is restricted to 
full-time employees, of both genders, who are aged 25 – 55 years, given the evidence that the 
participation rate is the highest among the prime age workers.
37
 
 
As for Germany, the dependent variable of the earnings equation is the logarithm of monthly 
gross earnings, which is explained by variables representing (1) schooling, measured as the 
highest degree attained (the six schooling categories are described in detail in Section 1.3.3), 
(2) potential labour market experience (measured in years) and (3) its square, (4) gender and 
(5) sector (public vs. private). An additional specification is estimated which is augmented 
with interaction terms between gender and the other explanatory variables of the earnings 
equation. Table 1.4 provides summary statistics for the full sample under analysis.  
 
The large number of observations in 2000 has the advantage that the returns to the specific 
fields of study at university can be estimated in order to give a more comprehensive picture of 
the returns to university education. This amounts to replacing the schooling dummies with 
eight field of study dummies (i.e. the dependent variable and the other explanatory variables 
remain identical). As for Germany, for this specification the (occupational) group of 
“Professionals” is used from all occupational groups because (a) the field of study can only be 
inferred for this occupational group (using the Foglaglkozások Egységes Osztályozasi 
Rendszere (FEOR-93) classification
38) and (b) the group of “Professionals” contains over half 
of the university graduates in the 2000 sample (see Table 1.16). The eight categories, based 
on the ISCED “Broad fields of university education”, are as follows: (1) Training for 
secondary school teachers, (2) Training for primary school and other teachers, (3) Social 
sciences, Humanities and Arts, (4) Economics, Business and Law, (5) Science, Mathematics 
and Computing, (6) Engineering, (7) Medicine and Veterinary Medicine and (8) Other 
professionals. Section 1.8.6 of the Appendix provides detail on how the eight categories for 
university education have been generated, and Table 1.5 provides summary statistics for the 
sample of university graduates who belong to the (occupational) group of “Professionals” and 
are used in the analysis. 
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 For evidence see Laky (2002) in Fazekas and Koltay (Eds.). 
38
 FEOR-93 is the system for the classification of occupations in Hungary since 1993 (four digit codes for 632 
occupations) and is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) to assure 
international comparability. 
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1.4.3 Cross-country comparison 
As expected, the (sample) mean of monthly gross earnings is substantially higher in Germany 
than in Hungary in 2000. The German and Hungarian samples are similar in terms of (a) age 
composition (the mean age is around 40 years and 41 years in Germany and Hungary 
respectively), (b) years of potential labour market experience and (c) distribution across sector 
of employment. However, the gender composition of the sample of full-employees differs 
across the two countries. Whereas the Hungarian sample of full-time employees (who satisfy 
the selection criteria) consists of slightly more females than males, there are only 
approximately 31 percent female employees (who satisfy the selection criteria) in the German 
sample. This difference in gender composition across the two countries can partially be 
attributed to the differences in the proportion of part-timers within the group of employed 
women. That is, whereas in Hungary the fraction of part-timers within the group of employed 
women is not significant, in Germany female part-time employment has grown in the past two 
decades.
39
 According to OECD figures for Hungary, female employment rate (women aged 
15 – 64 years) was around 50 percent, and the share of part-timers within the group of 
employed women was merely around 5 percent in 2000. The respective figures for Germany 
were approximately 59 percent and approximately 34 percent. Note also that the share of part-
timers within the group of employed women in Germany is not only high in comparison to 
Hungary but also in an international comparison – the share of part-time employment as a 
proportion of female employment in the OECD was around 21 percent in 2000
40
. 
 
Since the returns to human capital is the center of interest of this analysis, the distribution of 
educational attainment in the two countries merits comment.  First, it must be noted that the 
distribution of educational attainment in the 2000 samples is representative for both countries. 
Namely, in Germany, the most common school degree is the Hauptschulabschluss (39 
percent), followed by the Realschulabschluss (28 percent), the Abitur (23 percent) and, 
finally, the Fachhochschulreife (9 percent). Furthermore, around 49 percent of the individuals 
completed the Lehre, and around 22 percent of the individuals possess a tertiary degree. In 
Hungary, approximately 28 percent of the individuals have completed the apprentice school, 
about 31 percent posses a high school degree as the highest qualification and approximately 
19 percent of the individuals have completed tertiary education. In both countries, the number 
of individuals without any kind of schooling degree is small, around 1 percent.  
                                                 
39
 For evidence see Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2004). 
40
 See OECD Employment Outlook (2004) p. 296 and p. 310. 
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Moreover, a number of differences across the two countries in terms of the allocation across 
the six generated education groups merit comment. First of all, in Hungary, although 
decreasing, there is still a large number of individuals with only a primary school degree in 
the labour market in 2000.
41
 Subsequently, it is not surprising that approximately 20 percent 
of the individuals belong to Group (1), which is twice as much as in Germany. Second of all, 
whereas in Germany about half of the individuals belong to Group (2), in Hungary, only 
around 30 percent of the individuals posses a lower level vocational degree – which reflects 
the importance / strength of the vocational education in the German education system as 
opposed to the Hungarian education system.
42
 On the other hand, the fraction of individuals 
who posses a high school degree (and no tertiary degree) is substantially higher in Hungary 
than in Germany – approximately 31 percent in Hungary as opposed to 12 percent in 
Germany. Finally, although increasing during the 1990s, the rate of enrolment in university 
education in Hungary is still below the OECD level
43
, which is reflected by the composition 
of Groups (5) and (6). That is, whereas in Germany approximately 9 percent and 13 percent of 
the individuals belong to Groups (5) and (6) respectively, in Hungary the respective figures 
are approximately 13 percent and 6 percent.  
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Results for Germany 
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present the parameter estimates for the quantile regressions for five 
quantiles without and with interaction terms respectively. The OLS estimates are also 
provided in order to allow for the comparison with the mean effects.  
 
The OLS estimates in Table 1.6 reveal some interesting aspects of the between-educational-
levels earnings differentials. As expected, there is an earnings premium associated with the 
additional degree levels. The second result worth noting is that a higher level vocational 
degree (Group (3)) is worth more than a lower level vocational degree (Group (2)) in the 
labour market, i.e. the incremental (mean) return to having a higher level vocational degree 
rather than a lower level vocational degree is approximately 19 percent.  
                                                 
41
 Note that transition brought with itself a decrease in demand for unskilled labour, and hence major changes in 
the composition of the workforce by qualification, namely, a reduction and an increase in the fraction of primary 
school graduates and college / university graduates respectively. For evidence see Labour Force Survey 1992 – 
2001: Time Series (2002), p. 39. 
42
 For an extensive discussion of the strength of vocational training in Germany see for example Kloss (1995) in 
Phillips, pp. 161 – 171. 
43
 For evidence see Lannert (2001), pp. 21 – 23.  
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The parameter estimates of the selected quantiles shed light on the within-educational-levels 
earnings differentials in addition to the between-educational-levels differentials. First, the 
importance of differentiating between lower and higher level vocational training is supported 
by the fact that at all quantiles the return to higher level vocational training (Group (3)) is 
higher that that to lower level vocational training (Group (2)). However, it is interesting that a 
higher level vocational training is valued more at the lower quantiles than at the higher 
quantiles, i.e. the additional return to possessing a higher level vocational degree rather than a 
lower level vocational degree is 24, 19 and 16 percent at the 10
th
 quanitle, at the median and 
at the 90
th
 quantile respectively. Second, the estimated premium to a high school degree 
(relative to a higher vocational degree) is increasing across the earnings distribution (note also 
that at the 10
th
 quantile a higher level vocational degree is valued (slightly) more than a high 
school degree). The latter two findings suggest that at the lower quantiles vocational skills are 
valued more than academic skills, and the opposite is true at the upper quantiles. Moreover, in 
addition to high school education, the relative return to tertiary education, both college and 
university, is increasing across the distribution. Note also that a university degree (Group (6)) 
entails a higher monetary payoff than a college degree (Group (5)) at all estimated quantiles. 
Finally, as expected, the within-dispersion increases with the increasing levels of education, 
with the exception of higher level vocational training. 
 
The effect of the other explanatory variables, namely, potential labour market experience, 
gender and sector, is not uniform across the quantiles. First, (a) as expected, at the mean and 
at all estimated quantiles, the experience profile is concave i.e. rapid initial earnings growth, 
which declines over the individual’s career44 (see Figure 1.3), (b) the return to the first year of 
potential labour market experience increases across the quantiles, (c) earnings growth declines 
more rapidly at the top of the distribution and (d) overall earnings growth is higher at the top 
of the distribution. Second, the coefficient estimate for the female-male earnings gap is 
approximately - 0.28, - 0.20 and - 0.15 at the 10
th
 quantile, at the median and at the 90
th
 
quantile respectively, which indicates that earnings of female full-time employees are around 
28, 20 and 15 percent lower than the earnings of their male counterparts at the respective 
quantiles – that is, the gender earnings gap in favour of males narrows over the earnings 
distribution. Finally, the public sector earnings premium decreases across the quantiles. That 
is, the earnings gap in favour of the public sector is only positive at the 10
th
 quantile 
(approximately 5 percent), and becomes negative at the 25
th
 quantile i.e. the private sector 
                                                 
44
 Note that the cross-section experience profiles reflect a combination of age, experience and cohort effects 
(Heckman and Robb (1985)). 
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earnings premium amounts to approximately 6 percent at the median and increases to 
approximately 18 percent at the top decile.  
 
Table 1.7 reports the regression results with the gender interaction terms. A few points are 
worth noting about this specification. First, the OLS estimates reveal that the (mean) returns 
to education for males are lower at all education levels other than to college education than 
for females (which is in line with the findings of Krueger and Pischke (1995)). The results of 
the quantile regressions provide a more informative picture of the differences in returns to 
education across the genders and suggest the following: (a) whereas for males the return to 
high school and tertiary education increases across the quantiles (and no such pattern can be 
observed for vocational education), no such pattern is observed for females at any educational 
level and (b) whereas for males the within-dispersion increases with the level of education 
(i.e. the within-dispersion is largest at the university level), no such pattern is observed for 
females. In addition, it is important to note that (a) for both males and females an earnings 
premium exists to possessing a higher level vocational degree relative to possessing a lower 
level vocational degree and (b) this incremental return is higher for females than for males at 
all quantiles (other than at the top decile where the incremental return is of the same 
magnitude). Finally, the return of possessing a university degree is higher than that to 
possessing a college degree at all quantiles for both males (other than at the bottom decile) 
and females. The latter results give (continuous) support to the importance of subdividing the 
large group of individuals with a “vocational qualification and no high school degree” and the 
group of tertiary graduates when the center of analysis is the returns to education.  
 
Turning to the informal component of human capital, the experience profiles for both males 
and females are concave (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). The quantile regression results for males 
reveal that (a) the return to the first year of potential labour market experience increases 
across the quantiles, (b) earnings growth declines more rapidly at the top of the distribution 
and (c) overall earnings growth is higher at the top of the distribution. At the mean and all 
estimated quantiles the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between gender and the 
linear term for potential labour market experience is negative and the coefficient estimate of 
the interaction term between gender and squared term for potential labour market experience 
is positive (other than the 10
th
 quantile), which suggests that (a) the return to the first year of 
potential labour market experience is higher for males than for females and (b) earnings 
growth diminishes faster for males than for females (other than at the 10
th
 quantile) indicating 
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that the difference in earnings growth declines at higher years of experience (other than at the 
10
th
 quantile). Note also that visual inspection of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 suggests that overall 
earnings growth is higher for males than for females at the mean and at all estimated 
quantiles. Finally, the public-private sector earnings gap differs across the two genders. 
Namely, whereas the earnings of full-time public sector male employees are lower than that of 
their private sector counterparts (other than at the 10
th
 quantile), for females this is only 
applicable at the top of the distribution (at the 75
th
 and 90
th
 quantiles). However, for both 
males and females, the private sector earnings premium increases (from the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
quantiles respectively) across the distribution, reaching around 18 and 16 percent at the 90
th
 
quantile for males and females respectively. (Note that the quantile regression results contrast 
sharply with the OLS estimate of approximately 7 and 2 percent earnings gap in favour of the 
private sector for males and females respectively.) 
 
Table 1.8 presents the regression results for the subgroup of university graduates who belong 
to the occupational group of “Professionals”. Note that this specification is not augmented 
with gender interaction terms due to the small number of university graduates, especially 
females who have studied “Natural sciences” (for detail see Table 1.3). Note also that the 
three groups are heterogeneous in terms of both earnings prospects and educational 
background (in particular “Social sciences, Humanities and Arts” (Group 2)), and 
subsequently the coefficient estimates only provide a vague indication of the returns to 
university education for the selected sample. In summary, as expected, (a) the return to 
“Natural sciences” (relative to the other two groups) is the highest at all estimated quantiles 
(other than at the top decile) and (b) the return to both fields (relative to “Education”) 
increases across the estimated quantiles. It is also worth noting that the earnings of the public 
sector full-time employed “professionals” are lower than that of their private sector 
counterparts at all estimated quantiles. 
1.5.2 Results for Hungary 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 present the parameter estimates for the OLS estimation and the quantile 
regressions for five quantiles without and with interaction terms respectively.  
 
The parameter estimates in Table 1.9 reveal some noteworthy features about the between- and 
within-educational-levels earnings differentials. First, it must be noted that, as expected, 
university education is valued the most in the labour market, followed by college education, 
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technical school education, high school education, lower level vocational training and primary 
school or less at the mean and at all estimated quantiles.
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 Note also that the increasing 
educational levels, as expected, entail a larger within-dispersion (except for a high school 
degree, which has a larger within-dispersion than a college degree, which is in part attributed 
to the fact that the group of high school graduates includes individuals with and without 
vocational qualification). What is striking is the large within-dispersion at the university level. 
Namely, at the bottom decile the premium to a university degree (relative to “no vocational 
and no high school degree”) is around 89 percent, it increases across the quanitles and at the 
top decile the relative return to university reaches 164 percent, which (a) supports further the 
standard finding that aggregate earnings inequality arises from differences between as well as 
within educational groups, and (b) is the first motivation for analysing the group of university 
graduates in more detail.  
 
As far as the coefficient estimates of the other explanatory variables are concerned, the 
experience profiles are concave at the mean and at all the estimated quantiles (other than at 
the 90
th
 quantile) i.e. earnings increase at a decreasing rate, and there is no evidence that 
earnings growth is higher at higher quantiles (see Figure 1.6). Furthermore, not surprisingly, 
the coefficient estimates for the female-male earnings gap indicate that the earnings of 
females are lower than that of males at all estimated quantiles, and the earnings premium for 
male full-time employees increases from approximately 3 percent at the 10
th
 quantile to 
approximately 21 percent at the 90
th
 quantile. Finally, note that the earnings of the public 
sector full-time employees are lower than that of their private sector counterparts (other than 
at the 10
th
 quantile where the positive earnings premium of around 24 percent is in favour of 
the public sector), and this private sector earnings premium increases from around 3 percent at 
the 25
th
 quantile to around 49 percent at the top decile.  
 
The estimation results of the specification with the gender interaction terms (see Table 1.10) 
imply that (a) for both genders, university education is valued the most, followed by college, 
technical school, high school, lower level vocational and primary school education or less at 
the mean and at all estimated quantiles, (b) the estimated returns to the educational categories 
increase across the quantiles for both genders, (c) the within-educational-levels earnings 
differentials are smaller for females than for males at all educational categories and (d) as 
                                                 
45
 Note that, in Hungary, the relative return to a szakiskola degree is lower than that to a szakmunkásképző 
degree, so the aggregate return to Group (2) is an overestimate of the former and an underestimate of the latter 
type of vocational qualification. 
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expected, the within-educational-levels earnings differentials are the largest for university 
education for both genders, which in turn dictates a closer look at the university graduates. 
Accordingly, the estimated (relative) returns to the seven fields of study for the specifications 
without and with interaction terms for the group of “Professionals” are tabulated in Tables 
1.11 and 1.12 respectively. Before commenting on the results, it is important to look at the 
gender composition of the different fields (see Table 1.5). As expected, there are over twice as 
many females as males in the teaching profession (approximately 39 percent vs. 17 percent), 
and approximately trice as many males as females who have studied “Science, Mathematics 
and Computing” and  “Engineering” (approximately 12 percent vs. 4 percent and 25 percent 
vs. 8 percent for the respective fields of study).  For the other fields of study, the proportion of 
males and females is approximately equal. Note that “Medicine and Veterinary Medicine” is 
selected as the reference category among the eight field of study groups due to (a) the large 
number of cases (i.e. the fraction of individuals belonging to “Medicine and Veterinary 
Medicine” is approximately 18 percent of the overall sample of professionals) and (b) the 
approximately equal fraction of males and females in this category (i.e. approximately 17 and 
19 percent of all male and female professionals have studied “Medicine and Veterinary 
Medicine”).  
 
Because the results of the regression with the gender interaction terms (see Table 1.12) are 
more informative, they will be the center of analysis in this (sub)section. However, it must be 
noted that the between-field-of-study differentials are apparent from the specification without 
interaction terms (see Table 1.11). Not surprisingly, on average, relative to “Medicine and 
Veterinary Medicine” the group of “Economics, Business and Law” professionals enjoy the 
highest return, followed by “Other professionals” (who are mostly composed of 
administrative professionals, see Table 1.15), “Science, Mathematics and Computing” and 
“Engineering”. Those who have studied “Training for secondary school teachers”, “Training 
for primary school and other teachers” and “Social sciences, Humanities and Arts” reap 
negative returns relative to the omitted category (in increasing order). Therefore, one may 
conclude that, in addition to the group of university graduates who enjoy executive positions 
(i.e. the group “Legislators, senior officials and managers”) and are not a part of this analysis, 
the high return to university education is driven by the high (relative) return to the fields of 
“Economics, Business and Law” and fields requiring technical skills such as “Science, 
Mathematics and Computing” and “Engineering”. Finally, the estimation results of this 
specification and the gender composition of the group of Professionals (see Table 1.5) imply 
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that the (average) earnings advantage of males at the university level (see Table 1.10) can be 
in part explained by the fact that most (approximately 63 percent) of the female professionals 
work in occupations which require the completion of lower-paying fields of study, i.e. 
“Training for secondary school teachers”, “Training for primary school and other teachers”, 
“Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts” and “Medicine and Veterinary Medicine” (in 
opposition to men for whom the corresponding figure is only around 37 percent).   
 
The OLS estimates of the specification with the gender interaction terms (see Table 1.12) 
reveal that (a) the pattern of estimated (mean) relative returns to the fields of study is 
(qualitatively) identical for the two genders (i.e. same as described in the paragraph above), 
(b) (mean) relative return to the teaching profession and “Social Sciences, Humanities and 
Arts” is higher for females than for males and (c) the (mean) relative return to “Economics, 
Business and Law”, “Science, Mathematics and Computing”, “Engineering” and “Other 
professionals” is higher for males than for females, implying that (d) between-fields-of-study 
earnings dispersion is, on average, smaller for females than for males.  
 
The quanitle regressions augment the OLS estimates in the following respects: (a) the 
between-fields-of-study earnings dispersion is smaller for females than for males at all 
quantiles other than at the 25
th
 quanitle, (b) it increases across the quantiles for both genders 
and (c) whereas for males the high-paying fields i.e. “Other professionals”, “Science, 
Mathematics and Computing” and “Economics, Business and Law” experience the highest 
within-dispersion, for females the low-paying fields i.e. “Training for secondary school 
teachers” and “Training for primary school and other teachers” experience the highest within-
dispersion. For instance, the OLS estimate of the return to “Economics, Business and Law” 
relative to “Medicine and Veterinary Medicine” is similar across the two genders, namely, 
approximately 57 and 52 percent for males and females respectively. However, whereas the 
mean earnings premium to “Economics, Business and Law” is a (relatively) good indicator 
for females, it is by no means a good indicator for males. That is, for males the earnings 
premium for “Economics, Business and Law” amounts to around 18, 54 and 110 percent at 
the bottom decile, at the median and at the top decile respectively. Subsequently, the higher 
within-dispersion for the group of male university graduates (relative to females) (see table 
1.10), can be in part attributed to the higher (level and dispersion of) the earnings premium for 
the high-paying fields of study for male professionals (who make up around 63 percent of the 
group of male professionals).  
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1.5.3 Cross-country comparison 
From the previous two sections various differences across the two countries in terms of the 
return to human capital become apparent. First, in terms of between-educational-levels 
earnings differentials the OLS estimates imply that, on average, relative to having “No high 
school degree and no vocational degree” (a) lower level vocational education enjoys a slightly 
higher additional return in Germany than in Hungary, namely, around 17 and 12 percent 
respectively, (b) “Higher vocational training” is valued more in Hungary than in Germany, (c) 
the return to “High school degree and no tertiary degree” is very similar in the two countries, 
namely, approximately 41 and 43 percent in Germany and Hungary respectively, (d) the 
return to college education is around 20 percentage points higher in Hungary than in Germany 
and (e) and return to university education is around 57 percentage points higher in Hungary 
than in Germany. The fact that the individuals who have completed “Higher vocational 
degree” enjoy a higher (relative) return in Hungary than in Germany is not surprising as the 
composition of academic skills (not only vocational skills) varies across the countries. That is, 
whereas in Hungary the individuals belonging to the group with “Higher vocational degree” 
possess a high school degree, in Germany they do not. The high relative return to tertiary 
education in Hungary is in fact characteristic for the 1990s (see, for example, Köllő (2002)), 
and is in part due to the increased demand for highly skilled labour.  
 
Furthermore, a few points are worth noting in terms of the within-educational-levels earnings 
differentials: (a) in Hungary, the returns to all educational categories are increasing across the 
quantiles for both genders (as opposed to Germany, where an increase across quantiles is only 
observed for males with high school or tertiary degrees), (b) as expected, the within-
educational-levels earnings dispersion is substantially lower for a vocational degree than for a 
university degree for both genders in Hungary and for males in Germany and (c) the within-
educational-level earnings dispersion is larger in Hungary than in Germany at all educational 
levels. Thus, Hungary is no exception (see Pereira and Martins (2000)) to the fact that 
aggregate earnings inequality is attributed to both between and within-educational-levels 
earnings differentials. It is important to add that the quantile regression estimates of the 
specification using the subsample of professionals within the sample of university graduates 
reveal an expected similarity across the two countries in terms of university education, 
namely, the high valuation of technical skills (i.e. high relative returns to “Natural sciences” 
in Germany and to “Science, Mathematics and Computing” and “Engineering” in Hungary.)  
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Although the center of the empirical analysis is the comprehensive comparison of the returns 
to education in the two countries, a few points about the remaining explanatory variables 
merit comment. In terms of the informal component of human capital, it is worth noting that 
the pattern of higher earnings growth at the top of the distribution characterizes the pooled 
sample, the female sample and male sample in Germany only (see figures 1.3 – 1.8). Second, 
in both countries, the earnings of female full-time employees are lower than that of their male 
counterparts, on average, by approximately 23 and 15 percent in Germany and Hungary 
respectively. However, whereas in Germany the earnings disadvantage of women declines 
across the estimated quantiles, the opposite is true in Hungary – the estimated earnings 
premium for males at the bottom and top deciles amounts to approximately 28 and 15 percent 
in Germany and to around 4 and 21 percent Hungary. It is important to note, that in both 
countries the estimated earnings gap in favour of men could be in part attributed to the 
differences in working hours between the men and women. That is to say, although only full-
time employees are selected for the empirical analysis, it is possible that male full-time 
employees work longer hours, especially in the private sector of employment, than their 
female counterparts, which (in part) generates their estimated “earnings advantage”. 
Subsequently, hourly wage as an income measure would be an asset in estimating the “wage 
disadvantage” of females.46 Furthermore, in both countries, on average, the earnings of full-
time public sector employees is lower than the earnings of their private sector counterparts – 
by approximately 5 and 21 percent in Germany and Hungary respectively. The earnings 
disadvantage of public sector employees is in fact characteristic of the entire distribution 
(other than at the 10
th
 quantile) in both countries, and it increases in magnitude in both 
countries – the earnings gap in favour of the private sector reaches around 18 percent and as 
high as 48 percent at the 90
th
 quantile in Germany and Hungary respectively. Finally, the 
following similarities across the two counties merit comment: (a) females experience lower 
returns to tertiary education than males at the top of the earnings distribution, (b) the within-
educational-levels earnings differentials are smaller at the tertiary level for females than for 
males and (c) the estimated private sector earnings premium is smaller for females than for 
males at all estimated quantiles.  
1.6 Conclusion  
In this study standard Mincer earnings equations were estimated using both OLS and quantile 
regression in order to give a comprehensive picture of the returns to education in Germany 
                                                 
46
 I would like to thank PD Dr. Pfeiffer for pointing this out.  
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and Hungary for the year 2000. To make the cross-country comparison of the returns to 
education informative, six differentiated categories for formal education, rather than years of 
education, were generated and used in the empirical analysis. 
 
In summary, the regression results document several differences between the returns to formal 
education in Germany and Hungary. Namely, (a) whereas the (relative) returns to lower 
vocational training and high school education are similar in the two countries across the 
estimated quantiles, (b) the (relative) return to tertiary education is substantially higher in 
Hungary than in Germany, especially at the top quantiles and (c) the returns to all educational 
categories are increasing in Hungary across the estimated quantiles, for both genders, as 
opposed to Germany, where an increase across qunatiles is only observed for males with high 
school and tertiary degrees. It is important to note that the quantile regression estimates for 
Germany augment those of Pereira and Martins (2000) who find evidence (using the GSOEP 
for the period of 1984 – 1995 and years of schooling as a proxy for the formal component of 
human capital) for a negative relationship between the returns to education and the earnings 
distribution. The (substantially) higher returns to university education in Hungary can be in 
part attributed to the fact that, although the composition of the workforce has changed by 
qualification over the past decade, the demand for qualified labour was still larger than its 
supply for the year under analysis. Note also that such high relative returns to tertiary degrees, 
despite the increase in the number of individuals holding tertiary degrees, has also been 
observed for Portugal (see Machado and Mata (2000)), and is in line with the literature for 
Hungary (see, for example, Köllő (2002)) and for other Central and Eastern European 
countries (see, for example, Orazem and Vodopvec (1997)). It is also important to note that 
(a) the within-dispersion is substantially larger at the university level than at the lower 
vocational level for both genders in Hungary and for males in Germany and (b) the within-
educational-levels earnings dispersion is larger in Hungary than in Germany at all educational 
levels and is especially high at the tertiary level. Concerning tertiary education, two 
similarities across the two countries are worth pointing out: (a) females experience lower 
returns to tertiary education than males at the top of the earnings distribution and (b) the 
within-educational-levels earnings differentials are smaller at the tertiary level for females 
than for males.  
 
For Hungary, the additional specifications for the subgroup of professionals within the group 
of university graduates shed light on the valuation of the fields of study at university in 
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general and across the two genders, thereby offering some explanation for the high within-
dispersion at the tertiary level. Relative to medical professionals, the group of “Economics, 
Business and Law” professionals enjoy the highest return, followed by “Other professionals” 
(who are mostly composed of administrative professionals), “Science, Mathematics and 
Computing” and “Engineering”. Pre-tertiary level teachers and those who completed degrees 
in “Social sciences, Humanities and Arts” reap negative returns relative to medical 
professionals. This pattern of relative returns characterizes both the pooled sample of 
professionals as well as the separate samples of female and male professionals. Note that the 
low return to medicine and (pre-tertiary level) teaching is not surprising given that wages in 
medical and teaching professions were low (prior to and) in 2000 relative to the private sector 
jobs requiring the same level of education, and was one of the motivating factors behind the 
wage reforms between September 2002 and 2003, whereby there was a 50 percent average 
increase in public sector (nominal) wages, affecting the various groups of public sector 
employees in different magnitudes.
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 Furthermore, apart from the fact that more male than 
female university graduates belong to the occupational group of “Legislators, senior officials 
and managers” (for whom, on average, earnings are higher than for other university 
graduates), the lower average return to university education for females can be attributed to 
the fact that (a) the majority (around 63 percent) of female professionals work in occupations 
requiring low-paying fields of study and (b) female professionals reap lower returns to the 
high-paying fields than their male counterparts.  
 
A few points concerning the other variables of interest merit comment. First, in terms of 
potential labour market experience, the pattern of higher earnings growth at the top of the 
distribution characterizes the Germany samples under analysis only. Second, the estimated 
earnings premium for males relative to females declines and increases across the quantiles in 
Germany and Hungary respectively. Third, the earnings advantage of private sector full-time 
employees relative to their private sector counterparts is (a) larger at every estimated quantile 
in Hungary than in Germany and (b) is smaller in magnitude for females than for males at all 
estimated quantiles in both countries. Note that the large private-public sector earnings gap in 
Hungary, which characterised the transition period, generated the public sector wage increases 
in 2002. 
 
                                                 
47
 For detail on the wage increases for various groups in the public sector see Employment and Earnings 1998 – 
2003 (2005), pp. 127 – 132, Labour Report: January – December 2003 (2004), pp. 10 – 20 and  Közalkalmazotti 
Bértábla: Béremelés 2002 szeptember. 
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Overall, the estimates of the quantile regressions provide evidence for the fact that in 
Hungary, like in other EU countries (see Pereira and Martins (2000)), aggregate earnings 
inequality is attributed to both between- and within-educational-levels earnings differentials, 
and subsequently emphasize the relevance of using quantile regression when analysing the 
returns to education.  
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1.8 Appendix  
1.8.1 Education systems 
Figure 1.1 The German education system 
Age Institution ISCED-97 
classification 
27  Second stage of 
tertiary 
education 
  
ISCED-97  
Level 6 
Second stage 
of tertiary 
education 
26 
25 
24    ISCED-97 
Level 5  
First stage of 
tertiary 
education  
ISCED-97 
Level 4 
Post-
secondary 
non-tertiary 
23    
22   University 
Universiät /  
Technische 
Hochschule 
(ISCED 5) 
21    
20    School for 
higher level 
vocational 
education  
Fachschule 
(ISCED 4) 
University of 
applied sciences 
Fachhochschule 
(ISCED 5) 
19   
18   General 
secondary 
school – upper 
level 
Gymnasiale  
Oberstufe / 
Fachgymnasium 
ISCED-97 
Level 3 
Upper 
secondary 
level of 
education 
17 Apprenticeship 
with part-time 
vocational 
school 
Duales System 
– Berufsschule 
Full-time 
vocational 
school 
Berufsfachschule 
Upper secondary 
schools leading to 
Fachhochschule 
entrance 
qualification 
Fachoberschule / 
Berufsoberschule 
16 
15 Intermediate secondary school 
Realschule
1)
 
General 
secondary 
school – lower 
level 
Gymnasium
1)
 
ISCED-97 
Level 2  
Lower 
secondary 
level of 
education 
14 Lower 
secondary 
school 
Hauptschule
1) 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 Primary school 
Grundschule 
ISCED-97 
Level 1 
Primary 
level of 
education  
8 
7 
6 
5 Kindergarten 
Kindergarten 
ISCED-97 
Level 0 
Pre-primary 
level of 
education 
4 
3 
Sources: 1) OECD (1999) Classifying Educational Programmes – Manual for ISCED-97 
Implementation in OECD Countries.  2) Cortina et al. (Eds.) (2003).  
Adult education 
Abendgymnasium / 
Kolleg 
 57 
Note on Figure 1.1: 1) The comprehensive school, Gesamtschule, combines the Hauptschule, 
Realschule and Gymnasium, lasting 9 to 13 years, depending on the degree pursued.  
 
Figure 1.2 The Hungarian education system 
Age 
 
Institution ISCED-97 
classification 
27  
Second 
stage of 
tertiary 
education  
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26 
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First stage of 
tertiary 
education 
23    
22  
University 
Egyetem 
  
21 College 
20 Főiskola 
19 
18      
Technical 
school 
Technikum 
  ISCED-97 
Level 3 
Upper 
secondary 
level of 
education  
17 General 
secondary  
School 
Gimnázium 
 
 
Vocational  
secondary 
school 
Szakközépiskola 
16 Apprentice 
school 
Szakmunkásképző 
15 Vocational 
school 
Szakiskola 
14 
13          
Primary school –  upper level 
ISCED-97 
Level 2 
Lower 
secondary 
level of 
education  
12 
11 Àltalános iskola – feső tagozat 
10 
9  
Primary school – lower level 
Àltalános iskola – alsó tagozat 
ISCED-97 
Level 1 
Primary 
level of 
education 
8 
7 
6 
5  
Kindergarten 
Òvoda 
ISCED-97 
Level 0 
Pre-primary 
level of 
education 
4 
3 
Sources: 1) OECD (1999) Classifying Educational Programmes – Manual for ISCED-97 
Implementation in OECD Countries. 2) Lannert (Ed.) (2001). 
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Table 1.1 Six schooling categories for Germany and Hungary  
 Six schooling categories  
(1) No formal vocational degree and no high school degree 
Germany Ohne Abschluss verlassen / 
Hauptschulabschluss / 
Realschulabschluss / 
Anderer Abschluss 
Hungary Less than általános iskola / 
Àltalános iskola 
(2) Lower level vocational degree and no high school degree 
Germany School degree Plus one of the vocational qualifications  
Hauptschulabschluss / 
Realschulabschluss /          
Anderer Abschluss  
Lehre / 
Berufsfachschule /  
Schule des Gesundheitswesens / 
Beamtenausbildung /  
Sonstige Ausbildung 
Hungary Szakiskola / 
Szakmunkásképző 
(3)  Higher level vocational degree and no high school degree / higher level vocational 
degree 
Germany School degree 
 
Plus vocational qualification  
Hauptschulabschluss / 
Realschulabschluss / 
Anderer Abschluss  
Fachschule 
Hungary Technikum 
(4) High school degree and no tertiary degree 
Germany School degree Plus one / none of the vocational 
qualifications  
 
Fachhochschulreife / 
Abitur 
Lehre /  
Berufsfachschule /  
Schule des Gesundheitswesens / 
Fachschule /  
Beamtenausbildung /  
Sonstige Ausbildung 
Hungary Szakközépiskola / 
Gimnázium 
(5) College degree 
Germany Fachhochschule 
Hungary Főiskola 
(6) University degree 
Germany Universität /  
Technische Hochschule  
Hungary Egyetem 
Note: The six schooling categories are based on the educational information provided by the 
“German Socio-Economic Panel” (GSOEP) and on the educational information provided by 
the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey”.  
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1.8.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics for Germany, full sample, 2000 
Variable   
Mean monthly gross earnings  3, 086.88 
Secondary school degree (%) 
Hauptschulabschluss 38.61 
Realschulabschluss 28.15 
Fachhochschulreife 8.67 
Abitur 23.17 
Anderer Schulabschluss 0.28 
Ohne Abschluss verlassen 1.13 
Vocational degree (%) 
Lehre 48.35 
Berufsfachschule 9.16 
Schule des Gesundheitswesens 1.89 
Fachschule 7.82 
Beamtenausbildung 5.89 
Sonstige Ausbildung 1.59 
Tertiary degree (%)  
Fachhochschule 8.71 
Universität / Technische Hochschule 12.86 
Six categories for the highest level of education completed (%) 
(1) No formal vocational degree and no high school degree 9.09 
(2) Lower level vocational degree and no high school degree 52.26 
(3) Higher level vocational degree and no high school degree 5.37 
(4) High school degree and no tertiary degree 11.71 
(5) College degree  8.71 
(6) University degree 12.86 
Gender (%) 
Male 68.98 
Female 31.02 
Sector (%) 
Private sector 71.93 
Public sector 28.07 
Mean years of potential labour market experience 19.94 
Mean age 39.62 
Observations 3,440 
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Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics for Germany, subgroup of university graduates belonging to 
the occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
 Full sample Male Female 
Mean monthly gross earnings 4,177.94 4, 574.47 3, 461.00 
Field of Study (%) 
Education  30.26 20.25 48.38 
Social sciences, Humanities and Arts  35.03 31.96 40.58 
Natural sciences 34.72 47.79 11.04 
Gender (%)   
Male  64.41   
Female 35.59   
Sector (%) 
Private  49.57 55.97 37.98 
Public  50.43 44.03 62.02 
Mean years of potential labour market experience 16.78 17.18 16.05 
Mean age 41.20 41.63 40.42 
Observations  263 187 76 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
Variable  
Mean monthly gross earnings  352.18 
Highest level of education completed (%) 
Less than primary school (less than általános iskola) 0.75 
Primary school (általános iskola) 19.27 
Vocational school (szakiskola) 2.34 
Apprentice school (szakmunkásképző) 27.96 
Vocational secondary school (szakközépiskola) 17.22 
General secondary school (gimnázium) 10.02 
Technical school (technikum) 3.45 
College (főiskola) 12.84 
University (egyetem) 6.14 
Six categories for the highest level of education completed (%) 
(1) No formal vocational degree and no high school degree 20.02 
(2) Lower level vocational degree and no high school degree 30.30 
(3) Higher level vocational degree  3.45 
(4) High school degree and no tertiary degree 27.24 
(5) College degree 12.84 
(6) University degree 6.14 
Gender (%) 
Male 49.00 
Female 51.00 
Sector (%)  
Private sector 71.02 
Public sector 28.98 
Mean years of potential labour market experience 22.94 
Mean age 40.66 
Observations 150,775 
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Table 1.5 Descriptive statistics for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging to 
the occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
 Full sample Male Female 
Mean monthly gross earnings 659.35 760.23 554.25 
Field of Study (%) 
Training for secondary school teachers 19.91 12.60 27.52 
Training for primary school and other teachers 7.72 4.01 11.60 
Social sciences, Humanities and Arts  4.08 3.39 4.70 
Economics, Business and Law 14.65 14.30 15.01 
Science, Mathematics and Computing 7.81 11.71 3.73 
Engineering 16.22 24.78 7.92 
Medicine and Veterinary Medicine 18.34 17.43 19.30 
Other professionals 11.27 11.68 10.86 
Gender (%)   
Male  51.02   
Female 48.98   
Sector (% 
Private  41.60 54.67 27.98 
Public  58.40 45.33 72.02 
Mean years of potential labour market experience 17.28 16.71 17.89 
Mean age 40.28 39.71 40.89 
Observations  6,243 3,194 3,049 
Notes on Tables 1.2 – 1.5: 1) Earnings are denoted in Euro. 2) Years of potential labour 
market experience is measured as age minus years of schooling minus six. 
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1.8.3 Estimation results for Germany 
Table 1.6 Estimation results for Germany, full sample, 2000 
 Germany, full sample, 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Education group 
(2) 0.165 
(0.023) 
0.115 
(0.041) 
0.161 
(0.029) 
0.169 
(0.035) 
0.124 
(0.052) 
0.140 
(0.050) 
(3) 0.353 
(0.034) 
0.355 
(0.046) 
0.316 
(0.040) 
0.357  
(0.044) 
0.260 
(0.065) 
0.295  
(0.073) 
(4) 0.411 
(0.029) 
0.344 
(0.062) 
0.348 
(0.047) 
0.397 
(0.042) 
0.408 
(0.067) 
0.468 
 (0.067) 
(5) 0.660 
(0.031) 
0.549 
(0.058) 
0.571 
(0.044) 
0.608 
(0.043) 
0.635 
(0.066) 
0.679 
(0.105) 
(6) 0.670 
(0.028) 
0.622 
(0.117) 
0.674 
(0.046) 
0.712 
(0.039) 
0.700 
(0.061) 
0.777 
(0.070) 
Experience 0.029 
(0.003) 
0.021 
(0.008) 
0.027 
(0.005) 
0.034 
(0.004) 
0.037 
(0.006) 
0.048 
(0.006) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.047 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.000) 
-0.063 
(0.000) 
-0.085 
(0.000) 
Female -0.231 
(0.014) 
-0.278 
(0.036) 
-0.229 
(0.024) 
-0.202 
(0.018) 
-0.174 
(0.025) 
-0.145 
(0.029) 
Public sector -0.054 
(0.014) 
0.052 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.059 
(0.017) 
-0.127 
(0.022) 
-0.179 
(0.030) 
Constant 8.063 
(0.039) 
7.817 
(0.082) 
7.919 
(0.054) 
8.017 
(0.045) 
8.193 
(0.073) 
8.245 
(0.073) 
Observations 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 
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Table 1.7 Estimation results for Germany, full sample, 2000 
 Germany, full sample, 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Education group 
(2) 0.138 
(0.028) 
0.124 
(0.045) 
0.124 
(0.033) 
0.128 
(0.039) 
0.122 
(0.050) 
0.168 
(0.040) 
(3) 0.300 
(0.039) 
0.355 
(0.052) 
0.269 
(0.043) 
0.278 
(0.049) 
0.246 
(0.058) 
0.317 
(0.066) 
(4) 0.365 
(0.036) 
0.262 
(0.072) 
0.308 
(0.054) 
0.356 
(0.046) 
0.366 
(0.055) 
0.502 
(0.058) 
(5) 0.669 
(0.036) 
0.563 
(0.064) 
0.564 
(0.047) 
0.584 
(0.052) 
0.667 
(0.081) 
0.790 
(0.139) 
(6) 0.636 
(0.034) 
0.503 
(0.261) 
0.638 
(0.049) 
0.679 
(0.046) 
0.734 
(0.061) 
0.845 
(0.063) 
Experience 0.039 
(0.004) 
0.023 
(0.010) 
0.032 
(0.005) 
0.042 
(0.005) 
0.047 
(0.007) 
0.048 
(0.009) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.069 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.056 
(0.000) 
-0.078 
(0.000) 
-0.082 
(0.000) 
-0.084 
(0.000) 
Female -0.078 
(0.079) 
-0.197 
(0.222) 
-0.039 
(0.119) 
-0.133 
(0.106) 
0.027 
(0.172) 
0.055 
(0.168) 
Public sector -0.072 
(0.017) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
-0.084 
(0.020) 
-0.142  
(0.025) 
-0.181 
(0.043) 
Interaction terms 
(2) * female 0.070 
(0.048) 
-0.121 
(0.165) 
0.048 
(0.075) 
0.137 
(0.081) 
0.018 
(0.158) 
-0.088 
(0.124) 
(3) * female 0.203 
(0.087) 
-0.114 
(0.208) 
0.241 
(0.190) 
0.209 
(0.106) 
0.049 
(0.195) 
-0.093 
(0.330 
(4) * female 0.116 
(0.060) 
0.139 
(0.182) 
0.071 
(0.105) 
0.128 
(0.103) 
0.024 
(0.192) 
-0.059 
(0.156) 
(5) * female -0.070 
(0.069) 
-0.100 
(0.185) 
0.011 
(0.107) 
0.021 
(0.095) 
-0.157 
(0.181) 
-0.346 
(0.191) 
(6) * female 0.078 
(0.061) 
0.054 
(0.313) 
0.021 
(0.112) 
0.040 
(0.097) 
-0.152 
(0.166) 
-0.303 
(0.153) 
Experience * 
female 
-0.023 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.009) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Experience
2 
* 
female (/100) 
0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.000) 
Sector * female 0.050 
(0.030) 
0.079 
(0.071) 
0.033 
(0.054) 
0.088 
(0.037) 
0.081 
(0.047) 
0.021 
(0.061) 
Constant 7.993 
(0.048) 
7.800 
(0.109) 
7.890 
(0. 060) 
7.976 
(0.056) 
8.094 
(0.079) 
8.210 
(0.098) 
Observations 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 
Notes on Tables 1.6 – 1.7: 1) The reference group among the education categories is Group 
(1) “No formal vocational training and no high school degree”. 2) Experience is measured as 
years of potential labour market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus 
six). 5) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 6) Standard errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap 
replications for the quantile regressions.  
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Table 1.8 Estimation results for Germany, subgroup of university graduates belonging to the 
occupational group of “Professionals” 
 
 
Germany, university graduates (Professionals), 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Field of Study 
Social sciences, Humanities 
and Arts 
0.031 
(0.091) 
-0.152 
(0.158) 
-0.174 
(0.127) 
0.020 
(0.116) 
0.067 
(0.096) 
0.311 
(0.133) 
Natural sciences 0.008 
(0.107) 
0.005 
(0.975) 
0.004 
(0.178) 
0.089 
(0.116) 
0.138 
(0.103) 
0.308 
(0.097) 
Experience 0.046 
(0.018) 
0.087 
(0.035) 
0.051 
(0.028) 
0.053 
(0.019) 
0.052 
(0.018) 
0.064 
(0.015) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.082 
(0.001) 
-0.165 
(0.001) 
-0.095 
(0.001) 
-0.106 
(0.001) 
-0.108 
(0.000) 
-0.147 
(0.000) 
Female -0.118 
(0.075) 
-0.150 
(0.140) 
-0.240 
(0.106) 
-0.164 
(0.081) 
-0.165 
(0.063) 
-0.094 
(0.063) 
Public sector -0.215 
(0.081) 
-0.160 
(0.165) 
-0.252 
(0.099) 
-0.160 
(0.093) 
-0.265 
(0.099) 
-0.200 
(0.099) 
Constant 8.555 
(0.179) 
7.861 
(0.309) 
8.512 
(0.255) 
8.590 
(0.201) 
8.764 
(0.171) 
8.685 
(0.133) 
Observations 263 263 263 263 263 263 
Notes on Table 6: 1) The reference group among the “Field of Study” categories is 
“Education”. 2) Experience is measured as years of potential labour market experience 
(measured as age minus years of schooling minus school six). 3) Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 5) Standard errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap replications for the quantile 
regressions. 
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Figure 1.3 Experience profiles for Germany, full sample 
Experience profiles, full sample, 2000
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Figure 1.4 Experience profiles for Germany, males 
Experience profiles, males, 2000
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Figure 1.5 Experience profiles for Germany, females 
Experience profiles, females, 2000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Years of potential labour market experience
L
o
g
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
OLS 0.1 quantile 0.25 quantile median 0.75 quantile 0.9 quantile
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
1.8.4 Estimation results for Hungary 
Table 1.9 Estimation results for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
 Hungary, full sample, 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Education group 
(2) 0.124 
(0.004) 
0.107 
(0.006) 
0.122 
(0.007) 
0.133 
(0.007) 
0.150 
(0.007) 
0.176 
(0.009) 
(3) 0.565 
(0.008) 
0.400 
(0.033) 
0.570 
(0.015) 
0.562 
(0.012) 
0.633 
(0.012) 
0.721 
(0.016) 
(4) 0.430 
(0.004) 
0.241 
(0.007) 
0.391 
(0.006)  
0.451 
(0.007) 
0.502 
(0.005) 
0.595 
(0.009) 
(5) 0.864 
(0.005) 
0.706 
(0.007) 
0.816 
(0.005) 
0.832 
(0.006) 
0.894 
(0.006) 
1.028 
(0.011) 
(6) 1.227 
(0.007) 
0.885 
(0.013) 
1.057 
(0.007) 
1.163 
(0.010) 
1.377 
(0.011) 
1.640 
(0.014) 
Experience 0.014 
(0.001) 
0.018 
(0.001) 
0.024 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001)  
0.005 
(0.002) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.027 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
Female -0.150 
(0.003) 
-0.036 
(0.005) 
-0.120 
(0.006)   
-0.166 
(0.006) 
-0.184 
(0.005) 
-0.209 
(0.007) 
Public sector -0.213 
(0.003) 
0.238 
(0.005) 
-0.033 
(0.006) 
-0.267 
(0.004) 
-0.395 
(0.005) 
-0.480 
(0.007) 
Constant 10.674 
(0.008) 
9.873 
(0.012)   
10.145 
(0.011) 
10.633 
(0.013) 
11.067 
(0.013) 
11.395 
(0.020)  
Observations 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 
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Table 1.10 Estimation results for Hungary, full sample, 2000 
 Hungary, full sample, 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Education group 
(2) 0.141 
(0.006) 
0.056 
(0.008) 
0.121 
(0.013) 
0.137 
(0.011) 
0.157 
(0.010) 
0.193 
(0.011) 
(3) 0.551 
(0.010) 
0.332 
(0.039) 
0.553 
(0.019) 
0.539 
(0.016) 
0.619 
(0.015) 
0.698 
(0.019) 
(4) 0.397 
(0.007) 
0.132 
(0.013) 
0.353 
(0.018) 
0.401 
(0.013) 
0.466 
(0.011) 
0.567 
(0.016) 
(5) 0.926 
(0.009) 
0.593 
(0.016)  
0.812 
(0.015) 
0.894 
(0.011) 
1.050 
(0.017) 
1.216 
(0.018) 
(6) 1.251 
(0.009) 
0.762 
(0.017) 
1.041 
(0.015) 
1.201 
(0.016) 
1.447 
(0.018) 
1.711 
(0.022) 
Experience 0.014 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.002) 
0.020 
(0.003) 
0.017 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.002) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.000) 
Female -0.196 
(0.017) 
-0.230 
(0.023) 
-0.230 
(0.036) 
-0.295 
(0.034) 
-0.255 
(0.032) 
-0.146 
(0.035) 
Public sector -0.230 
(0.040) 
0.297 
(0.008) 
-0.057 
(0.009) 
-0.322 
(0.008) 
-0.426 
(0.008) 
-0.474 
(0.012) 
Interaction terms 
(2) * female -0.040 
(0.008) 
0.067 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.016)   
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.024 
(0.014) 
(3) * female 0.060 
(0.017) 
0.140 
(0.049) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
0.071 
(0.027) 
0.053 
(0.028) 
0.104 
(0.034) 
(4) * female 0.054 
(0.008) 
0.168 
(0.015) 
0.053 
(0.019) 
0.077 
(0.015) 
0.050 
(0.012) 
0.038 
(0.019) 
(5) * female -0.087 
(0.011) 
0.178 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.069 
(0.013) 
-0.205 
(0.018) 
-0.283 
(0.022) 
(6) * female -0.046 
(0.013)   
0.187 
(0.020) 
0.034 
(0.018) 
-0.056 
(0.018)  
-0.149 
(0.024) 
-0.174 
(0.038) 
Experience * 
female 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
Experience
2 
* 
female (/100) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.028 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.000) 
Sector * female 0.028 
(0.007) 
-0.077 
(0.010) 
0.035 
(0.012) 
0.083 
(0.010) 
0.045 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
Constant 10.690 
(0.012) 
10.015 
(0.019) 
10.214 
(0.032) 
10.696 
(0.030) 
11.078 
(0.028) 
11.338 
(0.027) 
Observations 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 150,775 
Notes on Tables 1.9 – 1.10: 1) The reference group among the education categories is Group 
(1) “No formal vocational training and no high school degree”. 2) Experience is measured as 
years of potential labour market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus 
six). 3) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 5) Standard errors are computed by 200 bootstrap 
replications for the quantile regressions. 
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Table 1.11 Estimation results for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging to the 
occupational group of “Professionals” 
 Hungary, university graduates (Professionals), 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Field of Study 
Training for secondary 
school teachers 
-0.068 
(0.023) 
0.091 
(0.016) 
0.046 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.143 
(0.019) 
-0.295 
(0.030) 
Training for primary school 
and other teachers 
-0.148 
(0.031) 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.056 
(0.020) 
-0.106 
(0.017) 
-0.222 
(0.021) 
-0.343 
(0.037) 
Social sciences, Humanities 
and Arts 
-0.220 
(0.040) 
-0.133 
(0.069) 
-0.153 
(0.032) 
-0.217 
(0.029) 
-0.262 
(0.034) 
-0.268 
(0.076) 
Economics, Business and 
Law 
0.538 
(0.030) 
0.359 
(0.078) 
0.447 
(0.050) 
0.530 
(0.050) 
0.624 
(0.057) 
0.628 
(0.053) 
Science, Mathematics and 
Computing 
0.309 
(0.035) 
0.024 
(0.079) 
0.082 
(0.070) 
0.271 
(0.062) 
0.485 
(0.072)  
0.460 
(0.089) 
Engineering 0.162 
(0.031) 
0.109 
(0.056) 
0.105 
(0.043) 
0.085 
(0.040) 
0.198 
(0.060) 
0.129 
(0.059) 
Other professionals 0.404 
(0.028) 
0.167 
(0.029) 
0.206 
(0.030) 
0.320 
(0.030) 
0.416 
(0.052) 
0.651 
(0.093) 
Experience 0.027 
(0.004) 
0.022 
(0.005) 
0.023 
(0.004) 
0.029 
(0.003) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
0.036 
(0.005) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.050 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.070 
(0.000) 
Female -0.082 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.035 
(0.014) 
-0.055 
(0.012) 
-0.077 
(0.014) 
-0.124 
(0.023) 
Public sector -0.164 
(0.023) 
0.383 
(0.059) 
-0.103 
(0.043) 
-0.361 
(0.036) 
-0.422 
(0.052) 
-0.509 
(0.049) 
Constant 11.488 
(0.039) 
10.479 
(0.080) 
11.138 
(0.053) 
11.547 
(0.045) 
11.838 
(0.060) 
12.225 
(0.061) 
Observations 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 
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Table 1.12 Estimation results for Hungary, subgroup of university graduates belonging to the 
occupational group of “Professionals”, 2000 
 Hungary, university graduates (Professionals), 2000 
OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Field of Study 
Training for secondary 
school teachers 
-0.084 
(0.037) 
0.054 
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
-0.046 
(0.024) 
-0.137 
(0.029) 
-0.277 
(0.043) 
Training for primary 
school and other 
teachers 
-0.186 
(0.055) 
-0.108 
(0.051) 
-0.120 
(0.029) 
-0.157 
(0.033) 
-0.222 
(0.043) 
-0.311 
(0.078) 
Social sciences, 
Humanities and Arts  
-0.251 
(0.060) 
-0.410 
(0.129) 
-0.239 
(0.084) 
-0.269 
(0.051) 
-0.270 
(0.065) 
-0.072 
(0.203) 
Economics, Business 
and Law 
0.578 
(0.044) 
0.180 
(0.187) 
0.341 
(0.094) 
0.541 
(0.083) 
0.731 
(0.084) 
1.104 
(0.243) 
Science, Mathematics 
and Computing 
0.435 
(0.046) 
-0.042 
(0.115) 
0.068 
(0.130) 
0.342 
(0.100) 
0.683 
(0.090) 
0.994 
(0.232) 
Engineering 0.266 
(0.042) 
0.054 
(0.077) 
0.085 
(0.067) 
0.115 
(0.066) 
0.359 
(0.078) 
0.549 
(0.204) 
Other professionals 0.521 
(0.039) 
0.121 
(0.047) 
0.196 
(0.044) 
0.356 
(0.050) 
0.623 
(0.117) 
1.382 
(0.250) 
Experience 0.023 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.007) 
0.028 
(0.006) 
0.034 
(0.006) 
0.042 
(0.008) 
Experience
2
(/100) -0.046 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.046 
(0.000) 
-0.063 
(0.000) 
-0.089 
(0.000) 
Female -0.041 
(0.077) 
-0.325 
(0.156) 
-0.283 
(0.112) 
-0.088 
(0.102) 
0.062 
(0.113) 
0.438 
(0.230) 
Public sector -0.084 
(0.033) 
0.335 
(0.090) 
-0.103 
(0.064) 
-0.337 
(0.057) 
-0.320 
(0.074) 
-0.154 
(0. 205) 
Interaction terms 
Training for secondary 
school teachers * female 
0.016 
(0.048) 
0.068 
(0.030) 
0.067 
(0.026) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
-0.017 
(0.039) 
-0.065 
(0.061) 
Training for primary 
school and other 
teachers * female 
0.042 
(0.067) 
0.113 
(0.055) 
0.111 
(0.037) 
0.078 
(0.041) 
-0.014 
(0.050) 
-0.064 
(0.094) 
Social science, 
Humanities and Arts * 
female 
0.058 
(0.080) 
0.418 
(0.146) 
0.141 
(0.088) 
0.092 
(0.066) 
0.023 
(0.076)  
-0.226 
(0. 221) 
Economics, Business 
and Law * female 
-0.061 
(0.061) 
0.224 
(0.208) 
0.223 
(0.112) 
-0.005 
(0.107) 
-0.131 
(0.113) 
-0.566 
(0.354) 
Science, Mathematics 
and Computing * female 
-0.346 
(0.077) 
0.067 
(0.184) 
-0.032 
(0.155) 
-0.235 
(0.139) 
-0.499 
(0.125)  
-0.905 
(0.249) 
Engineering * female -0.242 
(0.065) 
0.035 
(0.111) 
-0.009 
(0.094) 
-0.069 
(0.089) 
-0.373 
(0.106) 
-0.653 
(0.240) 
Other professionals* 
female 
-0.227 
(0.055) 
0.046 
(0.060) 
0.034 
(0.062) 
-0.033 
(0.062) 
-0.298 
(0.129) 
-1.013 
(0.260) 
 
Experience * female 0.011 
(0.007) 
0.031 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
Table 1.12 continues on next page  
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Table 1.12 continued 
Experience
2 
* female 
(/100) 
-0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0. 000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.000) 
Sector * female -0.154 
(0.046) 
-0. 004 
(0. 128) 
0.019 
(0.088) 
-0.029 
(0.074) 
-0.108 
(0.098) 
-0.427 
(0.215) 
Constant 11.451 
(0.054) 
10.740 
(0.118) 
11.252 
(0.084) 
11.567 
(0.084) 
11.718 
(0.089) 
11.788 
(0.216) 
Observations 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 6,243 
Notes on Tables 1.11 – 1.12: 1) The reference group among the “Field of Study” categories is 
“Medicine and Veterinary Medicine”. 2) Experience is measured as years of potential labour 
market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus six). 3) Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 5) Standard errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap replications for the 
quantile regressions. 
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Figure 1.6 Experience profiles for Hungary, full sample 
Experience profiles, full sample, 2000
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Figure 1.7 Experience profiles for Hungary, males 
Experience profiles, males, 2000
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Figure 1.8 Experience profiles for Hungary, females 
Experience profiles, females, 2000
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1.8.5 Generation of field of study groups in Germany 
The three broad field of study groups have been generated using the occupational information 
(ISCO-88) provided in the GSOEP. To make cross-country comparison possible, the 
occupational composition of the field of study groups is identical across the two countries. 
That is, in a first step, the university graduates belonging the main occupational group of 
“Professionals” have been allocated to eight field of study groups in both countries according 
to their occupational background (see Table 1.14 in Section 1.8.6 for detail) and, in a second 
step, these eight categories have been merged into three broad categories for the German 
subsample in order to assure a sufficient number of observations for econometric analysis. 
Table 1.13 presents the field of study groups for the two countries. Group (2) is the most 
heterogeneous one in Germany in terms of both educational background and earnings 
prospects.  
 
Table 1.13 Field of study groups in Germany and Hungary 
 Field of study  
Hungary Germany 
(1) Training for secondary school teachers (1) Education   
(2) Training for primary school and other teachers 
 
(3) Social sciences, Humanities and Arts  (2) Social sciences, 
Humanities and Arts (4) Economics, Business and Law  
 
(5) Science, Mathematics and Computing (3) Natural sciences 
(6) Engineering 
(7) Medicine and Veterinary Medicine 
 
(8) Other professionals 
Note: For Germany, those who would otherwise belong to the Group of “Other professionals” 
(because the field of study cannot be inferred from the occupation), namely, “Administrative 
professionals” and “Tertiary education teaching professionals” are omitted form the analysis. 
Furthermore, the subgroup of “Pharmacists” and “Social workers” have been allocated to the 
Group of “Natural sciences” and “Social sciences, Humanities and Arts” respectively. This 
allocation procedure is preferred to generating a fourth group of “Other professionals” with a 
small number of observations. 
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1.8.6 Generation of field of study groups in Hungary 
The eight field of study groups have been generated using the occupational information in the 
“Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey”. The eight groups reflect the ISCED 
classification of university education and are tailored to the dataset due to considerations 
about (a) sample size and (b) characteristics of the Hungarian education system (as well as 
earnings prospects), which allow the subdivision of some broad fields of study alternatively  
the merging of some narrow fields of study. For example, “Education” has been subdivided 
into “Training for secondary school teachers” and “Training for primary school and other 
teachers” as these two subgroups of “Education” are large enough to support meaningful 
econometric analysis. Note also that the subdivision makes sense in terms of both educational 
qualification and earnings prospects. Moreover, “Social sciences” and “Humanities and Arts” 
have been group together for sample size considerations. Table 1.14 presents the occupation 
composition of the eight field of study groups, with Group (3) being the most heterogeneous 
one. 
 
Table 1.14 Occupational composition of the eight field of study groups 
Occupation Field of study 
All secondary education teaching professionals (general and 
vocational) 
 
(1) Training for 
secondary school 
teachers 
 
Primary education teaching professionals, Pre-primary education 
teaching professionals, Special education teaching professionals 
 
(2) Training for 
primary school and 
other teachers 
 
Historians, Sociologists, Anthropologists and related professions, 
Philologists, Translators, Interpreters, Psychologists, Librarians and 
related information professionals, Authors, Journalists, Sculptors, 
Painters, Composers, Musicians, Singers, Actors, Directors 
 
(3) Social sciences, 
Humanities and Arts  
Economists, Accountants, Other business professionals, Lawyers, 
Judges, Legal professionals not elsewhere classified 
 
(4) Economics, 
Business and Law 
 
Biologists, Biochemists, Zoologists, Pharmacologists, Physicists, 
Meteorologists, Chemists, Other scientists not elsewhere classified,  
Mathematicians, Computing professionals  
 
(5) Science, 
Mathematics and 
Computing 
All engineering professionals, Architects 
 
(6) Engineering 
Medical doctors, Dentists, Veterinarians 
 
(7) Medicine and 
Veterinary Medicine 
 
Health and welfare professionals (nursing and midwifery 
professionals, pharmacists, social work and counselling 
professionals), Other technical professionals, Tertiary education 
teaching professionals, Administrative professionals 
(8) Other 
professionals 
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The final group of “Other professionals” consists of (a) those fields of study which account 
for approximately one percent of the selected sample (namely occupations belonging to the 
“Health and Welfare” category) and (b) those occupations for which the exact field of study 
cannot be determined (namely “Other technical professionals”, “Tertiary education teaching 
professionals” and “Administrative professionals”). Table 1.15 provides information of the 
exact occupational composition of the “Other professionals” category.  
 
Table 1.15 Occupational composition (%) of “Other professionals” 
“Other professionals”   
Health and Welfare 11.00 
Other technical professionals  14.53 
Tertiary education teaching professionals 14.98 
Administrative professionals 59.49 
Observations 622 
 
Note that only the individuals belonging to the (major occupational) group of “Professionals” 
are used in estimation, who represent approximately 57 percent of all university graduates in 
the 2000 sample. This is due to the fact that the field of study can only be imputed for the 
“Professionals” using the FEOR classification code. For completeness, Table 1.16 provides 
information on the (major) occupational composition of all university graduates (i.e. 
individuals who belong to Education group (6) “University degree”), males and females 
separately.  
 
Table 1.16 Major occupational composition of all university graduates  
 Full sample Male Female 
Major occupation group (%) 
(1) Legislators, senior officials and managers 32.86 40.51 22.29 
(2) Professionals  57.26 50.35 66.79 
(3) Technicians and associate professionals 7.86 7.50 8.34 
(4) Clerks 0.95 0.37 1.76 
(5) Service workers  0.24 0.22 0.26 
(6) Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.06 0.10 0.00 
(7) Craft and related trades 0.50 0.61 0.35 
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.17 0.25 0.05 
(9) Elementary occupations 0.11 0.07 0.15 
Observations 11,001 6,454 4,547 
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2 An analysis of the earnings structures in the public and private 
sectors in Hungary  
2.1 Introduction 
Socialist wage policy in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries tried to diminish 
wage differentials, that is, workers were not rewarded according to skill or productivity and 
the returns to education were set centrally and were low. Furthermore, the socialist education 
system was adjusted to the needs of the planned economy, and thus put a strong emphasis on 
technical skills as opposed to business related skills (see, for example, Kertesi and Köllő 
(1999) and Flanagan (1995)). Not surprisingly, transition brought with itself an increase in 
earnings inequality attributed to the widening earnings differentials across education groups, 
which has been documented by an ample of studies on the CEE countries. Despite the 
quantitative differences across the CEE countries, the cross-country estimates (based on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Mincer earnings equations), document an increasing 
mean return to an additional year of schooling during the period of transition. For example, 
for the Czech Republic Munich et al. (2002) find that men’s average rate of return to an 
additional year of schooling increased from around 3 percent in 1989 to 6 percent in 1996.
48
 
Similarly, Chase (1997) finds that the average return to education increased from around 
approximately 2 and 3 percent in 1984 to around 5 percent in 1993 for Czech and Slovak men 
respectively. Moreover, Rutkowski (1997) finds that the average rate of return to an additional 
year of schooling rose form 5 percent in 1987 to 7 percent in 1992 in Poland. Furthermore, 
Andrén et al. (2005), using cross-sections from 1950 – 2000, estimate the mean return to 
schooling to be 3 – 4 percent during the socialist period, rising during the 1990s and reaching 
around 9 percent by 2000. Kézdi (2005) estimates the mean return to an additional year of 
schooling to rise from 7 percent in 1989 to 12 percent in 2002. On the other hand, Krueger 
and Pischke (1995) find evidence that in East Germany the mean rate of return to a year of 
schooling declined from around 8 percent in 1988 to 6 percent in 1991, thus concluding that 
education attained under the Communist system became less valuable during the transition 
period.  
 
Using categorical variables for educational attainment, in order to shed light on how different 
degrees are valued in the transition process, the cross-country consensus is that relative to 
primary school or less, the average premium to high school and university education rose 
                                                 
48
 Log percentage points throughout the chapter. 
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dramatically while the average return to vocational education remained constant or even 
declined during the transition period, partially due to the inefficient training in vocational 
institutions, on the one hand, and due to the increasing demand for high-skilled labour on the 
other. For example, for the Czech Republic Munich et al. (2002) find evidence that the mean 
return to university education relative to junior high school increased from around 28 percent 
in 1989 to 72 percent in 1996. Moreover, Orazem and Vodopivec (1998) find that relative to 
less than primary school the average return to high school and 4 years of university increased 
from approximately 32 and 72 percent in 1987 to 41 and 94 percent respectively in 1991 for 
Slovene men. Keane and Prasad (2001) find that whereas the average wage premium for a 
college degree relative to primary school rose substantially between 1986 and 1996 in Poland 
(i.e. around 37, 53 and 68 percent in 1986, 1992 and 1996 respectively), the average return to 
vocational training remained in the range of 11 and 17 percent throughout the decade of 1986 
– 1996. In addition, Noorkôiv et al. (1997) find evidence that the average premium to 
university education relative to less than primary school rose from around 19 percent in 1989 
to 54 and 66 percent in 1993 and 1995 respectively for Estonian men. Finally, Kertesi and 
Köllő (2002) find that the mean rate of return relative to primary school or less to vocational 
training school, high school and college increased from approximately 12 to 13 percent, from 
14 to 22 percent and from 36 to 60 percent respectively between 1986 and 1994 for 
Hungarian full-time employees in the private sector. By 1999 the corresponding figures are 
12, 21 and 63 percent, hence indicating an approximately constant average relative return to 
vocational education and increasing premium to high school and university education. It is 
important to note that the earnings advantage for tertiary graduates in Hungary has not only 
increased after 1990, but is higher than in any other OECD country under analysis in 2005 
(Education at a Glance 2007 (2007)).  
 
Moreover, there is evidence for a widening wage gap between the private and public sectors 
of employment during the transition period in Hungary and other CEE countries (Kertesi and 
Köllő (2002) and Keane and Prasad (2001)). Note that in Hungary the share of the public 
sector employment over total employment remained high during the transition period – 
around 20 percent. Wage setting in the public sector is subject to political pressure and 
pursues the goals of equity, whereby the public sector wage scale
49
 is characterised by the 
                                                 
49
 The public sector wage scale (Közalkalmazotti bértábla) assures equal wages for public sector employees for a 
given job with the same qualification and seniority. The wage scale is such that wages increase mechanically 
both horizontally and vertically: wages increase along the 10 educational categories (A – J) and for each 
qualification category wages increase with seniority along 14 brackets in different magnitudes. A separate wage 
 80 
principle of not paying too low wages for low-skilled employees and not too high for their 
high-skilled counterparts. Subsequently, the wage distribution is more compressed in the 
public sector of employment than in the private sector – where competitive goals are pursued. 
The goal of equity and fairness of wages in the public sector, coupled with the more 
compressed distribution of public sector wages, characterises also Western economies (Melly 
(2005), Dustmann and van Soest (1997), Lucifora and Meurs (2004)). Moreover, Hungary is 
no exception to the fact that the education level is higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector, due to the professional composition of the public sector. However, there are 
major differences in the unconditional level of mean wages between Hungary and the Western 
economies. Whereas unconditional mean wages are higher in the public sector of 
employment, for instance, in Germany (Dustmann and van Soest (1997) and Melly (2005)), 
France, Great Britain and Italy (Lucifora and Meurs (2004)), in Hungary the transition period 
has been characterised by higher unconditional mean wages in the private sector of 
employment (as Figure 2.1 in the Appendix illustrates). The low level of public sector wages 
in Hungary has been a problem – for fairness as well as migration reasons –, and has 
generated public sector wage reforms in the early 2000s, which will be discussed below.   
 
The goal of this study is to examine the evolution of earnings in the public and private sectors 
of employment in Hungary for full-time male employees for the time period of 1994 – 2003. 
The analysis is restricted to the time period of 1994 – 2003 (a) because of data availability 
considerations – 1994 marks the first year when data is available for both the private and 
public sectors on an annual basis – and (b) because this particular time period witnessed 
numerous reforms which had a potential effect not only on relative wages but also on the 
distribution of the wages in the two sectors of employment.  
 
At this point a brief description of the evolution of wages and the wage reforms during the 
period of observation is of order. The time period of 1994 – 1997 is characterised by the 
“transformational recession” and the stabilization package (the Bokros Csomag which was  
carried out in 1995).
50
 Real wages were decreasing throughout this period. During the second 
                                                                                                                                                        
scale exists for (a) tertiary education and research institutes and (b) civil servants (Köztisztviselői előmeneteli és 
illetmény rendszer). For detail see Közalkalmazotti Bértábla: Béremelés 2002 szeptember.  
50
 Transformational recession was characterised by declining GDP growth, double digit inflation and an instable 
currency. In 1995, the government adopted a stabilization programme (Bokros Csomag) in order to restore 
macroeconomic stability. The stabilisation measures of the Bokors Comag (among other things) constrained the 
growth of public sector nominal wages. During the second half of the 1990s, real GDP increased by 4 – 5 
percent per year, inflation dropped from around 28 percent in 1995 to less than 10 percent by 2000 and the Forint 
was stabilised (Kovács and Moulin (2004)). 
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period of 1998 – 2000, characterised as the “boom of the Hungarian economy”, real wages 
started to rise (Horváth and Hudomiet (2005)). In the early 2000s, significant wage reforms 
were implemented, which meant large increases in (a) the minimum wage and (b) the public 
sector wages respectively, and subsequent increases in the government deficit. More 
specifically, the minimum wage was increased twice, first on 01.01.2001 from 25,500 
Hungarian Forints (HUF) to 40,000 HUF (57 percent increase in nominal wages) and then on 
01.01.2002 to 50,000 HUF (25 percent increase in nominal wages). It is important to note that 
when the statutory minimum wage
51
 was introduced (set by the government) in Hungary in 
1989, it amounted to around 35 percent of the average earnings (Kertesi and Köllő (2003)) – 
below the European average (Dolado et al. (1996)). In the 1990s, the ratio of the minimum 
wage to average earnings was falling, and it amounted to approximately 29 percent in 2000 
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2007)). Following the two increases, the minimum 
wage reached approximately 41 percent of average earnings in 2002 (Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (2007)), which, according to 2002 Eurostat figures, (from 17 countries) is 
higher than in Romania (31 percent), Slovakia (32 percent), Poland (33 percent), the Czech 
Republic (34 percent), the UK (34 percent), the US (34 percent), Latvia (35 percent), Spain 
(37 percent), Bulgaria (37 percent), and Lithuania (38 percent), and lower than in Portugal (43 
percent), Slovenia (45 percent), Luxembourg (49 percent), the Netherlands (49 percent), 
Ireland (50 percent), Malta (54 percent) (Paternoster (2004)).  
 
The political motivation behind the minimum wage increases in the early 2000s merits 
comment. The motivation of the government (in office between 1998 and 2002) can be 
outlined as follows: to “restore the prestige of work”, to combat “living on benefits” and to 
“whiten the black economy” (Kertesi and Köllő (2003)). Despite the mixed theoretical and 
international empirical research on the effect of increases in minimum wage on employment 
level
52
, the government then in office argued that the increase in the minimum wage would 
increase the employment level – which is low in international comparison. According to 
OECD statistics, (total) employment rate in Hungary in 2000 was 56 percent, which is 7.5 
percent lower than the average of the former 15 EU member states. In fact, during the 1990s 
employment rate lagged behind that of the EU average: between 1992 and 2000 the average 
(total) employment rate in the former 15 EU member states was approximately 61 percent, the 
                                                 
51
 The statutory minimum wage relates to gross monthly earnings net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonuses. 
The minimum wage is legally binding and covers all employment contracts. Compliance with the minimum 
wage regulations is high. For instance, in 2001, less than 2 percent of the full-time employees were paid less than 
the minimum wage (Kertesi and Köllő (2003)).  
52
 For a summary see, for instance, Dolado et al. (1996) and Kertesi and Köllő (2003). 
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corresponding figure for Hungary was 54 percent (OECD Factbook 2007 (2007)). It was 
argued that increasing the minimum wage would lead to incentive effects on the supply side, 
that is, higher wages would increase the incentives for job search by widening the gap 
between benefits and wages, especially in the depressed regions of Hungary. However, 
Kertesi and Köllő (2003) find no evidence for the expected positive employment effect.  
 
Moreover, in Hungary where (especially in small firms) employers may report workers at the 
officially declared minimum wage but pay them above that level, an increase in the minimum 
wage should lead to increased revenue from social security contributions (given that the 
employees do not lose their jobs), as discussed in detail in Tonin (2007).
53
 Tonin (2007) finds 
that the increase in the minimum wage in 2001 was effective for the purposes of increasing 
tax revenues from the affected households – those who are officially earning between the old 
and new minimum wage before the reform – at the same time inducing a fall in income for 
these households. 
 
The increases in the minimum wage compressed the public sector wage scale. As mentioned 
earlier, the public sector wages, for each education group, were lagging behind the wages of 
the private sector throughout the decade of transition (as Figures 2.1 – 2.3 in the Appendix 
demonstrate) – which was one of the motivating factors behind the Socialist-led government’s 
promise of large increases in the wages of public servants in 2002.
54
 In addition to fairness 
reasons, the increase in public sector wages also aimed at avoiding (a) a negative selection in 
the public sector in terms of entering and leaving public sector jobs and (b) the migration of 
the highly qualified workforce abroad, which in the long-run has potential negative effects on 
the quality of the public sector employment (Telegdy (2006)). Subsequently, the government 
in office carried out a 50 percent average increase in public sector (nominal) wages, affecting 
the various groups of public service employees (approximately 800,000 employees which 
represents around 20 percent of the labour force) in different magnitudes between September 
2002 and 2003. The government revised the existing wage scale, thereby altering relative 
                                                 
53
 Note that the possible problem of underreporting wages in this study is mitigated by the fact that firms 
employing more than 20 employees are used for the empirical analysis (in order to maintain the comparability of 
the data collection in the private sector throughout the period under analysis, which will be discussed in Section 
2.1).  
54
 To address the issue of the private-public sector wage gap previous governments have increased the wages of 
relatively small groups, such as judges, public prosecutors, armed forces personnel (The New Government 
increases public sector pay and low earners’ income). For example, between July 2001 and January 2002 the 
wages of civil servants, public order officers and army officers were increased (Labour Report: January – 
December 2003 (2004), p. 10).  
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wages. According to the revised wage scale, the wages in the lowest qualification and 
seniority category (A1) are equal to the statuary minimum wage and those in (the lowest 
seniority bracket) of the highest qualification category (J1) earn 2.65 times more than the 
minimum wage. Moreover, the government introduced a minimum monthly wage for tertiary 
graduates, whereby the wages of the (lowest education and seniority bracket of) tertiary 
graduates (F1) were set to 100,000 HUF (which is twice the statutory minimum wage).
55
 
 
In light of the evolution of wages and the wage reforms, the analysis of the evolution of the 
wage structures in the Hungarian private and public sectors is particularly interesting. 
However, it must be pointed out that the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of 
earnings in the private and public sectors for the decade of 1994 – 2003 rather than to 
concentrate explicitly on the effects of the wage reforms. In particular, this chapter examines 
(a) the evolution of the private-public earnings gap for full-time male employees, (b) the 
evolution of the private-public earnings gap for groups of full-time male employees 
distinguished by education and (c) the evolution of the returns to education in the private and 
public sectors separately – as the emphasis for the decade of transition has been placed on the 
private sector. Therefore, this study augments the existing literature as it analyses earnings 
differentials by education groups for both sectors of employment for a long period of time. 
Moreover, whereas existing studies use OLS regression to analyse (a) the mean private-public 
earnings gap (for instance, Telegdy (2006)) and (b) the evolution of the mean returns to 
education (for instance, Kézdi (2005) and Kertesi and Köllő (2002)), the second contribution 
of the study is that it is concerned with distributional aspects. The focus on distributional 
issues in turn motivates the use of quantile regression (Koeneker and Bassett (1978)), which 
allows the analysis of the effect of each covariate along the entire distribution of earnings. 
Quantile regression is particularly applicable for the analysis of the development of the 
private and public sector wages as the wage setting in the public sector (as discussed above) 
implies that distribution of wages is more compressed in the public sector of employment than 
in the private sector, which in turn implies that focusing on the mean private-public sector 
wage gap may not be appropriate. For instance, Lucifora and Meurs (2004) – estimating the 
public-private wage gap by quantile regression using standard wage equations – conclude that 
for France, Italy and Great Britain, that the public sector pay gap declines along the wage 
distribution in all three countries. Similarly, Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Mueller (1998) 
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 For detail on the wage increases for various groups in the public sector see Employment and Earnings 1998 – 
2003 (2005), pp. 127 – 132, Labour Report: January – December 2003 (2004), pp. 10 – 20 and  Közalkalmazotti 
Bértábla: Béremelés 2002 szeptember. 
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find declining public sector wage premium as quantiles increase for the US and Canada 
respectively. Telegdy (2006), using standard OLS regression, concludes that following the 
public sector wage reforms in Hungary, “the government has not only levelled the wages in 
the public and corporate sector but also pays a premium to the majority of its employees”. 
Given the different distributions of wages in the two sectors, it is therefore important to ask 
(a) whether the statement above applies to just the average wage gap, and (b) how the private-
public wage gap (for different education groups) varies along the conditional wage 
distribution in Hungary over the period under analysis. Although the importance of quantile 
regression technique, which has been stressed by the studies in Fitzenberger et al. (Eds.) 
(2001), has been applied to the analysis of the wage structure in the private and public sectors, 
among others, by Budria (2006), Lucifora and Meurs (2004), Melly (2005), Mueller (1998) 
Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Nielsen and Rosholm (2001), it has not been previously 
applied in Hungary, to the best of my knowledge.  
 
The data for the empirical analysis is drawn from the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s 
Wage Survey”, which is a cross-section dataset. The analysis is restricted to full-time prime 
age male employees (aged 25 – 55). The educational information in the dataset allows for the 
differentiation of four education groups for the period under analysis, namely, primary school 
or less (unskilled), vocational degree (low-skilled), high school degree (middle-skilled) and 
tertiary degree (high-skilled). It is important to note that the study is purely descriptive in 
nature, it aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the evolution of earnings structures in 
the two sectors for the selected sample. Another issue that needs to taken into consideration is 
that the estimated cross-section experience profiles reflect age, experience and cohort effects 
(as pointed out by Heckman and Robb (1985) and analysed by several studies such as 
Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger et al. (2001) and MaCurdy and Mroz (1985)).  
 
The empirical evidence for the estimated private-public sector earnings gap for both the entire 
sample of full-time male employees and the subsamples distinguished by educational 
attainment indicates that there is a private sector earnings premium (other than at the 10
th
 
quantile in some cross-sections) which increases across the distribution between 1994 and 
2002. The fact that in Hungary for the period under analysis there is a private sector earnings 
premium, as opposed to a public sector earnings premium, is not surprising given that in 
Hungary the earnings of public sector employees have been lagging behind those of their 
private sector counterparts between 1994 and 2002 – which was one of the motivating factors 
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behind the average 50 percent increase in (nominal) wages in 2003. Following the public 
sector wage reforms, in 2003, the private-public sector gap declined at all estimated quantiles 
and the magnitude of the decline in the private-public earnings gap between 2002 and 2003 is 
uniform across the distribution other than at the 10
th
 quantile, where the decline is more 
pronounced. In 2003, there is a public sector earnings premium at the bottom of the 
distribution. In fact, for the unskilled in 2003 the public sector earnings premium is 
characteristic of the entire distribution, other than the top of the distribution. Thus, the mean 
as well as the quantile regression results indicate that the unskilled – the only education group 
– are better off in the public sector of employment in 2003 – as opposed to the other years 
under analysis. Similarly to the middle-skilled, for the high-skilled, the private-public sector 
earnings gap declined at all estimated quantiles between 2002 and 2003, with a sharper 
decline at the bottom of the distribution, whereby in 2003 at the 10
th
 quantile the sector 
earnings gap is around 27 percent in favour of the public sector – for the first time for the 
decade under analysis. Despite the public sector wage reforms, at the top of the earnings 
distribution, the private sector earnings premium is still high relative (a) to the other education 
groups and (b) the pre-reform level.  
 
The estimated earnings differentials in the two sectors separately reflect the different wage 
policy / wage structure in the private and public sectors: (a) earnings differentials especially 
between the high-skilled and unskilled are lower in the public sector, (b) within-education-
group-earnings differentials are lower in the public sector and (c) the private-public sector 
difference in high-skilled earnings premium at the top of the distribution is especially high. 
Specific to the period under observation, two phases in terms of the evolution of earnings 
differentials can be distinguished: 1994 – 2000 and 2000 – 2003. Starting with the private 
sector, the first period is characterised by increasing tertiary premium: not only do tertiary 
graduates experience high and increasing relative returns at the estimated quantiles, the 
within-dispersion is the highest from all education groups, and the increase in the high-skilled 
premium (relative to the unskilled) is more pronounced at the top of the distribution between 
1994 and 2000. Therefore, this period is characterised by an increase in aggregate earnings 
inequality due to an increase in both between- and within-dispersion in the private sector. 
Second, in the early 2000s, in the private sector, as a result of the minimum wage hikes, 
which affected the private employees at the bottom of the education and earnings distribution, 
the returns to each education group relative to the group of unskilled decreased, and the 
decline is more pronounced at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Nevertheless, the final 
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year of observation is still characterised by high tertiary premium, especially at the top of the 
distribution. Turning to the public sector of employment, (a) the tertiary premium also 
increased between 1994 and 2000 and (b) within-dispersion is increasing in education level. 
Between 2000 and 2002, as expected, the relative return to all education levels declined 
relative to the unskilled, with sharper decline at the bottom of the distribution. After the public 
sector wage reforms – which aimed at increasing the tertiary premium – the average relative 
return to high-skilled relative to middle-skilled increased substantially, from around 55 
percent in 2002 to 65 percent in 2003 – which is the highest high-skilled premium (relative to 
middle-skilled) over the decade under observation. The increase in high-skilled premium was 
most pronounced at the bottom of the distribution, and in 2003, the earnings differentials are 
roughly uniform across the distribution – contrary to the private sector of employment. 
Although in 2003 the difference in tertiary premium between the private and public sectors is 
the lowest for the period under analysis, at the top of the distribution the private sector high-
skilled employees still enjoy a substantially higher earnings premium (relative to their 
unskilled counterparts) than their public sector counterparts.  
 
The mean estimates for the returns to formal education are in line with the cross-country 
consensus for CEE countries in terms of increasing between-education-group inequality, 
which manifests itself especially in the increasing incremental return to university education – 
despite the slight decline in earnings differentials in the early 2000s due to the minimum wage 
hikes. The separate analysis for the two sectors, coupled with the quantile regression 
estimates, “disentangle” the high tertiary premium in Hungary. More precisely, the quantile 
regression estimates demonstrate that there is high dispersion in the tertiary premium in the 
private sector, and a substantial gap in tertiary premium across the two sectors of employment 
(even in 2003). This in turn indicates that, although in general tertiary degree is valuable in 
Hungary in terms of earnings advantages, its “value” is not uniform, neither across the sectors 
nor within the private sector of employment.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents the data used in the 
empirical analysis and a brief descriptive analysis of the skill composition and the evolution 
of earnings of the sample for the time period of 1994 – 2003 in the private and public sectors. 
Section 2.3 proceeds with a description of the empirical framework. Section 2.4 describes the 
estimation results for the years under analysis and finally Section 2.5 concludes. Tables and 
Figures are presented in the Appendix.  
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2.2 Data and descriptive evidence 
2.2.1 Data  
The data for the empirical analysis is drawn from the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s 
Wage Survey”. The Wage Survey was first carried out in May 1986. Initially data was 
collected every three years and from 1994 onwards data is collected on a yearly basis in both 
the private and public sectors of employment. In the private sector, data collection covers 
firms employing at least 20 employees, which provide information on a 10 percent random 
sample of their full-time employees.
56
 In the public sector, all institutions independent of size, 
provide information on their full-time employees.
57
 The Wage Survey has the advantage of 
having a large number of observations, ranging from 130,000 to 220,000, depending on the 
year. Data is collected on monthly gross earnings, defined as monthly gross wage plus one 
twelfth of the sum of all other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job 
paid over the previous year
58
, gender, age, educational attainment, occupation, firm size, 
location and ownership structure, sector of employment and industry classification. Weights 
are included in the dataset.  
 
The period under analysis in the study is restricted to the period of 1994 – 2003, given that for 
this time period data is available on both sectors of employment on an annual basis. In the 
private sector, the analysis is restricted to firms employing more than 20 employees, as the 
selection procedure has changed twice over the observation period, in 1995 and 2001. This 
amounts to dropping all observations that come from (a) firms employing 10 – 20 employees 
between the years 1995 and 2000, (b) firms employing 5 – 20 employees from the year 2001 
onwards and (c) firms with missing observations on firm size (only applicable in 1997, 1999 
and 2003).
59
 The analysis focuses on full-time male employees with permanent attachment to 
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 From 1995 and 2001 onwards, a 20 percent random sample of companies employing at least 10 and at least 5 
employees respectively are included in the Wage Survey, which provide information on all of their full-time 
employees.  
57
 Information on the size of the public sector institutions is not provided in the dataset.  
58
 Note that neither hourly wages nor the number of hours worked are reported in the cross-sections (other than 
from 2002 onwards), hence hourly wages cannot be used for the decade under analysis in the estimation.  
59
 Apart from sample comparability purposes, using firms employing more than 20 employees implies that the 
reported earnings information is reliable as (a) the general practice of underreporting wages is more common in 
smaller companies and (b) the compliance rate to the minimum wage regulation (which is high in general) is 
lower in smaller firms (Kertesi and Köllő (2003)). However, it must be noted that not including firms employing 
less than 20 employees has a (potential) disadvantage. Namely, the estimated earnings gap between the private 
and public sectors could potentially be (somewhat) larger when the analysis is restricted to firms employing 
more than 20 individuals than if firms employing less than 20 individuals were also included in the estimation 
procedure, given the evidence that smaller firms tend to pay lower wages than larger firms. Subsequently, the 
results must be interpreted with caution, taking into account the selection procedure for the empirical analysis.  
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the labour market, i.e. aged 25 – 55 years. From 2002 onwards, part-timers are also included 
in the Wage Survey. Subsequently, in the years 2002 and 2003, all workers working part-time 
i.e. less than 36 hours per week are dropped from the sample. The analysis is restricted to 
male employees given the problems in estimation, namely, the problem of potential self-
selection of females into employment coupled with the problem associated with estimating 
experience profiles for females due to their more unstable labour market attachment for 
family reasons. Furthermore, the full sample cannot be treated as a homogeneous group due to 
(a) the gender gap in the level and distribution of earnings, (b) the differences in gender 
composition across sectors, (c) the differences in educational attainment and finally (d) the 
differences in returns to both formal and informal education across genders. More 
specifically, looking at the first and last years under analysis, there are more males working in 
the private sector: the Wage Survey provides evidence that around 91 and 83 percent of all 
males and around 71 and 49 percent of all females work in the private sector in 1994 and 
2003 respectively. Moreover, the Wage Survey provides evidence that in both 1994 and 2003 
the educational attainment differs across the genders in a similar manner in both sectors, i.e. 
the fraction of females who (1) left or finished at most primary school is higher, (2) possess a 
vocational degree is lower, (3) have a high school degree is higher and (4) graduated from 
college is lower.  
 
Throughout the analysis four education groups are used, namely, unskilled (U), low-skilled 
(L), middle-skilled (M) and high-skilled (H), which is motivated by (a) the structure of the 
Hungarian education system, (b) the fact that the four education groups can be generated for 
the entire observation period
60
 and (c) the fact that it is comparable to the existing literature 
estimating (a) the average sector gap in earnings and (b) the average returns to schooling in 
Hungary. The education groups U, L, M and H stand for “No vocational degree and no high 
school degree”, “Vocational degree and no high school degree”, “High school degree and no 
tertiary degree” and “Tertiary degree” respectively, thereby representing a ranking in terms of 
educational level. Table 2.1 describes how the degree levels reported in the Wage Survey 
have been aggregated for 1994 – 1995 and for 1996 – 2003 respectively. Earnings are 
monthly gross earnings, defined as monthly gross wage plus one twelfth of the sum of all 
other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous 
year, denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual consumer price index. 
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 Note that the reporting system for educational attainment in the Wage Survey has changed in 1996, from five 
categories to nine categories (which is described in Table 2.1).   
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Table 2.2 presents some descriptive statistics for the first and last years of the period under 
analysis.  
2.2.2 Differences in educational attainment across sectors 
First of all, Table 2.2 documents the differences across sectors in the educational attainment 
of the sample of male full-time employees for the first and last cross-sections of the 
observation period. The educational composition of the sample suggests that the average skill 
level is higher in the public sector, which also characterises Western European economies 
(Dustmann and van Soest (1997) and Lucifora and Meurs (2004)) and the US (Poterba and 
Rueben (1994)). In particular, in the private sector in both years (and indeed in each cross-
section of the dataset), (a) the fraction of unskilled workers is higher, (b) the fraction of low-
skilled workers is substantially higher and (c) the fraction of high-skilled workers is 
substantially lower. Whereas in the public sector the tertiary graduates make up almost half of 
the sample (approximately 44 and 49 percent in 1994 and 2003 respectively), in the private 
sector in both years only around 14 percent possess a tertiary degree, and the category which 
most individuals belong to is that of low-skilled (approximately 39 and 45 percent in 1994 
and 2003 respectively). Between 1994 and 2003 the most notable change in the distribution of 
skills of the sample is the reduction of the fraction of unskilled workers (primary school or 
less) and a corresponding rise in the fraction of low-skilled (vocational degree) workers in 
both sectors.  
2.2.3 Evolution of earnings 1994 – 2003  
Figure 2.1 depicts the evolution of the unconditional average real monthly gross earnings for 
the period of 1994 – 2003 for the private and public sectors respectively for the sample of 
full-time employed males. The evolution of average real monthly earnings for the selected 
sample reflects the three phases of the Hungarian economy described in the Introduction. 
During the early years of transition, characterised by the “transformational recession” and the 
stabilization package (Bokros Csomag, carried out in 1995), average real monthly earnings of 
the selected sample declined (more in the public sector than in the private sector). From 1997 
and 1996, average real monthly earnings of the selected sample started rising in the public and 
private sector respectively. Between 2000 and 2003, wage growth was especially high in the 
public sector which reflects the increases in the minimum wage and in public sector wages: 
(a) the (nominal) minimum wage was increased twice, first on 01.01.2001 from 25,500 HUF 
to 40,000 HUF and then on 01.01.2002 to 50,000 HUF and (b) between September 2002 and 
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2003, there was a 50 percent average increase in public sector nominal wages.
61
 Between 
2000 and 2003, the growth in real monthly gross earnings for the selected sample amounted to 
approximately 19 and 48 percent in the private and public sectors respectively.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, public sector wages were lagging behind the wages of the 
private sector throughout the decade of transition – which was one of the motivating factors 
behind the increase the wages of public servants. Accordingly, Figure 2.1 documents that 
unconditional average real monthly earnings for the selected sample are higher in the private 
sector between 1994 and 2002. Following the public sector wage reforms, in 2003, 
unconditional average real monthly earnings were higher in the public sector – unconditional 
average monthly gross earnings in the public sector were 11 percent higher than earnings in 
the private sector. Note that, contrary to Hungary, international evidence indicates that 
unconditional average wages are higher in the public sector of employment – for example, in 
Germany (Dustmann and van Soest (1999) and Melly (2005)), Great Britain, Italy and France 
(Lucifora and Meurs (2004)) and Zambia (Nielsen and Rsoholm (2001) – attributed partly to 
the observed higher educational level in the public sector, which is also characteristic for 
Hungary.  
 
Finally, Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of the real monthly minimum wage for the time 
period under analysis. The statutory monthly minimum wage was falling between 1994 and  
1997 and increasing slightly until 2000 – the year before the first hike in minimum wages. As 
a result of the minimum wage hikes in 2001 and 2002, real monthly minimum wage increased 
between 2000 and 2002 (by 44 and 19 percent in 2001 and 2002 respectively) and fell by 
2003 (as the nominal level of the minimum wage remained at its 2002 level). The evolution of 
the statutory minimum wage relative to average earnings for the selected sample in the private 
and public sectors respectively merits comment. Between 1994 and 2000 the monthly 
minimum wage as a proportion of average monthly gross earnings in the private sector for the 
selected sample
62
 was falling, from 27 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2000. After the first 
and second increases, the monthly minimum wage amounted to 33 percent and 36 percent of 
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 For a detailed description of the wage increases for various groups in the public sector see Employment and 
Earnings 1998 – 2003 (2005), pp. 127 – 132 and Labour Report: January – December 2003 (2004), pp. 10 – 20 
and Közalkalmazotti Bértábla: Béremelés 2002 szeptember. 
62
 Note the minimum wage / average earnings ratio is somewhat lower than the figures presented in the 
Introduction because of the sample selection in this study. Namely, three groups who are likely to be paid lower 
wages or wages close to the minimum wage – females, individuals aged less than 25 and employees in small 
firms – are not a part of this analysis. Nevertheless, the general trend is in accordance with the trends presented 
in existing studies (Kertesi and Köllő (2003)) and the figures of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2007).  
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the average monthly gross earnings in the private sector (for the selected sample), and the 
ratio declined to 33 percent in 2003. The evolution of the monthly minimum wage as a 
proportion of average monthly gross earnings in the public sector for the selected sample 
shows a similar pattern: the ratio of monthly minimum wage to average monthly gross 
earnings in the public sector was falling (although not monotonically) between 1994 and 
2000, from 30 percent in 1994 to 27 percent in 2000 and it increased to 36 and 40 percent in 
the years of the minimum wage increases (in 2001 and 2002 respectively). Given the 
increases in public sector wages the following year, in 2003, the proportion of minimum wage 
to average monthly gross earnings for the selected sample amounted to 30 percent – which for 
the first time for the period under analysis was lower than the corresponding ratio in the 
private sector.  
2.2.4 Evolution of earnings by education groups 1994 – 2003 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the evolution of real average monthly gross earnings for the four 
education groups in the private and public sectors respectively. First of all, note that in the 
public sector, the proportion of unskilled to high-skilled average earnings between 1994 and 
1997 is higher than in the latter part of the observation period: unskilled male full-time 
employees in the public sector earned approximately 55 and 44 percent of their high-skilled 
counterparts in the 1994 and 2003 cross-sections of the Wage Survey. It is notable that 
following the minimum wage increases, between 2000 and 2002, (a) the proportion of 
unskilled to low-skilled, to middle-skilled and to high-skilled average earnings and (b) the 
proportion of low-skilled to the middle-skilled average earnings increased, implying a 
compression in earnings at the bottom of the education scale between 2000 and 2002. On the 
other hand, the proportion of middle-skilled to high-skilled earnings did not increase: the 
middle-skilled – who were (a) on average not likely to be affected by the minimum wage 
hikes and (b) did not, on average, enjoy as much of a pay rise as their high-skilled 
counterparts in 2003 – earned around 60, 59 and 56 percent of their high-skilled counterparts 
in 2000, 2002 and 2003. In fact, visual inspection of Figure 2.3 suggests an increased earnings 
dispersion between the middle-skilled full-time public sector male employees and their high-
skilled counterparts throughout the sample period. 
 
Unlike in the public sector, in the private sector for the selected sample the ratio of unskilled 
to low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled average earnings declined between first and 
last years of the observation period, and the decline was most pronounced for the unskilled to 
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high-skilled earnings ratio: unskilled male full-time employees in the private sector earned 
around 91, 64 and 35 percent of the their low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled 
counterparts respectively in the 1994 cross-section of the Wage Survey; the corresponding 
figures are 87, 61 and 26 percent in 2003. However, the decline in the earnings ratio of the 
unskilled to the other skill groups was not monotone over the period under observation: 
following the first minimum wage hike in 2001 – which affected mostly the unskilled private 
sector employees from the skill groups – the ratio of unskilled average earnings to the other 
skill groups did not decline any further. Moreover, unlike in the public sector, the proportion 
of low-skilled to middle-skilled earnings remained roughly constant over the period of 
observation: low-skilled full-time private sector male employees earned around 70 percent of 
their middle-skilled counterparts throughout the observation period. As in the public sector, 
the proportion of middle-skilled to high-skilled earnings declined (almost year by year) over 
the observation period: middle-skilled full-time private sector employees earned around 55 
percent and 43 percent of their high-skilled counterparts in 1994 and in 2003 respectively. In 
fact, a common feature in both sectors is that from all education groups average monthly 
earnings increased the most for the high-skilled employees by 2003.  
 
For the selected sample, as expected, the earnings distribution is more compressed – in the 
sense that the proportion of unskilled to high-skilled earnings is higher – in the public sector 
of employment than in the private sector for the selected sample for the time period under 
observation as wage setting in the public sector is subject to political pressure and pursues the 
goals of equity, whereby the public sector wage scale is characterised by the principle of not 
paying too low wages for low-skilled employees and not too high for their high-skilled 
counterparts.  
 
It is also worth noting that the proportion of public to private sector average earnings differs 
across education groups. Visual inspection of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 indicates that for the 
selected sample (a) earnings for all education groups are higher in the private sector, other 
than in 2003 for the unskilled group and (b) the differences in average earnings levels are 
higher the higher the education level – which reflects the principles behind the wage setting in 
the public sector. In particular, in 1994, the unskilled, low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-
skilled full-time male employees in the public sector earn roughly 86, 83, 82 and 55 percent 
of their private sector counterparts respectively. The corresponding figures are 82, 73, 73 and 
53 percent in 2002 and 105, 94, 82 and 63 percent in 2003. In 2003, (a) the higher public 
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sector average earnings for the unskilled workers relative to their private sector counterparts 
and (b) the higher (average) public / private sector earnings ratio for the other education 
groups relative to 2002 reflect the increase in public sector wages in 2003.  
 
Furthermore, the public / private sector earnings ratio for the different education groups 
across the distribution merits comment, given that the distribution of earnings is more 
compressed in the public sector of employment than in the private one (in general and for 
each education group). Table 2.2 presents, in addition to the mean monthly gross earnings, 
monthly gross earnings for the different education groups at the 25
th
 quantile, at the median 
and at the 75
th
 quantile for the first and final years of the observation period. The public / 
private sector earnings ratio is lower at the top of the earnings distribution for all education 
groups in both 1994 and 2003. For example, the group of high-skilled full-time employees 
earn approximately 71, 65 and 57 percent at the bottom quartile, at the median and at the top 
quartile respectively of their private sector counterparts in 1994. The corresponding figures 
are 96, 74 and 60 percent in 2003.  
 
In light of the descriptive evidence and the wage reforms, a number of hypotheses about the 
evolution of the private-public sector earnings gap and the earnings differentials by education 
in the two sectors can be drawn. First of all, given the public sector wage increases, the 
private-public sector earnings gap is expected to be lower in 2003 than in the rest of the 
decade under analysis. Moreover, given that the public sector pursues egalitarian goals, the 
private-public sector earnings gap is expected to be higher for those with tertiary degrees 
relative to those who are less skilled. Moreover, given the more compressed public sector 
wage structure, it is expected that the private-public sector earnings gap is smaller at the 
bottom of the distribution for all education groups. Following the public sector wage 
increases, a lower private-public sector earnings gap for each education group is expected 
than prior to the reform, however, it is expected that this decline is more pronounced at the 
bottom of the distribution. In terms of the earnings differentials between and within education 
groups in the private and public sectors, it is expected that the returns to all skill groups 
relative to the unskilled have risen over the decade by 2000, especially in the private sector of 
employment, and that within-dispersion for the high-skilled also increased. In the early 2000s, 
as the minimum wage hikes affected the unskilled, (a) lower earnings differentials between 
the unskilled and the other education groups are expected, especially at the bottom of the 
distribution and (b) after the public sector wage reforms, a higher high-skilled earnings 
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premium is expected in the public sector at the bottom of the distribution than in the pre-
reform period.  
2.3 Empirical framework  
The private-public earnings differential is estimated using the standard wage equation (Mincer 
(1974)), pooling data for both sectors and including a dummy variable for the private sector of 
employment:  
 
2
, 1, , 2, , 3, , 4, , 5, , ,ln( ) ,i t t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t i tw S EX EX P R                                   1,...,i n     (4) 
     
where 1,...,i n  indexes individuals in the selected sample and 1994,..., 2003t   stands for 
calendar year. The dependent variable  ,ln i tw  for individual i  in year t  is the logarithm of 
monthly gross earnings, defined as monthly gross wages plus one twelfth of the sum of all 
bonuses paid over the year denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual 
CPI. The explanatory variables include a set of education dummies  S , potential labour 
market experience – age minus years of schooling minus school starting age –  EX  and its 
square  2EX , a dummy variable for private sector  P  (equals 1 if private sector and 0 
otherwise), a dummy variable for region  R  (equals 1 if Budapest and 0 otherwise) and a 
random disturbance term   , which contains the unobserved determinants of earnings. 
Equation (1) is first estimated for the entire economy and then Equation (1) is estimated for 
the four groups distinguished by education in order to focus on the private-public sector 
earnings gap within the particular education groups. Finally, Equation (1) is estimated for the 
private and public sectors separately in order to analyze the evolution of the earnings 
differentials by education in the two sectors seperately. In light of the empirical evidence that 
experience / age profiles differ by education groups (Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger et al. 
(2001), Köllő (1999) and MaCurdy and Mroz (1995)), experience profiles are also estimated 
for each education group separately. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS and by quantile regression at five quantiles of the log 
earnings distribution, at the 10
th
 quantile, at the 25
th
 quantile, at the median, at the 75
th
 
quantile and at the 90
th
 quantile. For all specifications weights are used in estimation. 
Standard errors are obtained by 200 bootstrap replications for the quantile regressions. As 
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noted earlier, the study is purely descriptive in nature, that is, its objective is to shed light on 
the public-private earnings gap and the evolution of the returns to the formal and informal 
components of education in the private and public sectors separately over the entire 
conditional earnings distribution for the time period of 1994 – 2003.  
 
The quantile regression model is formulated as: 
 
,
ii i
y x       with ( | )i i iQuant y x x  ,                                                         1,...,i n      (5) 
 
where iy  is the regression’s dependent variable, ix  is a 1K   vector of regressors, i  is a 
disturbance term
 
and   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The subscript i  indexes 
the individuals in the sample, 1,...,i n . ( | )i iQuant y x denotes the 
th conditional quantile of 
iy , conditional of the regressor vector ix .  As one increases   continuously from 0 to 1, one 
traces the entire conditional distribution of y , conditional on x . 
 
The th  regression quantile,  0 1  , is defined as a solution to the problem of minimizing a 
weighted sum of absolute residuals. The th  regression quantile can be computed by:  
 
: :
| | (1 ) | |min
k
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In the framework of the Mincer earnings equation (1), the resulting regression fit ix   
describes the th  quantile of the earnings of individual i  given the characteristics (for 
example, education level, potential labour market experience etc.) of individual i .  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap 
Figures 2.4 – 2.6 illustrate the estimated private-public sector earnings gap conditional on 
education, potential labour market experience and region at the mean and at five quantiles for 
three time periods, namely, 1994 – 1997, 1997 – 2000 and 2000 – 2003 respectively. Note 
that the three periods correspond to the three phases of the Hungarian economy: the first 
period corresponds to the (final years of the) period of the “transformational recession” and 
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the stabilization package when (unconditional) real earnings were falling, 1997 – 2000 is the 
period when real earnings growth was positive and the final period of 2000 – 2003 represents 
the year prior to the wage reforms and the years of the wage reforms – characterised by 
especially high earnings growth in the public sector.  
 
Starting with Figure 2.4, in 1994, the estimated mean private-public sector earnings gap is 
around 23 percent, that is, earnings of private sector male employees are on average around 
23 percent higher than the earnings of their public sector counterparts.
63
 The quantile 
regression estimates reveal that (a) the positive earnings gap is in favour of the private sector 
at all estimated quantiles and (b) it increases across the estimated quantiles from 
approximately 13 percent at the bottom quartile to approximately 40 percent at the 90
th
 
quantile. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, the average earnings gap amounts to 21, 31 and 38 percent 
respectively – the increase in the average sector earnings gap is due to freeze of nominal 
wages in the public sector (as the income measure of the stabilization package), which in turn 
lead to a higher decline in real monthly earnings in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Similarly to 1994, in the other three years, (a) the positive earnings gap is in favour or the 
private sector at all estimated quantiles and (b) it increases across the estimated quantiles. 
Note that between 1994 and 1997, the increase in the private-public sector earnings gap is 
higher at the top of the distribution: the earnings gap in favour of the public sector is 25 
percent at the bottom quartile and 62 percent at the top quantile in 1997.  
 
During the period of 1997 to 2000, a period of positive earnings growth, (a) the average 
private-public sector earnings gap ranges between approximately 30 and 38 percent – it is 
lower in 1998 and 1999 when public sector earings growth picked up – and (b) increases 
across the estimated quantiles. In the year prior to the wage reforms, the average private-
public sector earnings gap amounts to around 37 percent, and private-public sector earnings 
gap increases across the distribution: it amounts to around 3 percent and 55 percent at the 10
th
 
and 90
th
 quantiles respectively.  
 
                                                 
63
 At this point it must be noted that the estimated private-public sector earnings gap could in part be attributed to 
differences in working hours in the two sectors. That is, although the analysis is restricted to full-time male 
employees, differences in working hours may exist. For instance, it may well be that (some) full-time employees 
in the private sector work longer hours than their public sector counterparts, which in turn generates higher 
earnings. Subsequently, information on the actual hours worked or alternatively on hourly wages would be 
necessary to estimate the (hourly) wage gap between the two sectors for the decade under analysis.  
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Figure 2.6 illustrates that the magnitude of the mean private-public sector earnings gap is 
similar in the three years prior to the public sector wage reforms: the mean private-public 
sector gap amounts to approximately 37, 36 and 32 percent in 2000, 2001 and 2002 
respectively. In 2003, given the average 50 percent increase in (nominal) wages of the public 
sector employees, the estimated average private-public sector earnings gap amounts to around 
14 percent – which is not only substantially lower than in 2002 (by 18 percentage points) but 
is the lowest estimated average earnings premium in favour of the private sector for the 
observation period. In fact, the magnitude of the decline in the private-public earnings gap 
between 2002 and 2003 is uniform across the distribution other than at the 10
th
 quantile, 
where the decline (21 percentage points) is the largest. The coefficient estimate for the 
private-public sector earnings gap at the 10
th
 quantile amounts to approximately - 0.24, which 
indicates that earnings of private sector male employees are around 24 percent lower than the 
earnings of their public sector counterparts. Note that at the 25
th
 quantile in 2003 there is also 
a public sector earnings premium: earnings of private sector male employees are around 4 
percent lower than the earnings of their public sector counterparts.  
 
Given that the decline in the private-public sector earnings gap between 2002 and 2003 is 
higher at the 10
th
 quantile than at the other estimated quantiles, one may conclude that the 
public sector employees at the bottom of the earnings distribution benefited more from the 
public sector wage reforms, which aimed at reducing the earnings gap between the two 
sectors of employment. These individuals are more likely to be at the bottom of the education 
distribution. In order to investigate to what extend each education group “benefited from the 
wage reforms” (i.e. the magnitude of the reduction in the private-public sector earnings gap), 
the private-public sector earnings gap is estimated for each education group separately. In 
fact, the analysis of the private-public sector earnings gap for each education group is 
important for each year under observation as the educational composition of the two sectors is 
different: whereas approximately half of the public sector employees are professionals with 
college / university education, the private sector is dominated by low-skilled employment (as 
Section 2.2.2 discusses). Finally, the private-public sector earnings gap is expected to vary for 
each education group given (a) the egalitarian wage policy in the public sector (manifested in 
high ceilings to the unskilled and low floors for the high-skilled) and (b) given the different 
evolution of earnings for each education group (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3).  
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2.4.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap by education groups 
The private-public sector earnings gap at the mean and at the estimated quantiles (conditional 
on potential labour market experience and region) for the different education groups are 
depicted in Figures 2.7 – 2.18. Figures 2.7 – 2.9 document the estimated private-public sector 
earnings gap for the unskilled full-time male prime age employees for the time periods of 
1994 – 1997, 1997 – 2000 and 2000 – 2003 respectively. Figures 2.10 – 2.12, Figures 2.13 – 
2.15 and Figures 2.16 – 2.18 illustrate the estimated private-public sector earnings gap for the 
low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled for the three time periods respectively.  
Before turning to each education group in more detail, it must be noted that, as expected (see 
discussion in Section 2.2.4), the estimated average private-public sector earnings gap is 
increasing in education level for most of the cross-sections under analysis. 
2.4.2.1 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Unskilled 
Turning specifically to the group of unskilled, between 1994 and 1997, the estimated average 
earnings premium in favour of the private sector increases each year in the first time period, 
from around 8 percent in 1994 to 26 percent in 1997 – as earnings growth picked up for the 
unskilled in 1996 and 1997 in the private and public sectors respectively. The quantile 
regression estimates reveal that each year the private-public sector earnings gap increases 
across the distribution, for instance, it amounts to approximately 10 percent in favour of the 
public sector at the 10
th
 quantile and 26 percent in favour of the private sector at the 90
th
 
quantile in 1994. Visual inspection of Figure 2.7 indicates that the increase in the private 
sector earnings premium is roughly constant across the distribution between 1994 and 1997. 
Coming to the next period, Figure 2.8 demonstrates (a) that between 1997 and 1998, the 
average private-public sector earnings gap decreases to around 17 percent, remains at its 1998 
level in 1999 and increases to 24 percent by 2000 and (b) the private-public sector earnings 
gap increases across the distribution. 
 
The most interesting time period for the unskilled group is between 2000 and 2003, as both 
the minimum wage reforms and public sector wage reforms affected the earnings of this 
education group, thereby altering the distribution of earnings and the private-public sector 
earnings gap for this time period. In 2000, prior to the reforms, (a) the mean private-public 
earnings gap amounts to around 24 percent, (b) the private-public sector earnings gap 
increases across the estimated quantiles: the coefficient estimate at the 10
th
 quantile is around 
- 0.06 indicating that the earnings of private sector employees are around 6 percent lower than 
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that of their public sector counterparts, and the private-public sector earnings gap amounts to 
around 44 percent at the 90
th
 quantile. After the first and second minimum wage increases, the 
average private-public sector earnings gap dropped to around 21 and to 15 percent in 2001 
and 2002 respectively. The magnitude of the decline is (approximately) uniform across the 
distribution in both years apart from the bottom quntile, where the magnitude of the private-
public sector earnings gap remained around the same. After the increase in public sector 
wages, in 2003, as expected, the mean private-public sector earnings gap declined further. For 
the first time for the period under analysis the average earnings gap is in favour of the public 
sector and amounts to around 6 percent. In fact, in 2003, the public sector earnings premium 
is characteristic of the entire distribution, other than at the top of the distribution. The public 
sector earnings premium amounts to 20 and 5 percent at the 10
th
 quantile and at the median 
respectively, and the private sector premium amounts to around 10 percent at the 90
th
 
quantile. Thus, the mean as well as the quantile regression results indicate that the unskilled 
are better off in the public sector of employment in 2003 – as opposed to the other years under 
analysis.  
2.4.2.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Low-skilled 
Figures 2.10 – 2.12 present the private-public sector earnings gap for the low-skilled group 
for the three time periods respectively. Before turning to some noteworthy changes over time, 
it is important to note that for all cross-sections there is a general pattern of negative earnings 
gap in favour of the private sector at the bottom of the distribution which turns positive at the 
25
th
 quantile and increases across the distribution – which is similar to the observed earnings 
gap for the unskilled. For instance, in 2000, at the 10
th
 quantile the public-private sector 
earnings gap amounts to around 1 percent, at the 25
th
 quantile the private-public sector 
earnings gap amounts to around 22 percent and it increases across the qunatiles, reaching 57 
percent at the top quantile. The average private-public sector earnings gap for the low-skilled 
is increasing in the last years of the “transformational recession” and the stabilization 
package, from around 11 percent in 1994 to around 31 percent in 1997, decreases to 26 
percent by 1998, increases to around 31 percent by 2000, and after the wage reforms it 
decreases year by year from 30 percent in 2001 to 4 percent in 2003. Note also that (a) the 
evolution of the average private-public sector earnings gap is similar for the two education 
groups and (b) in all cross-sections the average private-public sector earnings gap for the low-
skilled is slightly higher than that for the unskilled. In 2003, the decline in private-public 
sector earnings gap amounts to around 22 percentage points at the mean, and this decline is 
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uniform at the estimated quantiles, resulting in a public sector earnings premium at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution. The public sector earnings premium amounts to 28 and 11 percent 
at the 10
th
 and 25
th
 quantiles, the private sector earnings premium amounts to 5 percent at the 
median and increases to 30 percent at the 90
th
 quantile.  
2.4.2.3 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, Middle-skilled 
Figures 2.13 – 2.15 illustrate the private-public sector earnings gap for the middle-skilled. 
First of all, note that the mean private-public sector earnings gap for the middle-skilled 
evolves in a similar way over the decade as that of the unskilled and low-skilled. More 
specifically, the private-public sector earnings gap amounts to around 14 percent in 1994 and 
increases to around 41 percent by 1997 – the high private-public sector earnings gap by 1997 
is not surprising because, whereas in the public sector real earnings of the middle-skilled fell 
constantly until 1997, with a marked decline between 1996 and 1997, in the private sector real 
earnings started to grow steadily from 1995 onwards. The private-public sector earnings gap 
declines to around 28 percent by 1998 – as public sector earnings growth for the middle-
skilled picked up in 1997 –, remains approximately the same in magnitude until 2001 and 
decreases to around 14 percent by 2003 (as a result of the public sector wage reforms) – 
which is equivalent to the 1994 level, in opposition to the other two education groups for 
whom the estimated private-public sector earnings gap is lower in 2003 than in 1994. The 
quantile regression estimates reveal that, as for the other two education groups, the private-
public sector earnings gap is sensitive to the quantile estimated, and increases across the 
distribution for most cross-sections. Furthermore, the quantile regression estimates reveal a 
difference to the other two education groups analysed so far, namely, whereas for the 
unskilled and low-skilled groups the changes in the magnitude of the private-public sector 
earnings gap over time are (more or less) uniform across the distribution, for the middle-
skilled the changes are more pronounced at the top of the distribution for the time periods of 
1994 – 1997 and 1997 – 2000, and the changes more pronounced at the bottom of the 
distribution for the 2000 – 2003 period. For example, whereas the private-public sector 
earnings gap remained about the same in magnitude between 1997 and 2000 at the bottom of 
the distribution, at the 90
th
 quantile the estimated private-public sector earnings gap declined 
gradually, from around 63 percent in 1997 to around 32 percent by 2000. Moreover, between 
2002 and 2003 the private-public sector gap declined at each estimated quantile (and at the 
mean), with a sharper decline at the bottom of the distribution: at the 10
th
 quantile the 
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earnings premium is in favour of the public sector and amounts to around 26 percent and at 
the 90
th
 quantile the private-public sector earnings gap amounts to 41 percent.  
2.4.2.4 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, High-skilled 
Figures 2.16 – 2.18 document the estimated private-public sector earnings gap for the high-
skilled group. Starting with the mean estimates, the private-public sector earnings gap is 
increasing over the ten year period, or remains roughly constant, with the exception of 1995, 
1998 and 2003 – the three years of high public sector high-skilled earnings growth (see Figure 
2.3)). Between 2002 and 2003, the average private-public sector earnings gap declined by 21 
percentage points from 45 to 23 percent. As expected, due to the higher earnings dispersion in 
the private sector, in all cross-sections, the private-public sector earnings gap increases across 
the distribution: for example, in 1994, from around 21 percent at the 10
th
 quantile to 69 
percent at the 90
th
 quantile. The private-public sector earnings gap declined at all estimated 
quantiles between 2002 and 2003, with a sharper decline at the bottom of the distribution, 
whereby in 2003, at the 10
th
 quantile the sector earnings gap is around 27 percent in favour of 
the public sector – for the first time for the decade under analysis – and around 62 percent in 
favour of the private sector at the 90
th
 quantile. Despite the public sector wage reforms, at the 
top of the earnings distribution, the private sector premium is still high relative (a) to the other 
education groups and (b) the pre-reform level. 
2.4.3 Results for the private sector 
Tables 2.3 – 2.12 present the parameter estimates for the OLS and quantile regressions from   
1994 to 2003 respectively. The first six columns of each table present the parameter estimates 
for the private sector.  
 
First of all, in terms of the between-educational-levels earnings differentials, as expected, 
there is an earnings premium associated with the additional degree levels at the mean and at 
all estimated quantiles for all cross-sections. Starting with 1994, the mean returns to low-
skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled employees are around 14, 43 and 94 percent 
respectively relative to their unskilled counterparts. In light of the existing empirical evidence 
(for example, Köllő (2002)) for the private sector and the evolution of real monthly gross 
earnings for each education group (see Figure 2.2), an increasing average relative return to 
university / college education between 1994 and 2000 is expected. However, in the early 
2000s, the average return to the high-skilled labour relative to unskilled labour is not expected 
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to increase further, as the minimum wage reforms raised (mostly) the wages of the unskilled 
employees in the private sector. In fact, the OLS estimates indicate that the mean return to the 
low-skilled employees relative to their unskilled counterparts increased slightly to 
approximately 18 percent by 2000, and after the minimum wage hikes there was a slight 
gradual decline in the average relative return, reaching 14 percent in 2003. The relative return 
to the middle-skilled group increased slightly to 48 percent by 2000 and declined to 42 
percent by 2003. The relative return to the high-skilled group increased to 118 percent 
between 1994 and 2000 and declined slightly in the early 2000s to 114 percent by 2003. 
Therefore, the mean estimates reveal that whereas the relative return to vocational degrees 
and high school degrees increased slightly until 2000 and declined in the early 2000s 
(whereby the relative returns are the same in 2003 as in 1994), the return to college / 
university degree, despite the slight decline in the early 2000s, increased significantly over the 
decade under observation – and remains high in international comparison (see, for instance, 
Education at a Glance 2007 (2007)).  
 
Given the evidence above concerning the evolution of average earnings differentials by 
education, the quantile regression estimates will be discussed for two phases: 1994 – 2000 and 
2000 – 2003, whereby the first period is characterised by increasing average relative returns, 
especially for the high-skilled, and the second period is characterised by a slight decline in 
relative returns. First of all, for the cross-sections of 1994 – 2000, (a) the returns to all 
additional educational levels are increasing across the quantiles, (b) the within-dispersion is 
higher the higher the education level and (c) high-skilled workers experience the highest 
within-group dispersion. This is in line with the international evidence, despite the differences 
in magnitude (for example, Machado and Mata (2001)). Between 1994 and 2000, the increase 
in the high-skilled premium (relative to the unskilled) is more pronounced at the top of the 
distribution: the return to high-skilled relative to unskilled amounts to around 77, 90 and 119 
at the 10
th
 quantile, at the median and at the 90
th
 quantile respectively in 1994 and the 
corresponding figures are around 94, 115 and 151 percent in 2000.  
 
The increase in minimum wage in the early 2000s should effect the bottom of the earnings 
distribution and the bottom of the education scale in the private sector of employment, which 
in turn compresses the distribution of earnings for the unskilled. The expected effects of the 
increases in minimum wage are (a) declining earnings differentials by education groups, 
especially at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and (b) given the more compressed wage 
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structure of the unskilled, an increase in the relative within-dispersion for the other education 
groups. Investigating the estimates for 2000 and 2001, (a) the returns to each education group 
relative to the group of unskilled decreased, and the decline is more pronounced at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution, and (b) at each education level the within-dispersion increased. 
The declining relative returns also characterises the bottom of the distribution in 2002, as well 
as the increase in within-dispersion for each education group, relative to the unskilled. The 
final year of the observation period is still characterised by high-within dispersion, especially 
for the group of high-skilled: the returns relative to the unskilled at the 10
th
 quantile, at the 
median and at the 90
th
 quantiles are around 6, 15 and 20 percent for the low-skilled, 24, 43 
and 57 percent for the middle-skilled and 81, 117 and 148 percent for the high-skilled. 
Finally, (keeping in mind the distinct evolution of earnings differentials by education in the 
early 2000s as a result of the increases in the minimum wage) the relative return to the high-
skilled workers increased at all estimated quantiles between 1994 and 2003, by a higher 
amount at the top of the distribution i.e. the return at the 10
th
 and 90
th
 quantiles increased by 
approximately 4 and 29 percent respectively between 1994 and 2003.  
 
The experience profiles for the private sector at the mean and at the estimated quantiles are 
illustrated in Figures 2.19 – 2.28 for each year under analysis. All experience profiles have the 
expected concave shape i.e. earnings increase at a decreasing rate until the end of the 
individual’s career.64 Between 1994 and 1998 and in 2003, earnings growth is higher at the 
top of the distribution. In 1994, earnings growth reaches around 27, 39 and 55 percent at the 
10
th
 quantile at the median and at the 90
th
 quantile respectively by the end of the career, in 
1998 the corresponding figures are around 23, 29 and 33 percent, and in 2003 the 
corresponding figures are around 21, 33 and 46 percent. Between 1999 and 2002, the 
experience profiles are (roughly) uniform across the distribution (other than the 10
th
 quantile 
in 2002). Visual inspection of the mean experience profiles suggests that the experience 
profiles flattened between 1994 and 2003, although this was not uniform during the period.  
 
Given the (international) evidence that experience / age profiles are not the same across 
education groups (for example, Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger et al. (2001), Köllő (2002), 
MaCurdy and Mroz (1995)), the experience profiles are estimated for each skill group 
separately. The experience profiles at the mean and at four quantiles for the low-skilled, 
                                                 
64
 Note that in what is to follow the individual’s career is defined by the sample selection of this study – that is, 
the beginning of the career corresponds to the mid 20s and the end of the career to the mid 50s respectively – and 
not the official retirement age set by law.  
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middle-skilled and high-skilled are presented for 2003 in Figures 2.39 – 2.41 respectively in 
order to investigate the differences in experience profiles across education groups.
65
 As 
expected, (a) for all education groups, earnings growth declines over the career, (b) at the 
beginning of the career earnings growth increases in education level and (c) as opposed to the 
low- and middle-skilled, at 22 years of experience, earnings growth reaches slightly negative 
for the high-skilled private sector male employees. The quantile regressions point to further 
differences between the education groups: (a) for the low-skilled, earnings growth is uniform 
across the estimated quantiles i.e. the experience profiles are indistinguishable, (b) for the 
middle-skilled, overall life-cycle earnings growth increases across the distribution and (c) for 
the high-skilled, earnings growth is higher at the beginning of the career at the top of the 
distribution and it declines at a faster rate at the top of the distribution. Within-group 
dispersion in earnings growth is higher the higher the education level.  
 
Figures 2.42 – 2.50 present the experience profiles at the mean and at four quntiles in the 
private sector for the high-skilled for 1994 – 2003 respectively.66 The most remarkable 
change over the time period of observation for the high-skilled full-time private sector male 
employees is the shape of the cross-section experience profiles. Starting with the mean 
experience profiles, whereas between 1994 and 1998 average earnings growth is positive and 
declines over the career, from 1998 onwards, average earnings growth declines and reaches 
slightly negative after around 22 – 25 years of experience. More precisely, earnings growth 
becomes negative at 25 years of experience in 1999 and in 2000, at 23 years of experience in 
2001 and in 2002 and finally at 22 years of experience in 2003. This constant change in shape 
characterizes the experience profiles at all the estimated quantiles. Furthermore, in all cross-
sections the top of the distribution is characterised by higher earnings growth (when positive).  
 
Finally, the parameter estimates for the Budapest dummy merit brief discussion. As expected, 
in all cross-sections, those private sector employees working in the capital have higher 
average earnings. This average premium, relative to rest of the country, ranges between 
approximately 13 percent in 2000 and 21 percent in 2003. The quantile regression estimates 
                                                 
65
 The experience profiles for each education group for 2003 are presented as in 2003, unlike in the other years 
under analysis, the quantile regression and OLS regression parameter estimates were significant for each 
education group, other than for the unskilled and at the 10
th
 quantile for each education group. Therefore, the 
experience profiles (a) at the 10
th
 quantile and (b) for the unskilled are not presented. 
66
 The high-skilled experience profiles are presented because, unlike for the other three education groups, the 
returns to experience to this group were significant in all years. Note also that at the 10
th
 quantile the experience 
profiles are not presented given that the parameter estimates were not significant.  
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reveal that the Budapest premium increases across the quantiles under the period under 
analysis.  
2.4.4 Results for the public sector 
The final six columns of Tables 2.3 – 2.12 present the parameter estimates for the OLS and 
quantile regressions for the public sector for 1994 to 2003 respectively.  
 
Summarising briefly the OLS results in the public sector, there is an earnings premium 
associated with the additional degree levels – as in the private sector. In 1994, the mean 
returns to low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled full-time employed males are 
approximately 11, 41 and 63 percent respectively relative to their unskilled counterparts. 
Given the evolution of real monthly gross earnings in Figure 2.3, the earnings differentials by 
education groups will be discussed for the time period of 1994 – 2000 and of 2000 – 2003, 
with an emphasis on five years: 1995, 1998, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The OLS parameter 
estimates indicate that over the period of 1994 – 2000, relative to the unskilled full-time 
public sector male employees, (a) the return to their low-skilled counterparts ranged between 
8 and 14 percent, (b) the return to their middle-skilled counterparts ranged between 33 and 36 
percent and (c) the return to their high-skilled counterparts increased from 63 percent in 1994 
to 99 percent in 2000. The average incremental return to high-skilled public sector 
employment (relative to middle-skilled) merits comment, as this is expected to increase 
between 1994 and 2000: in 1994, the incremental return amounted to approximately 22 
percent, increased to 40 percent by 1995, to 52 percent in 1998, and remained at this level 
until 2000. Following the minimum wage increases, as expected, the relative return to all 
education levels relative to the unskilled declined compared to their pre-reform level: to 
around 4, 33 and 88 percent for the respective education groups by 2002. Given that the wage 
scale was revised in 2003 – aiming at increasing the tertiary degree premium – the average 
relative return to high-skilled employment relative to middle-skilled employment increased 
substantially, from around 55 percent in 2002 to 65 percent in 2003 – which is the highest 
high-skilled premium (relative to middle-skilled) over the decade under observation.  
 
In terms of within-dispersion, in 1994, (a) the relative return to the middle- and high-skilled 
groups is increasing over the distribution and (b) the within-dispersion is increasing in 
education level. For instance, the return to middle-skilled full-time employed males relative to 
their unskilled counterparts is approximately 33 and 48 percent at the 10
th
 quantile and 90
th
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quantile respectively, and the corresponding figures for high-skilled individuals are 
approximately 47 and 77 percent respectively. This pattern is characteristic for the period of 
1994 – 2000. Between 2000 and 2001, the earnings differential between the unskilled and the 
other skill groups declined at all quantiles, with a sharper decline at the bottom of the 
distribution, which is expected as the increases in minimum wage affected especially those at 
the bottom of the earnings and skill distribution. Note that the decline in earnings differentials 
continue in 2002, and the earnings differential between the low-skilled and unskilled at the 
top of the distribution diminishes. After the revision of the public sector wage scale, which 
introduced a statutory minimum wage for college graduates (see Introduction for detail) and 
aimed at a higher skill premia for the higher educated in general, the incremental return to 
high-skill public sector employment increased at all quantiles, with sharper increases at the 
bottom of the distribution. The tertiary degree premium (relative to high-school degree) is 
around 66, 65 and 69 percent at the 10
th
 quantile, at the median and at the 90
th
 quantile 
respectively in 2003. Note also that in 2003, unlike in the other years under observation, the 
earnings differentials are roughly uniform across the distribution.  
 
The cross-section experience profiles for the public sector for the time period of 1994 – 2003 
are depicted in Figures 2.29 – 2.38. There is evidence that (a) earnings grow over the career, 
(b) earnings growth declines over the career at the mean and at all estimated quantiles and (c) 
in most cross-sections, earnings growth is higher at the top of the distribution.   
 
Figures 2.51 – 2.60 illustrate the cross-section experience profiles for high-skilled public 
sector employees separately for 1994 – 2003 respectively.67 Note for the time period under 
analysis, the high-skilled group makes up around half of the selected sample (in the public 
sector), due to the professional composition of public sector employment (health, education 
and public administration). In 1994, mean earnings growth for the high-skilled males declines 
and turns negative at the end of the career. In the other years under analysis, mean earnings 
growth declines and remains positive over the career. In all cross-sections, earnings growth in 
the early years in labour market is higher at the top of the distribution, and this difference in 
growth rates declines over the career. Overall earnings growth is higher at the top of the 
distribution, however, the magnitude varies over the time period. Finally, visual inspection of 
the experience profiles suggests a change in the general shape of the experience profiles: the 
experience profiles become less concave over the time period under analysis.  
                                                 
67
 The cross-section experience profiles for the high-skilled are presented because, unlike for the other education 
groups, the returns to experience were significant at the mean and the estimated quantiles for the high-skilled.  
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Finally, the Budapest dummy indicates that, as in the private sector, (a) those public sector 
employees working in the capital have higher average earnings for the observation period and 
(b) the Budapest earnings premium increases across the quantiles for the period under 
analysis.   
2.4.5 Cross-sector comparison 
As the wage policy in the private and public sector differs – competitive versus egalitarian 
goals – the wage structure in the public sector is more compressed relative to the private 
sector, and the wage differentials are expected to reflect this: in comparison to the private 
sector, (a) lower earnings differentials between the high-skilled and unskilled, (b) lower 
within-education-group-earnings differentials and (c) an especially high private-public sector 
difference in high-skill earnings premium at the top of the distribution are expected. Specific 
to the period under observation, the difference in high-skill premium between the private and 
public sectors is expected to decline when the wages of high-skilled public sector employees 
are increased.  
 
Starting with the first year under observation, as expected, (a) the average relative return to all 
educational levels is lower in the public sector than in the private sector and (b) this difference 
is the highest for the high-skilled employees. The quantile regression estimates show that (a) 
the relative return to all educational levels is lower in the public sector than in the private 
sector at all estimated quantiles, other than at the 10
th
 quantile for the group of low-skilled 
individuals and (b) the gap in high-skilled earnings premium is the highest at the top of the 
distribution. The latter observations characterise all the cross-sections. In 2003, the difference 
in the average private-public sector high-skill earnings premium is lower than prior to the 
public sector wage reform. This is in accordance with the revised public sector wage scale 
which aimed at increasing the public sector high-skill premium. As the quantile regression 
estimates indicate, this decline in the private-public sector high-skill earnings premium is 
more pronounced at the bottom of the distribution. That is, at the top of the distribution the 
private sector high-skilled employees still enjoy a substantially higher earnings premium 
(relative to their unskilled counterparts) than their public sector counterparts.  
 
In terms of the estimated experience profiles several points are worth noting. First, in all 
cross-sections, the overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in the public sector at the mean 
 108 
and at all estimated quantiles. For the group of high-skilled male employees, whereas the 
overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in the public sector at the mean and at the bottom 
of the distribution, in some cross-sections the overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in 
the private sector the top of the distribution, which in turn implies higher within-dispersion in 
the private sector in terms of overall earnings growth for the high-skilled. In other words, 
experience is more valued at high paid jobs in the private sector. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The study examined the evolution of earnings in the private and public sectors of employment 
in Hungary for the decade of 1994 – 2003. More specifically, the study examined (a) the 
evolution of the private-public earnings gap for full-time prime aged male employees, (b) the 
evolution of the private-public earnings gap for groups of full-time male employees 
distinguished by education and (c) the evolution of the returns to education in the private and 
public sectors separately based “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wage Survey” using 
OLS and quantile regression. The use of quantile regression is motivated by the fact that the 
earnings distribution in the two sectors of employment differs, whereby wages are more 
compressed in the public sector due to the egalitarian wage policy pursued. Moreover, the 
particular time period under analysis witnessed numerous reforms – the increases in minimum 
wages in 2001 and 2002 and the increases in public sector wages in 2003 – which had an 
effect on the distribution of the wages in the two sectors of employment. Whereas quantile 
regression has been applied in other countries to address the wage structures in the private and 
public sectors of employment (for example, Budria (2006), Lucifora and Meurs (2004), Melly 
(2005), Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Mueller (1998)), and Nielsen and Rosholm (2001)), it 
has not been applied in Hungary so far.  
 
The first set of results describes the evolution of the private-public sector earnings gap for the 
decade under analysis. First of all, in 2003, given the average 50 percent increase in (nominal) 
wages of the public sector employees, the estimated average private-public sector earnings 
gap amounts to around 14 percent – which is not only lower than in 2002, but is the lowest 
estimated average earnings premium in favour of the private sector for the observation period. 
The decline in the mean private-public sector earnings gap is in line with the finding of 
Telegdy (2006) who estimates the mean sector earnings gap at around 27 percent in favour of 
the private sector in 2000 and at around 7 percent in favour of the public sector in 2004, based 
on the same dataset for the pooled sample of males and females.  
 109 
 
In light of the different wage policies in the two sectors, resulting in different wage 
distributions, it is expected that the private-public sector earnings gap is sensitive to the 
quantile estimated. In fact, existing evidence from Lucifora and Meurs (2004) suggests that in 
France, Italy and Great Britain in 1998 the estimated positive gap in favour of the public 
sector is decreasing along the wage distribution and it only turns negative at the top of the 
distribution, indicating that males are better off in the public sector at the lowest quantiles and 
the opposite is true for the highest quantiles. Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Mueller (1998) 
find declining public sector wage premium as quantiles increase in the US and in Canada 
respectively. For Hungary, between 1994 and 2002, at all estimated quantiles, there is a 
private sector earnings premium (other than at the 10
th
 quantile in some cross-sections) which 
increases across the distribution. The fact that in Hungary for the period under analysis there 
is a private sector earnings premium, as opposed to a public sector earnings premium, is not 
surprising given that in Hungary the earnings of public sector employees have been lagging 
behind those of their private sector counterparts between 1994 and 2002 – which was one of 
the motivating factors behind the average 50 percent increase in (nominal) wages in 2003. 
Following the public sector wage reforms, in 2003, the private-public sector earnings gap 
declined at all estimated quantiles and the magnitude of the decline in the private-public 
earnings gap between 2002 and 2003 is uniform across the distribution other than at the 10
th
 
quantile, where the decline is more pronounced. In 2003, there is a public sector earnings 
premium at the bottom of the distribution.  
 
Before turning to a brief summary of the findings for each education group, three points merit 
comment. First, as expected, the estimated average private-public sector earnings gap is 
increasing in education level in (almost) all cross-sections. Second, the evolution of the 
average private-public sector earnings gap mirrors the phases of the Hungarian economy and 
is similar for all education groups (despite the differences in magnitude): the average private-
public sector earnings gap is increasing in last years of the “transformational recession” and 
the stabilization package (1994 – 1997), decreases by 1999, increases by 2000, and after the 
wage reforms the average private-public sector earnings gap declines substantially by 2003. 
Moreover, whereas the average private-public sector earnings gap for the unskilled, low-
skilled and high-skilled is lower in the last year under observation than in the first year under 
observation (and in fact in all cross-sections), this is not true for the middle-skilled, for whom 
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after the wage reforms, though lower than in 2002, the average private-public sector earnings 
gap is the same in magnitude as in 1994.  
 
The quantile regression estimates demonstrate that, in line with the existing international 
evidence, the private-public sector earnings gap is sensitive to the quantile estimated for each 
education group. Since the private-public sector earnings gap after the public sector wage 
reform has been the center of attention in the literature, the time period of 2000 – 2003 will be 
the focus for each education group in order to augment the results to the existing evidence, 
which only consider the average earnings gap.  
 
First, in 2003, for the first time for the period under analysis, the average earnings gap for the 
unskilled employees is in favour of the public sector, which is in line with the findings of 
Telegdy (2006). In fact, in 2003 the public sector earnings premium is characteristic of the 
entire distribution, other than at the top of the distribution. Thus, the mean as well as the 
quantile results indicate that the unskilled – the only education group – are better off in the 
public sector of employment in 2003 – as opposed to the other years under analysis. The 
quantile regression estimates for the middle-skilled male employees reveal a difference to 
their unskilled and low-skilled counterparts: whereas for the unskilled and low-skilled 
employees the magnitude of the decline of the private-public sector earnings gap in the early 
2000s is (roughly) uniform across the distribution, for the middle-skilled the decline is more 
pronounced at the bottom of the distribution for the 2000 – 2003 period. In 2003, the middle-
skilled public sector employees at the 10
th
 quantile of the earnings distribution face an 
earnings premium relative to their private sector counterparts (like the unskilled and low-
skilled public sector employees). Similarly to the middle-skilled, for the high-skilled, the 
private-public sector earnings gap declined at all estimated quantiles between 2002 and 2003, 
with a sharper decline at the bottom of the distribution, whereby in 2003 at the 10
th
 quantile 
the sector earnings gap is around 27 percent in favour of the public sector – for the first time 
for the decade under analysis. Despite the public sector wage reforms, at the top of the 
earnings distribution, the private sector premium is still high relative (a) to the other education 
groups and (b) the pre-reform level.  
 
The set of results concerning the earnings differentials by education confirm the expectations  
in light of the wage policies / wage distributions in the two sectors: (a) earnings differentials 
especially between the high-skilled and unskilled are lower in the public sector, (b) within-
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education-group-earnings differentials are lower in the public sector and (c) the private-public 
sector difference in high-skill earnings premium at the top of the distribution is especially 
high. Two distinct phases in terms of the evolution of earnings differentials can be 
distinguished for the decade under observation: 1994 – 2000 and 2000 – 2003. Starting with 
the private sector, the first period is characterised by increasing tertiary premium: not only do 
tertiary graduates experience high and increasing relative returns at the estimated quantiles, 
the within-dispersion is the highest from all education groups, and the increase in the high-
skilled premium (relative to the unskilled) is more pronounced at the top of the distribution 
between 1994 and 2000. Therefore, this period is characterised by an increase in aggregate 
earnings inequality due to an increase in both between- and within-dispersion in the private 
sector. Second, in the early 2000s, in the private sector as a result of the minimum wage hikes, 
which affected the private employees at the bottom of the education and earnings distribution, 
the returns to each education group relative to the group of unskilled decreased, and the 
decline was more pronounced at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Nevertheless, the 
final year of observation is still characterised by high tertiary premium, especially at the top 
of the distribution. Turning to the public sector of employment, (a) the tertiary premium also 
increased between 1994 and 2000 and (b) within-dispersion is increasing in education level. 
Between 2000 and 2002, as expected, the relative return to all education levels declined 
relative to the unskilled, with sharper decline at the bottom of the distribution. After the public 
sector wage reforms – which aimed at increasing the tertiary premium – the average relative 
return to high-skilled relative to middle-skilled increased substantially, from around 55 
percent in 2002 to 65 percent in 2003 – which is the highest high-skilled premium (relative to 
middle-skilled) over the decade under observation. The increase in high-skilled premium was 
most pronounced at the bottom of the distribution, and in 2003, the earnings differentials are 
roughly uniform across the distribution – contrary to the private sector of employment. 
Although in 2003 the difference in tertiary premium between the private and public sectors is 
the lowest for the period under analysis, at the top of the distribution the private sector high-
skilled employees still enjoy a substantially higher earnings premium (relative to their 
unskilled counterparts) than their public sector counterparts. Note that the estimates of this 
study confirm the international consensus that the returns to education, especially at the 
tertiary level, are higher in the private sector than in the public sector (for example, Dustmann 
and van Soest (1997), Psacharopoulos (1994) and Nielsen and Rosholm (2001)). Moreover, 
for samples of full-time employed men in a number of EU countries (the year under analysis 
ranging from 2000 to 2003), Budria (2006) concludes that “the impact of schooling on within-
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groups dispersion is found to be substantially larger in the private than in the public sector” – 
which is in line with the evidence for Hungary.  
 
In terms of the estimated experience profiles two points merit comment. First, in all cross-
sections, the overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in the public sector at the mean and 
at all estimated quantiles. Second, for the group of high-skilled male employees, whereas the 
overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in the public sector at the mean and at the bottom 
of the distribution, in some cross-sections the overall life-cycle earnings growth is higher in 
the private sector the top of the distribution, which in turn implies higher within-dispersion in 
the private sector in terms of overall earings growth for the high-skilled. Experience is more 
valued at high paid jobs in the private sector.  
 
Finally, note that the mean estimates for the returns to formal education are in line with the 
cross-country consensus for CEE countries and with the existing evidence on Hungary in 
terms of increasing between-education-group inequality, which manifests itself especially in 
the increasing incremental return to university education (for example, Kertesi and Köllő 
(1999), Keane and Prasad (2001), Kézdi (2005), Munich et al. (2002), Orazem and Vodopivec 
(1998) and Noorkôiv et al. (1997)) – despite the slight decline in earnings differentials in the 
early 2000s due to the minimum wage hikes. For instance, the OLS estimates based also on 
the “Hungarian National Labour Center’s Wages Survey” for full-time male and female 
private sector employees by Kézdi (2005) indicate that the mean return relative to primary 
school or less (a) to vocational education ranged between 10 and 14 percent, (b) to high 
school increased from 30 to 40 percent and (c) to university education increased from 80 to 
150 percent between 1989 and 2002. The estimation results for Portugal are also worth 
noting, since Portugal is also a country where despite the increasing level of education, the 
incremental return to college education has been increasing and remains high in international 
comparison. For instance, Machado and Mata (2001) document that between 1982 and 1994, 
whereas the mean return to all education categories relative to less than 4 years of elementary 
schooling have decreased, the mean return to college education increased from 102 percent to 
109 percent. Furthermore, Machado and Mata (2001) also document a sharper rise in the 
incremental return to college education at higher quantiles between 1982 and 1994.  
 
It is important to note that the earnings advantage of university graduates has been found not 
only increasing during the 1990s in Hungary but also higher than in any other OECD country 
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under analysis by 2005 (Education at a Glance 2007 (2007)). As mentioned above, the mean 
estimates of this study confirm the general picture of the increasing tertiary premium. 
However, the separate analysis for the two sectors, coupled with the quantile regression 
estimates, “disentangle” the high tertiary premium. More precisely, the quantile regression 
estimates demonstrate that there is large dispersion in the tertiary premium in the private 
sector, and a substatnial gap in tertiary premium across the two sectors of employment (even 
in 2003). This in turn indicates that, although in general a  tertiary degree is valuable in 
Hungary in terms of earnings advantages, its “value” is not uniform, neither across the sectors 
nor within the private sector of employment.  
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2.7 Appendix  
2.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 Education groups used in the empirical analysis 
Education groups used in the 
empirical analysis 
Five categories for 
highest degree attained 
1994 – 1995 
Nine categories for 
highest degree attained 
1996 – 2003 
Unskilled  
(U) 
No vocational degree 
and no high school 
degree 
(1) Less than 8 years of 
primary school 
(2) 8 years of primary 
school 
(1) Less than 8 years of 
primary school 
(2) 8 years of primary 
school 
Low-skilled  
(L) 
Vocational degree and 
no high school degree 
(3) Vocational degree (3) Szakiskola (vocational 
school)  
(4) Szakmunkásképző 
(apprentice school) 
Middle-skilled 
(M) 
 
High school degree 
and no tertiary degree 
(4) High school degree (5) Gimnázium (general 
secondary school) 
(6) Szakközépiskola 
(vocational secondary 
school) 
(7) Technikum (technical 
school) 
High-skilled  
(H) 
Tertiary degree (5) Tertiary degree (8) Főiskola (college) 
(9) Egyetem (university) 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics for 1994 and 2003 
 Private sector Public sector 
 1994 2003 1994 2003 
Educational composition (%) 
Unskilled (U) 21.67 15.71  15.39  11.54         
Low-skilled (L) 39.37 45.13 12.70 18.29  
Middle-skilled (M) 25.38 25.97        28.08        21.44  
High-skilled (H) 13.58 13.19       43.83 48.73      
Mean monthly gross earnings  122,122.70 152,092.40 109,937.10 168,698.80  
Monthly gross earnings for education group U 
Mean 85,040.96 94,851.91 73,173.08 99,776.24 
25
th
 quantile 57,581.72  64,306.00 57,887.08  76,733.00  
Median 76,878.45 85,442.00 68,808.29                       93,175.00  
75
th
 quantile 101,970.70 112,145.00 83,216.18          118,614.00  
Monthly gross earnings for education group L 
Mean  93,852.98 109,279.80 78,366.44 102,634.20 
25
th
 quantile 64,324.52 72,146.00 62,841.35        82,817.00 
Median 84,730.50                       97,670.00 73,391.77                       97,120.00  
75
th
 quantile 112,714.30        132,088.00  85,768.09   116,512.00        
Monthly gross earnings for education group M 
Mean 133,642.80 155,430.60 109,814.90 128,143.80 
Table 2.2 continues on next page 
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Table 2.2 continued 
25
th
 quantile 84,873.84     91,255.00           76,336.28         92,817.00  
Median 116,422.30                       130,142.00                       98,200.52                       113,504.00 
75
th
 quantile 158,611.50         186,153.00         141,558.2        140,506.00 
Monthly gross earnings for education group H 
Mean  241,730.60 360,113.10 132,077.10 227,658.70 
25
th
 quantile 124,635.8        170,310.00  89,074.06        162,800.00  
Median 186,230.8 273,265.00  120,120.80                       203,225.00  
75
th
 quantile 284,325.3         430,500.00 162,338.10 260,400.00  
Mean age 40.24 40.03 40.21  41.46 
Budapest (%) 24.80  23.55   9.79   25.83  
Observations 54,138 50,700       7,903 8,659        
Note: Earnings are denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual CPI 
 
Figure 2.1 Evolution of unconditional average monthly gross earnings in the private and 
public sectors and evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003 
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Figure 2.2 Evolution of conditional average monthly gross earnings in the private sector and 
evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003  
Average monthly gross earnings in the private sector and minimum wage
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Figure 2.3 Evolution of conditional average monthly gross earnings in the public sector and 
evolution of minimum wage, 1994 – 2003 
Average monthly gross earnings in the public sector and minimum wage
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2.7.2 Estimated private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 2003  
Figure 2.4 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997  
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Figure 2.5 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000  
Private-public sector earnings gap
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
P
ri
v
a
te
-p
u
b
li
c
 s
e
c
to
r 
e
a
rn
in
g
s
 g
a
p
mean sector gap, 1997 private-public sector gap, 1997 mean sector gap, 1998
private-public sector gap, 1998 mean sector gap, 1999 private-public sector gap, 1999
mean sector gap, 2000 private-public sector gap, 2000
 
Figure 2.6 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003  
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Figure 2.7 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Unskilled 
Private-public sector earnings gap, Unskilled
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Figure 2.8 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Unskilled 
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Figure 2.9 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Unskilled 
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Figure 2.10 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Low-skilled 
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Figure 2.11 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Low-skilled 
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Figure 2.12 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Low-skilled 
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Figure 2.13 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, Middle-skilled 
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Figure 2.14 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, Middle-skilled 
Private-public sector earnings gap, Middle-skilled
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
P
ri
v
a
te
-p
u
b
li
c
 s
e
c
to
r 
e
a
rn
in
g
s
 g
a
p
mean sector gap, M, 1997 private-public sector gap, M, 1997 mean sector gap, M, 1998
private-public sector gap, M, 1998 mean sector gap, M, 1999 private-public sector gap, M, 1999
mean sector gap, M, 2000 private-public sector gap, M, 2000
 
 127 
Figure 2.15 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, Middle-skilled 
Private-public sector earnings gap, Middle-skilled
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
P
ri
v
a
te
-p
u
b
li
c
 s
e
c
to
r 
e
a
rn
in
g
s
 g
a
p
mean sector gap, M, 2000 private-public sector gap, M, 2000 mean sector gap, M, 2001
private-public sector gap, M, 2001 mean sector gap, M, 2002 private-public sector gap, M, 2002
mean sector gap, M, 2003 private-public sector gap, M, 2003
 
Figure 2.16 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1994 – 1997, High-skilled 
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Figure 2.17 Private-public sector earnings gap, 1997 – 2000, High-skilled 
Private-public sector earnings gap, High-skilled
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Figure 2.18 Private-public sector earnings gap, 2000 – 2003, High-skilled 
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2.7.2 Estimation results for the private and public sectors, 1994 – 2003 
Table 2.3 Estimation results, 1994 
 1994 Private sector 1994 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.135 0.167 0.139 0.126 0.129 0.138 0.109 0.178 0.120 0.090 0.091 0.094 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.025) 
M 0.432 0.402 0.408 0.424 0.442 0.502 0.405 0.331 0.310 0.357 0.469 0.478 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.033) 
H 0.937 0.769 0.828 0.899 1.038 1.187 0.630 0.466 0.554 0.658 0.761 0.768 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.039) (0.030) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) 
Exp 0.025 0.013 0.017 0.025 0.029 0.034 0.035 0.014 0.030 0.037 0.048 0.049 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.037 -0.012 -0.022 -0.039 -0.045 -0.054 -0.053 -0.009 -0.042 -0.054 -0.076 -0.082 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.170 0.119 0.158 0.185 0.200 0.195 0.076 -0.079 0.035 0.104 0.216 0.185 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.058) (0.045) (0.045) (0.033) (0.040) 
Constant 9.700 9.277 9.527 9.721 9.941 10.123 9.482 9.344 9.373 9.436 9.476 9.675 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.069) (0.055) (0.035) (0.050) (0.059) 
Obs 54,138 54,138 54,138 54,138 54,138 54,138 7,903 7,903 7,903 7,903 7,903 7,903 
Notes on Tables 2.3 – 2.12: 1) The reference group among the education groups is Unskilled 
(U) “No formal vocational training and no high school degree”. 2) Experience is measured as 
years of potential labour market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus 
six). 3) Standard errors are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors are computed by 200 bootstrap 
replications for the quantile regressions. 
 
Table 2.4 Estimation results, 1995 
 1995 Private sector 1995 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.133 0.158 0.135 0.124 0.134 0.149 0.082 0.169 0.112 0.047 0.028 0.065 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.028) (0.018) (0.022) (0.038) (0.053) 
M 0.401 0.364 0.381 0.403 0.427 0.467 0.415 0.326 0.298 0.396 0.492 0.533 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.043) (0.057) 
H 0.911 0.731 0.801 0.888 1.022 1.181 0.816 0.740 0.756 0.816 0.843 0.868 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.02$) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.059) 
Exp 0.023 0.010 0.019 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.049 0.035 0.047 0.050 0.048 0.057 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.034 -0.008 -0.029 -0.038 -0.043 -0.048 -0.073 -0.049 -0.071 -0.073 -0.073 -0.088 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.162 0.076 0.143 0.178 0.202 0.212 0.199 0.177 0.194 0.190 0.192 0.277 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.02/) (0.022) (0.017) (0.030) (0.049) 
Constant 9.900 9.507 9.696 9.891 10.115 10.326 9.368 9.172 9.215 9.319 9.576 9.654 
 (0.014) (0.036) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) (0.047) (0.043) (0.040) (0.071) (0.099) 
Obs 48,239 48,239 48,239 48,239 48,239 48,239 8,273 8,273 8,273 8,273 8,273 8,273 
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Table 2.5 Estimation results, 1996 
 1996 Private sector 1996 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.163 0.168 0.157 0.155 0.174 0.188 0.106 0.227 0.109 0.072 0.075 0.096 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.048) (0.056) 
M 0.439 0.373 0.394 0.432 0.481 0.538 0.384 0.360 0.307 0.345 0.385 0.533 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.029) (0.027) (0.033) (0.042) (0.090) 
H 1.016 0.783 0.862 0.968 1.167 1.371 0.778 0.733 0.736 0.773 0.800 0.905 
 (0.009) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.039) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.051) 
Exp 0.021 0.011 0.020 0.019 0.025 0.027 0.036 0.029 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.028 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.032 -0.009 -0.031 -0.028 -0.038 -0.044 -0.052 -0.038 -0.050 -0.064 -0.061 -0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.157 0.047 0.131 0.162 0.199 0.229 0.231 0.171 0.214 0.234 0.252 0.327 
 (0.006) (0.020) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.053) (0.065) 
Constant 10.097 9.632 9.857 10.138 10.327 10.544 9.641 9.317 9.431 9.545 9.752 10.087 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.022) (0.067) (0.047) (0.066) (0.091) (0.164) 
Obs 44,422 44,422 44,422 44,422 44,422 44,422 10,426 10,426 10,426 10,426 10,426 10,426 
 
Table 2.6 Estimation results, 1997 
 1997 Private sector 1997 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.162 0.142 0.140 0.155 0.184 0.193 0.131 0.242 0.171 0.121 0.077 0.052 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.036) 
M 0.441 0.365 0.411 0.443 0.477 0.516 0.326 0.332 0.312 0.312 0.326 0.346 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.044) 
H 1.042 0.785 0.902 1.008 1.200 1.394 0.871 0.847 0.841 0.854 0.866 0.918 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.038) 
Exp 0.020 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.028 0.031 0.036 0.044 0.045 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.029 -0.020 -0.019 -0.026 -0.038 -0.040 -0.047 -0.031 -0.035 -0.046 -0.066 -0.070 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.138 0.035 0.135 0.156 0.177 0.177 0.108 0.095 0.118 0.140 0.120 0.118 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.036) 
Constant 10.297 9.765 10.081 10.328 10.535 10.773 9.754 9.479 9.584 9.716 9.862 10.077 
 (0.017) (0.051) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.017) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.044) (0.082) 
Obs 38,653 38,653 38,653 38,653 38,653 38,653 11,025 11,025 11,025 11,025 11,025 11,025 
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Table 2.7 Estimation results, 1998 
 1998 Private sector 1998 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.181 0.159 0.173 0.175 0.195 0.231 0.118 0.164 0.105 0.061 0.111 0.118 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.026) 
M 0.482 0.403 0.458 0.486 0.516 0.597 0.408 0.328 0.275 0.388 0.468 0.544 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.036) 
H 1.110 0.860 0.994 1.091 1.249 1.447 0.926 0.797 0.794 0.875 0.989 1.195 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.045) 
Exp 0.017 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.043 0.037 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.024 -0.008 -0.020 -0.025 -0.029 -0.034 -0.051 -0.045 -0.045 -0.057 -0.062 -0.047 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.158 0.042 0.137 0.175 0.211 0.203 0.155 0.102 0.139 0.161 0.179 0.228 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033) 
Constant 10.456 9.935 10.191 10.468 10.735 10.963 9.937 9.642 9.796 9.902 10.055 10.257 
 (0.016) (0.051) (0.028) (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.040) (0.033) (0.046) (0.066) (0.112) 
Obs 42,713 42,713 42,713 42,713 42,713 42,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 
 
Table 2.8 Estimation results, 1999 
 1999 Private sector 1999 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.176 0.159 0.150 0.159 0.197 0.230 0.099 0.142 0.082 0.079 0.110 0.198 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.074) 
M 0.484 0.440 0.441 0.473 0.528 0.589 0.394 0.318 0.327 0.363 0.462 0.564 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.061) 
H 1.115 0.865 0.946 1.081 1.271 1.467 0.933 0.842 0.847 0.918 1.015 1.109 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.058) 
Exp 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.045 0.033 0.036 0.043 0.054 0.070 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.026 -0.016 -0.025 -0.029 -0.031 -0.026 -0.065 -0.040 -0.049 -0.063 -0.085 -0.116 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.163 0.038 0.147 0.182 0.191 0.210 0.179 0.123 0.152 0.185 0.204 0.277 
 (0.006) (0.027) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051) 
Constant 10.628 10.076 10.390 10.643 10.886 11.156 10.006 9.776 9.921 9.998 10.053 10.109 
 (0.016) (0.043) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.125) 
Obs 42,042 42,042 42,042 42,042 42,042 42,042 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 
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Table 2.9 Estimation results, 2000 
 2000 Private sector 2000 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.184 0.167 0.182 0.189 0.193 0.213 0.139 0.176 0.134 0.110 0.099 0.069 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.032) 
M 0.473 0.423 0.458 0.469 0.510 0.577 0.462 0.305 0.328 0.419 0.516 0.682 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026) (0.047) 
H 1.182 0.940 1.033 1.154 1.328 1.506 0.988 0.855 0.871 0.919 1.012 1.144 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.038) 
Exp 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.034 0.026 0.029 0.035 0.032 0.042 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.027 -0.023 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.022 -0.043 -0.028 -0.031 -0.046 -0.042 -0.066 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.134 -0.097 0.082 0.144 0.199 0.224 0.280 0.143 0.172 0.226 0.294 0.447 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.048) 
Constant 10.718 10.092 10.446 10.742 11.021 11.286 10.112 9.901 10.002 10.093 10.314 10.448 
 (0.016) (0.047) (0.035) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.027) (0.048) (0.077) 
Obs 44,027 44,027 44,027 44,027 44,027 44,027 9,143 9,143 9,143 9,143 9,143 9,143 
 
Table 2.10 Estimation results, 2001 
 2001 Private sector 2001 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.156 0.084 0.141 0.162 0.186 0.202 0.079 0.052 0.064 0.053 0.042 0.055 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) 
M 0.450 0.287 0.404 0.463 0.538 0.588 0.389 0.162 0.246 0.350 0.429 0.611 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.047) 
H 1.155 0.841 1.031 1.176 1.325 1.460 0.905 0.712 0.767 0.834 0.944 1.090 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) 
Exp 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.035 0.032 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.046 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.019 -0.016 -0.050 -0.048 -0.038 -0.040 -0.042 -0.076 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.128 -0.037 0.095 0.148 0.182 0.186 0.319 0.175 0.221 0.263 0.299 0.498 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.050) 
Constant 10.963 10.459 10.659 10.948 11.230 11.534 10.350 10.139 10.285 10.406 10.589 10.621 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.045) (0.062) 
Obs 42,048 42,048 42,048 42,048 42,048 42,048 8,501 8,501 8,501 8,501 8,501 8,501 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 133 
Table 2.11 Estimation results, 2002 
 2002 Private sector 2002 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.152 0.039 0.131 0.174 0.180 0.220 0.043 0.051 0.038 0.061 0.007 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.028) 
M 0.438 0.207 0.398 0.469 0.523 0.608 0.325 0.152 0.236 0.339 0.347 0.433 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.037) 
H 1.143 0.699 1.012 1.177 1.336 1.506 0.883 0.681 0.755 0.852 0.970 1.086 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.027) 
Exp 0.016 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.035 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.037 0.036 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.026 -0.009 -0.019 -0.022 -0.025 -0.025 -0.055 -0.052 -0.054 -0.057 -0.060 -0.056 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.155 0.000 0.111 0.178 0.199 0.196 0.129 0.063 0.113 0.149 0.179 0.197 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.031) 
Constant 11.041 10.736 10.758 11.004 11.294 11.555 10.620 10.434 10.496 10.597 10.754 10.965 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.032) (0.040) (0.062) 
Obs 51,551 51,551 51,551 51,551 51,551 51,551 8,429 8,429 8,429 8,429 8,429 8,429 
 
Table 2.12 Estimation results, 2003 
 2003 Private sector 2003 Public sector 
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
L 0.142 0.055 0.135 0.154 0.171 0.198 0.066 0.169 0.108 0.076 0.007 -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) 
M 0.415 0.236 0.368 0.426 0.489 0.570 0.269 0.270 0.241 0.252 0.191 0.313 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.044) 
H 1.142 0.807 1.014 1.167 1.307 1.480 0.922 0.933 0.898 0.901 0.885 0.999 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) 
Exp 0.023 0.012 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.033 0.035 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.049 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Exp
2
(/100) -0.037 -0.015 -0.026 -0.034 -0.041 -0.058 -0.047 -0.039 -0.038 -0.042 -0.053 -0.076 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budapest 0.208 0.027 0.166 0.225 0.242 0.263 0.167 0.133 0.144 0.164 0.179 0.176 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) 
Constant 11.032 10.683 10.771 11.024 11.260 11.416 10.837 10.560 10.719 10.841 11.006 11.050 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.057) (0.081) 
Obs 50,700 50,700 50,700 50,700 50,700 50,700 8,659 8,659 8,659 8,659 8,659 8,659 
Notes on Tables 2.3 – 2.12: 1) The reference group among the education groups is Unskilled 
(U) “No formal vocational training and no high school degree”. 2) Experience is measured as 
years of potential labour market experience (measured as age minus years of schooling minus 
six). 3) Standard errors are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors are computed by 200 bootstrap 
replications for the quantile regressions. 
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2.7.4 Estimated cross-section experience profiles, 1994 – 2003  
Figure 2.19 Experience profiles, private sector, 1994 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1994
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Figure 2.20 Experience profiles, private sector, 1995 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1995
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Figure 2.21 Experience profiles, private sector, 1996 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1996
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Figure 2.22 Experience profiles, private sector, 1997 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1997
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Figure 2.23 Experience profiles, private sector, 1998 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1998
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Figure 2.24 Experience profiles, private sector, 1999 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1999
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Years of potential labour market experience
L
o
g
 e
a
n
ri
n
g
s
OLS 0.1 quantile 0.25 quantile median 0.75 quantile 0.9 quantile
 
Figure 2.25 Experience profiles, private sector, 2000 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2000
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Figure 2.26 Experience profiles, private sector, 2001 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2001
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Figure 2.27 Experience profiles, private sector, 2002 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2002
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Figure 2.28 Experience profiles, private sector, 2003 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2003
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Figure 2.29 Experience profiles, public sector, 1994 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1994
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Figure 2.30 Experience profiles, public sector, 1995 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1995
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Figure 2.31 Experience profiles, public sector, 1996 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1996
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Figure 2.32 Experience profiles, public sector, 1997 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1997
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Figure 2.33 Experience profiles, public sector, 1998 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1998
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Figure 2.34 Experience profiles, public sector, 1999 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1999
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Figure 2.35 Experience profiles, public sector, 2000 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2000
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Figure 2.36 Experience profiles, public sector, 2001 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2001
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Figure 2.37 Experience profiles, public sector, 2002 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2002
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Figure 2.38 Experience profiles, public sector, 2003 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2003
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Figure 2.39 Experience profiles, private sector, 2003, Low-skilled 
Experience profiles, 2003, L
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Figure 2.40 Experience profiles, private sector, 2003, Middle-skilled 
Experience profiles, 2003, M 
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Figure 2.41 Experience profiles, public sector, 2003, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, 2003, H
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Figure 2.42 Experience profiles, private sector, 1994, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1994
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Figure 2.43 Experience profiles, private sector, 1995, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1995
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Figure 2.44 Experience profiles, private sector, 1996, High-skilled 
Earnoings profiles, private sector, 1996
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Figure 2.45 Experience profiles, private sector, 1997, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1997
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Figure 2.46 Experience profiles, private sector, 1998, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1998
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Figure 2.47 Experience profiles, private sector, 1999, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 1999
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Figure 2.48 Experience profiles, private sector, 2000, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2000
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Figure 2.49 Experience profiles, private sector, 2001, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2001
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Figure 2.50 Experience profiles, private sector, 2002, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, private sector, 2002
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Figure 2.51 Experience profiles, public sector, 1994, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1994
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Figure 2.52 Experience profiles, public sector, 1995, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1995
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Figure 2.53 Experience profiles, public sector, 1996, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1996
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Figure 2.54 Experience profiles, public sector, 1997, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1997
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Figure 2.55 Experience profiles, public sector, 1998, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1998
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Figure 2.56 Experience profiles, public sector, 1999, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 1999
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Figure 2.57 Experience profiles, public sector, 2000, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2000
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Figure 2.58 Experience profiles, public sector, 2001, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2001
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Figure 2.59 Experience profiles, public sector, 2002, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2002
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Figure 2.60 Experience profiles, public sector, 2003, High-skilled 
Experience profiles, public sector, 2003
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3 The effect of school starting age on academic performance in 
Hungary 
3.1 Introduction 
Research in education provides mixed theories and evidence on the optimal age at which 
children should start school.
68
 According to the proponents of late school starting age, starting 
school at an older age ensures that children have sufficient time to acquire the human capital 
necessary for educational success. In addition to the intellectual competencies of 
concentration and the ability to follow instructions, which children gain as they age, 
emotional aspects, such as being able to be apart from the parents, and social ones, such as 
being able to share with other children, play a significant role in success in school. Opponents 
of delayed school entry argue that (a) the advantage of late school entry may be modest and 
transitory (given that the school system is efficient in equalising early inequalities by 
promoting academic competencies accordingly) and (b) the emphasis should be placed on 
“making schools ready for children rather than making children ready for school”69, in the 
sense that teaching and learning opportunities should be tailored to the intellectual, emotional 
and social skills of children. From an economic perspective, the potential academic gains of 
starting school later need to be weighted against (a) the additional childcare costs imposed on 
the parents in case of delayed school entry, (b) the extra economic loss in labour market 
(which entails monetary and productivity losses) if the mother only returns to work once the 
child has started school and, most importantly, (c) the economic loss associated with entering 
the labour market later, given that eventual schooling attainment and retirement age are 
unaffected.  
 
There is an extensive recent empirical economic literature concentrating on the relationship 
between academic outcomes and school starting age.
70
 The difficulty in estimating the effect 
of school starting age on academic performance arises from the fact that there is a choice 
regarding enrolment decision despite the cut-off date regulation. Given a certain degree of 
discretion regarding enrolment decisions, based on teacher’s recommendation, boards of 
specialists giving school readiness tests assessing emotional and intellectual readiness and, 
                                                 
68
 For an extensive review of the theories and findings in educationalist literature see Stipek (2002).  
69
 Stipek (2002), p. 14. 
70
 For evidence on the effect of school starting age on academic performance see, among others, Leuven et al. 
(2004) for evidence on the Netherlands, Strøm (2004) on Norway, Frederikkson and Öckert (2005) on Sweden, 
Puhani and Weber (2007) and Fertig and Kluve (2005) on Germany and Bedard and Dhuey (2005) on a number 
of OECD countries.  
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most importantly, parental choice, the group of students with early / delayed entry does not 
represent a non-random sample. That is, whereas early entrants may well be higher ability 
children and children of ambitious parents who want an early start (regardless of the child’s 
ability), the late starters come from the pool of lower ability children and potentially from 
wealthier families (for whom the burden of additional childcare costs may be irrelevant). 
Given this non-random selection, late starters may be, on average, lower ability children. 
Subsequently, regressing academic performance on actual school starting age by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) may generate a downward biased estimate of the age effect on academic 
performance.  
 
In order to overcome the problem of non-random selection in countries where the cut-off date 
regulation for enrolment is not exogenous, the empirical literature has concentrated on 
instrumental variable estimation (IV), that is, finding a valid instrument for actual school 
starting age which is (1) correlated with actual school starting age and (2) uncorrelated with 
the unobserved determinants of academic performance i.e. ability. Numerous studies have 
hence exploited the exogenous variation in school starting age driven by (1) the cut-off date 
for enrolment and (2) the children’s month of birth, which generates the “expected school 
starting age”.71 Accordingly, the empirical strategy is to use the “expected school starting 
age” as an instrument for “actual school starting age”. It is important to note that the IV 
approach identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE), that is, the average causal 
effect of school starting age on academic performance for the group of “compliers”, who are 
defined as those individuals whose school entry age is affected by the instrument used 
(introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994)). At this point is important to clarify that the group 
of “LATE-compliers” is not equivalent to the group of students who enrol on time. The latter 
group, using the definitions of Angrist et al. (1996), is composed of the “LATE-compilers” as 
well as “always-takers” who are unaffected by the particular instrumental variable, that is, 
those who always enrol on time regardless of the value of the instrument to which they might 
be exposed.
72
 Subsequently, throughout the study the group of “LATE-compliers” / 
                                                 
71
 For empirical evidence using IV estimation in order to estimate the causal effect of school starting age on 
academic performance see, among others, Leuven et al. (2004) for evidence on the Netherlands, Strøm (2004) on 
Norway, Frederikkson and Öckert (2005) on Sweden, Puhani and Weber (2007) and Fertig and Kluve (2005) on 
Germany and Bedard and Dhuey (2005) on a number of OECD countries.  
72
 Note that Angrist et al. (1996) in the LATE framework differentiates between three important groups: (a) the 
compliers, who comply with the assignment mechanism of the instrument, and two other groups who are not 
affected by the instrument, namely, (b) the never-takers, who in this particular setting never enrol on time 
regardless of the value of the instrument to which they might be exposed, and (c) the always-takers, who always 
enrol on time regardless of the value of the instrument to which they might be exposed.  
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”compliers” and those “enrolling on time” / ”complying with the cut-off date regulation” will 
not refer to the same student population. 
 
The studies using the IV estimation strategy described above analyse the effect of school 
starting age on academic performance in various countries, using different age groups (for 
example, second, fourth and eighth graders), different subsamples (such as minority students 
or students with lower educated parents) and different outcomes of interest, ranging from 
which track a student chooses (for example, academic versus vocational) to test scores in 
different subjects. A number of studies, namely, Leuven et al. (2004) for the Netherlands (for 
some subsamples of students), Strøm (2004) for Norway, Frederikkson and Öckert (2005) for 
Sweden, Puhani and Weber (for full samples of students and some subsamples) (2007) for 
Germany and Bedard and Dhuey (2005) for a number of OECD countries find evidence that 
(1) the OLS estimate of the association between age and schooling outcomes is negative, 
attributing this to the non-random selection of early / late starters and (2) the IV regression, 
described above, yields a positive LATE estimate, which differs in magnitude across 
countries. An exception is the study by Fertig and Kluve (2005) who provide evidence that 
there is no effect of age at school entry on educational outcomes in Germany.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the effect of school starting age on academic 
performance in Hungary – a country for which, despite the vast recent international evidence, 
to the best of my knowledge, such analysis has not been carried out to this date. It is important 
to extend the international evidence because, as outlined above, the effect of age on schooling 
performance is not clear from the outset, and the cross-country differences may be caused by, 
among other factors, the different educational structures, which may equalise opportunities 
among students to different degrees.  
 
In Hungary, the school starting age regulation requires children who turn six years old by the 
31
st
 of May to start school on the 1
st
 of September in the corresponding year.
73
 Children born 
after that date need to wait an additional year in order to enrol. In Hungary, as in some other 
countries such as Germany and the US, the school cut-off date regulation is not exogenous, 
given that there is teacher, specialist and parental discretion regarding the school starting age. 
                                                 
73
 Note that the cut-off date for enrolment prior to 1986 was August 31
st
 rather than May 31
st
. All the samples 
under analysis have started school according the May cut-off date regulation, hence the change in regulation 
does not cause a problem for the purposes of this study. See Vágó (2005) for further detail on the cut-off date 
regulation in Hungary.  
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For example, for the samples under analysis, children who are born in the summer months 
may start school at the age of six instead of waiting another year, and those who are born just 
before the cut-off date may wait another year to enrol instead of starting at the age of six. 
Given the degree of discretion regarding enrolment, i.e. non-random selection of early / 
delayed school starters in Hungary, an OLS regression of academic achievement on school 
starting age may yield a downward biased estimate of the (mean) age effect, as described 
above. 
 
Therefore, in addition to the standard OLS regressions, the study uses an extension to the IV 
strategy of the existing literature, using “expected school starting age” as an instrument for 
“actual school starting age”, namely, the control function approach, proposed by Garen (1984) 
and Heckman and Robb (1985). The advantage of the control function approach over the IV 
estimation strategy is that in addition to the bias due to non-random selection of early / late 
entrants outlined above, it also accounts for the individual heterogeneity in the age effect. 
Whereas the IV-LATE estimate captures the average causal effect for the group of 
“compliers”, as defined above, which may not be representative of the entire population, the 
control function approach estimates the average treatment effect (ATE), which reflects the age 
effect on academic performance for a random individual.  
 
The data for the analysis is drawn from the 2001 “Progress in International Reading and 
Literacy Study (PIRLS)” and the 2003 “Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)” 
at the grade four level. Therefore, the effect of age on different areas of schooling 
performance, namely, Reading, Mathematics and Science is analysed. Although the key 
parameter of interest of the study is the effect of age on test scores, the effect of numerous 
other determinants of academic performance, such as gender, family size, parental education, 
home possessions (depending on the availability of data) are analysed. 
 
The OLS results suggest that the relationship between the actual school starting age and 
Reading, Mathematics and Science test scores at the fourth grade level is negative, for the 
samples as a whole as well as for the subsamples split by gender and parental education. This 
negative association, as discussed above, cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of age on 
academic performance. The ATE estimates of the age effect of the control function approach 
exceed the corresponding OLS estimates for the samples as a whole as well as for the 
subsamples split by gender and parental education. The other explanatory variables, namely, 
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gender, parental education, family size, and proxies for economic wealth play a significant 
role in academic performance, their effects are as expected and are robust across subjects and 
subsamples of students. For instance, the gender achievement gap is in favour of girls for 
Reading and in favour of boys for Mathematics and Science, and amounts to around 22, 10 
and 13 percent of the standard deviation of the Reading, Mathematics and Science test scores 
respectively. Moreover, the incremental (mean) Reading score for children whose parents (at 
least one parent) hold (s) a high school degree relative to those whose parents at most finished 
primary school is around 89 percent of the standard deviation of the Reading scores, and those 
students who have more than two siblings score around 46 percent of the standard deviation 
of the Reading tests lower than only children. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 proceeds with a 
presentation of the data used in the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics. Sections 
3.3 and 3.4 present the empirical strategy and the estimation results respectively and finally 
Section 3.5 concludes. Tables for the descriptive statistics and the estimation results are 
presented in Appendix 3.7.  
3.2 Data and descriptive evidence 
3.2.1 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), 2001 
The data for reading literacy is drawn from the 2001 “Progress in International Reading 
Literacy Study” (PIRLS), which is available for 35 countries. The sample of students assessed 
consists of fourth graders who were tested at the end of the academic year. Fourth graders 
were chosen because grade four represents an important stage in a child’s development as a 
reader because by the end of fourth grade children are expected to have learned to read 
efficiently and are therefore reading in order to learn. The children are tested on four areas 
(via multiple choice and constructed response), namely, (1) retrieving explicitly stated 
information, (2) making straightforward inferences, (3) interpreting and integrating ideas and 
information and (4) examining and evaluating content and language, based on the booklet 
they are given which consists of two blocks of either literary text or informational text.
74
  
 
                                                 
74
 For an extensive description of the PIRLS dataset, testing procedure, scoring guide see Gonzalez and Kennedy 
(Eds.) (2003). 
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For the empirical analysis, data from the Student Questionnaire (which contains the Reading 
test scores and basic student background information) and the Home Survey (which contains 
demographic and socio-economic indicators) are merged. The outcome variable of interest is 
the Reading score, which is standardized so that the mean is equal to 500 and the standard 
deviation equals 100 when all countries are weighted equally. The control variables included 
in the regression are the standard variables that are likely to be significant determinants of 
student achievement, namely, gender, parental education, family size
75
 and some indicator for 
household income. Accordingly, five categories for parental education
76
 and for the number 
of siblings
77
 respectively are generated, and dummy variables indicating gender and whether 
the family owns a car, as an indicator of family income, are included in the regression 
equation.
78
 The number of observations in the sample is 4,508. 
 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Note that the mean 
Reading score in the Hungarian sample is around 45 points above the international mean of 
500 points. Not surprisingly, mean Reading scores differ by gender and parental background, 
namely, girls and students with academic parents attain a higher score in the sample. In terms 
of the control variables included in the regression analysis, it is interesting to note that 
approximately 43 percent of the sample have parents with vocational degrees, and around half 
of the sample come from families with two children. Note also that mean actual school 
starting age, measured in yearly units (varying by month of birth) is slightly higher than mean 
expected school starting age (i.e. six years and eleven months versus six years and ten 
                                                 
75
 Note that in addition to family size, birth order also has a significant effect on academic performance 
(Behrman and Taubman (1986) and Strøm (2004)). That is, there is evidence that older siblings attain a higher 
tests score than younger ones. (Birth order is not available in the TIMMS and PIRLS datasets for Hungary.) 
76
 The categories for parental education (which are more aggregated than those reported in the dataset due to 
sample size considerations) have been generated using the seven highest schooling degrees completed reported 
for each parent separately in the dataset, namely, “did not go to school”, “ISCED level 2” (eight years of primary 
school), “ISCED level 3a, b” (high school degree), “ISCED level 3c” (lower level vocational degree), “ISCED 
level 4a” (higher level vocational degree), “ISCED level 5a” (college degree) and “ISCED level 5b” (university 
degree). These seven schooling degrees are coded into four possible “parental educational groups” (see Table 3.1 
for detail), whereby (a) at least one parent has the corresponding degree and (b) the groups represent a ranking in 
terms of the level of education. Those observations with missing educational information for both parents are in 
the Missing category. Including a category with missing educational information is preferred to dropping these 
observations because (a) dropping the observations with missing values on educational information would 
reduce the sample size and (b) would possibly result in a non-random sample if the missing values were not 
missing randomly, which ultimately may lead to biased coefficient estimates.  
77
 There is a variable in the dataset indicating the number of children living at home, ranging from one to more 
than ten (i.e. eleven categories), which have been aggregated into five groups (see Table 3.1 for detail). Those 
observations with missing information on the number of children living at home have been allocated to the 
Missing category for reasons outlined in the previous footnote (and this also applies to the TIMMS dataset). 
78
 Among others, Behrman and Taubman (1986) provide extensive theoretical background and econometric 
evidence on the effects of birth order, family size, parental education and family earnings on the years of 
schooling.  
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months), which reflects (a) that the majority of the students do enrol on time and (b) for those 
who do not enrol on time, a tendency (on average) towards later enrolment.  
3.2.2 Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 2003 
The data for Mathematics and Science scores is drawn from the 2003 “Trends in Mathematics 
and Science Study” (TIMSS), which has been conducted in 48 countries. Like in PIRLS, the 
sample of students assessed consists of fourth graders who were tested at the end of the 
academic year. Similarly to PIRLS, the fourth grade students were tested in various areas, 
namely, (1) knowing facts and procedures, (2) using concepts, (3) solving routine problems 
and (4) reasoning for Mathematics and (1) factual knowledge, (2) conceptual understanding 
and (3) reasoning and analysis for Science (whereby the broad field of Science is composed of 
three content domains, namely, Life Science, Physical Science and Earth Science).
79
  
 
The outcome variables of interest are the Mathematics score and Science score respectively. 
As for the PIRLS, the TIMMS mean score for Mathematics and Science for the participating 
countries is set at 500 and the standard deviation at 100. The control variables include five 
categories for the number of persons living at home
80
, dummy variables indicating gender and 
whether the family owns a VCR. Unfortunately, a drawback of the TIMSS at the fourth grade 
level is that information on parental education background is not available.
81
 The number of 
observations in the sample is 3,222.  
 
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Note that the mean 
Mathematics and the mean Science scores in the Hungarian sample are approximately 30 and 
32 points above the international mean of 500 points respectively. Boys attain higher scores in 
both Mathematics and Science than girls, in opposition to Reading. Approximately 42 percent 
                                                 
79
 For an extensive discussion of the TIMSS dataset, the content and cognitive domains tested for Mathematics 
and Science respectively, the test design and scoring guide see Martin (Eds.) (2005) 
80
 There is a variable in the dataset indicating the number of persons living at home, ranging from two to eight or 
more (i.e. seven categories), which have been merged into five groups (see Table 3.2) in an identical way as 
categories for number of siblings in the PIRLS dataset. 
81
 Note that the unavailability of information on parental education in the TIMMS dataset potentially affects the 
OLS estimates of the age effect on mathematics and science test score, which can be deduced from running 
regressions with the PIRLS dataset with and without information on parental education. The parameter estimate 
for the age effect when parental education is included as a control variable in the OLS regression of test score on 
school starting age and other determinants of test score is less negative than when parental education is not 
included. This is in accordance with the estimation results based on the PIRLS dataset for Germany (Puhani and 
Weber (2007)). Subsequently, it is possible that the estimated age effect using the TIMMS dataset (reported in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.7) are more negative than if parental education was included as a control variable in the 
regression.  
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of the sample comes from families with four persons living at home. As in the PIRLS 2001 
data, in the TIMMS data the mean actual school starting age measured in years (varying by 
month) is slightly higher than mean expected school starting age (i.e. seven years versus six 
years and ten months), which reaffirms (a) that the majority of the students do enrol on time 
and (b) for those who do not enrol on time a tendency (on average) towards later enrolment.  
3.3 Estimation strategy 
3.3.1 Ordinary least squares 
The study first estimates the effect of school starting age on scholastic achievement using a 
simple specification:  
 
1 2 3 ,
s
i i i iY A X                                                                                               1,...,i n   (1) 
    
where iY  is test score for individual i , 
s
iA  is actual school starting age, iX  represents a vector 
of student and family background variables that may influence student performance, such as 
gender and number of siblings, and i  is a random disturbance term which contains the 
unobserved determinants of student performance such as ability. The key parameter of interest 
is 2 , the age effect. 
 
The problem with estimating equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) is that, since the 
cut-off date regulation for enrolment is not exogenous, i.e. there is teacher and parental 
discretion, the early / late school entrants represent a non-random sample. That is, it is 
possible that (a) ambitious parents may prefer an early enrolment, (b) wealthier parents may 
prefer a later start irrespective of the additional childcare costs and (c) children with lower and 
higher abilities may start school a year later and earlier than proposed by the cut-off date 
regulation respectively i.e.  , 0Si iCov A   . If the non-random pattern of enrolment is such 
that, on average, less able children enter school a year later, the OLS estimate for the effect of 
school starting age on test score 2  may be downward biased.  
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3.3.2 Instrumental variables estimation 
In order to overcome the problem of non-random selection of early / late school entrants, the 
recent empirical literature has proposed instrumental variable estimation (IV), using an 
instrument for actual school starting age SiA  which is (1) correlated with actual school starting 
age and (2) uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of academic performance 
i  (most 
importantly ability). The IV approach in the existing literature exploits the exogenous 
variation in school starting age driven by the children’s month of birth and the cut-off date 
regulation for enrolment. Accordingly, expected school starting age EiA , defined as the age 
when the child is supposed to start school according to the cut-off date regulation and his / her 
month of birth, is used as the instrument for actual school starting age SiA .
82
 As discussed in 
the Introduction, the IV approach identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE), that is, 
the average causal effect of school starting age on academic performance for the group of 
“LATE-compliers”: the individuals who alter their school entry age in response to the 
instrument (discussed by Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Angrist 
et al. (1996)), which may not be representative for the entire student population. Therefore, 
the studies using the IV strategy characterize how school starting age influences academic 
outcomes for the group of “LATE-compliers”, and hence the estimates must be interpreted 
accordingly.  
 
Formally, in the IV approach, the first-stage regression (to be estimated by OLS) involves a 
regression of SiA  for individual i  on the instrument 
E
iA  and the vector of control variables iX , 
such as student and family background variables, to obtain the fitted values ˆ SiA : 
 
1 2 3 ,
S E
i i i iA A X                                                                                       1,...,i n        (2) 
 
where i  is a random disturbance term which contains the unobserved determinants of 
children’s actual school entry age such as intellectual, mental and social maturity.  
 
                                                 
82
 For examples see, among others, Leuven et al. (2004) for evidence on the Netherlands, Strøm (2004) on 
Norway, Frederikkson and Öckert (2005) on Sweden, Puhani and Weber (2007) and Fertig and Kluve (2005) on 
Germany and Bedard and Dhuey (2005) on a number of OECD countries.  
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The second stage involves a regression (to be estimated by OLS) of test score iY  for 
individual i  on ˆ SiA  and iX : 
 
1 2 3
ˆ ,Si i i iY A X                                                                                      1,...,i n       (3) 
 
where i  is a random disturbance term which contains the unobserved determinants of student 
performance such as ability. The IV estimation approach yields the LATE estimate of age 
effect 2ˆ . 
3.3.3 Control function approach 
Unlike the existing studies which use the IV estimation approach, this study uses the control 
function approach, discussed by Garen (1984) and Heckman and Robb (1985). The control 
function approach is an extension to the IV approach. The advantage of the control function 
approach over the IV estimation strategy is that, in addition to the bias due to the correlation 
between the unobserved determinants (i.e. ability level) and actual school starting age (for 
reasons outlined above), in this context called the “absolute advantage bias”, it also accounts 
for the individual heterogeneity in the age effect.  
 
More precisely, if individuals differ in their academic ability at different ages, they have a 
comparative advantage at certain ages. That is, the age effect is not constant for all ages for an 
individual. If the parents of the children or the teachers know the comparative advantage of 
the particular child and act accordingly, they will enrol the child at the age which yields the 
highest return (i.e. age effect). In this case, the age effect and the actual age at school entry 
will be correlated, causing a bias in the estimated age effect. This is the additional source of 
bias, the so-called “comparative advantage bias”, which the control function approach 
controls for. 
 
Formally, the model consists of two equations. The first equation (as in the IV estimation 
approach described above), keeping to the notation in the previous subsection, involves the 
relationship between actual school entry age SiA  for individual i  and the instrument 
E
iA  and a 
vector of other control variables iX :   
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1 2 3 , 
S E
i i i SiA A X                                                                                     1,...,i n      (4) 
 
where Si  is a random disturbance term which contains the unobserved determinants of 
children’s actual school entry age such as intellectual, mental and social maturity.  
 
For simplicity of notation, Equation (4) can be rewritten as:  
 
' ,si i SiA Z                                                                                                         1,...,i n     (5) 
 
where iZ  represents the vector of explanatory variables from Equation (4). 
 
The second equation of the model, the “test equation”, involves the relationship between test 
score iY  for individual i  and 
S
iA  and a vector of exogenous regressors iX  which affect test 
score such as student and family background variables: 
 
'
1 2 3 ,
S
i i i i iY A X                                                                                             1,...,i n    (6)          
 
where i  is a random disturbance term which contains the unobserved determinants of student 
performance such as innate ability. Taking into account the two sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity outlined above, the “test equation” can be rewritten  as follows: 
 
 '1 2 3 2 2 ,S Si i i i i iY A X A                                                                           1,...,i n   (7) 
 
where 2  is the average age effect and  2 2 Si i iA     is a composite disturbance term, 
which represents the two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: the first component of the 
disturbance term, i , represents unobserved individual characteristics which affect the test 
score (regardless the school starting age of the individual) and  2 2i   represents the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the age effect. As outlined above, there are two 
potential sources of bias in Equation (7): the “absolute advantage bias” due to the correlation 
between SiA  and i  (which the standard IV estimation strategy of the recent literature controls 
for) and the “comparative advantage bias” due to the correlation between  2 2i   and SiA .  
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For simplicity of notation denoting the term  2 2i i     and the exogenous variables 
 and i iZ X  in equations (5) and (7) respectively by ir , the conditional expectation of the 
composite error term  2 2 Si i iA     is: 
 
   
   
'
' '
| , | ,
                               | , | , ,
S S S S
i i i i i i i i i i Si i
S S S
i Si i i i i Si i i i i
E A A r E A A Z r
E A Z r E A Z r A
     
     
    
      
       1,...,i n  (8) 
 
  
 
 
'
,
| , ,
i SiS
i Si i i i Si
Si
Cov
E A Z r
Var
 
   

                                                                1,...,i n  (9) 
 
  
 
 
'
,
| , ,
i SiS
i Si i i i Si
Si
Cov
E A Z r
Var
 
   

                                                             1,...,i n  (10) 
 
Therefore, the conditional expectation of the “test equation” (7) is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'
1 2 3
, ,
| , , ,
i Si i SiS S S
i i i i i i Si Si i
Si Si
Cov Cov
E Y A X Z A X A
Var Var
   
    
 
           1,...,i n   (11) 
 
As the last two terms in (11) are nonzero, OLS estimation of the “test equation” will yield 
inconsistent estimates of the effect of age on test score. 
 
Obtaining a consistent estimate of ˆ,  Si Si  , and including ˆ ˆ and the interaction of  and 
S
Si Si iA   
as regressors in the “test equation” corrects for the bias caused by the unobserved factors. 
Consistent estimate of the error term, ˆSi , can be obtained from the OLS estimation of 
equation (5). 
 
Accordingly, the implementation of the control function regression consists of a two-stage 
procedure. The first stage involves OLS estimation of Equation (5): 
 
' , Si i SiA Z                                                                                                         1,...,i n  (12) 
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to obtain the fitted values 'ˆ ˆSSi i iA Z   . 
 
The second stage involves the OLS estimation of the regression of test score iY  for individual 
i  on SiA , iX  and the two additional regressors: the estimated residual from the first-stage 
regression ˆSi  and the interaction of ˆ and 
S
i SiA  :  
 
1 2 3 4 5
ˆ ˆ ,s si i i Si i Si iY A X A                                                                          1,...,i n   (13) 
 
where i  is the random disturbance term. The inclusion of ˆSi  and the interaction of 
ˆ and Si SiA   as additional regressors purges the relationship between test score and actual 
school starting age of the “absolute advantage bias” and of the “comparative advantage bias” 
respectively. The control function approach yields consistent estimates for the effect of age on 
test score for a random individual 2  which is equivalent of the average treatment effect 
(ATE).  
 
It is important to note that the control function approach is valid under the assumption that the 
conditional expectations of the two unobserved heterogeneity components  iand i   are linear 
in  and S Ei iA A . This assumption in combination with the assumption that the two unobserved 
heterogeneity components are mean independent (uncorrelated) of the instrument EiA : 
 
| | 0,E Ei i i iE A E A                                                                                          1,...,i n  (14) 
 
implies: 
 
4| , ,
S E
i i i SiE A A                                                                                                 1,...,i n  (15) 
 
and 
 
5| , ,
S E
i i i SiE A A                                                                                                 1,...,i n  (16) 
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where Si  is defined in Equation (5).  
 
Furthermore, note that estimating the test equation (13) with the additional regressor ˆSi  but 
without the interaction of ˆ and Si SiA  : 
 
1 2 3 4
ˆ ,si i i Si iY A X                                                                                      1,...,i n   (17) 
 
controls for ”absolute advantage bias” only (and not for heterogeneity in the age effect) and is 
numerically equivalent to the standard IV estimation described in Section 3.3.2. Therefore, 
the control function approach is an extension to the IV approach.  
 
The difference between the LATE and the ATE estimates of the age effect on test score of the 
IV estimation approach of the control function approach respectively must be pointed out. 
Whereas the ATE estimate is the age effect for a random individual, the LATE estimate is the 
age effect for the “compliers”, that is, those individuals whose school entry age is changed by 
the instrument, which may not be representative for the student population (implying that the 
two estimates may well differ from one another).  
 
At this point, the choice and the generation of the instrument merit comment. This study also 
builds on the use of “expected school starting age” as an exogenous determinant of “actual 
school starting age”, as discussed above, given the institutional features of the Hungarian 
education system. 
 
In Hungary, the school starting age regulation requires children who turn six years old (72 
months old) by the 31
st
 of May to start school on the 1
st
 of September in the corresponding 
year. Children born after that date need to wait an additional in order to enrol. Therefore, the 
“expected school starting age” EiA , in yearly units (varying by the month of birth), is 
generated using to the cut-off regulation c  and birth month ib  for individual i  is as follows: 
 
72 9
  1
12
84 9
   < 12 
12
 
i
i
E
i
i
i
b
if b c
A
b
if c b
 
 
 
  

                                                                            1,...,i n  (18) 
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Given that the cut-off date is May 5c  , EiA  is between 6.33 years for the youngest children 
born in May, which corresponds to 6 years and 4 months, and 7.25 years for the oldest 
children born in June, which corresponds to 7 years and 3 months. More precisely, for 
children born between September, who start school at age seven, and those born in May, there 
is a month-for-month decrease EiA . Children born after the cut-off date, May, are required to 
wait until the following September to enrol in school, and thus EiA  jumps up by 11 months 
between May and June children and falls again by month between June and August.  
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide graphical illustrations of SiA  and 
E
iA  for the PIRLS and the 
TIMSS datasets respectively. Before proceeding with a description of the Figures it important 
to recall the distinction discussed in detail in the Introduction between the group of students 
who comply with the cut-off-date regulation i.e. enrol on time and the group of “LATE-
compliers”, who alter their school entry age in response to the particular instrument. The 
proceeding discussion of the Figures refers to the former group. First of all, note that the 
figures reaffirm the pattern which emerges from the summary statistics from Tables 3.1 and 
3.2, namely, (a) that the majority of students enrol on time and (b) for those not enrolling on 
time, there is a tendency (on average) towards late enrolment. The particular pattern of 
compliance to the cut-off date regulation merits comment: (a) compliance in both years under 
analysis is weaker in the first six months of the year than in the latter six months and (b) June 
and July (the months just after the cut-off date) are the only months characterized, on average, 
by early entry. Finally, note that the broad pattern of the (average) tendency towards late 
entry, with the exception of the months just after the cut-off date, is in line with other 
countries, such as Germany.
83
   
 
Finally, it is important to comment on the similarity between the estimation approach in this 
study and the regression-discontinuity design (applied, for example, by van Klauuw (1996) 
and Angrist and Levy (1999)
84
) as both make explicit use of a discontinuity induced by an 
assignment rule to identify a treatment effect. The similarities between the two approaches 
                                                 
83
 For a comparison to (a) Germany as a whole using the 2003 PIRLS data and “Pupil-Level Data of the 
Statistics of General Schools for the State of Hessen 2004/2005” see Puhani and Weber (2007) and to (b) the 
former West and to (c) the former East Germany using the “Young Adult Longitudinal Survey 1991 – 
1995/1996” see Fertig and Kluve (2005).  
84
 The papers provide examples of how fuzzy regression-discontinuity (where assignment is not deterministic i.e. 
misassignment relative to the cut-off value is possible) can be analyised in an instrumental variables framework.   
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can be highlighted from (a) the study by Angrist and Levy (1999), which aims to estimate the 
causal effects of class size on scholastic achievement, and (b) briefly recalling the formula for 
the generation of the expected school starting age in the context of this study.  
 
Starting with the study of Angrist and Levy (1999), note that the endogeneity problem in the 
regression of class size on test score arises from the correlation of class size with the 
unobserved determinants of test score and, thus warrants instrumental variables estimation. To 
construct instrumental variables estimates of the effect of class size on scholastic achievement 
Angrist and Levy (1999) use the discontinuity in Maimonides’ rule, which is used (as one of 
the factors) to determine the class size as a function of total school enrolment in Israeli public 
schools. More specifically, the Maimonides’ rule induces a discontinuity in the relationship 
between enrolment and class size at enrolment multiples of 40. That is, the rule requires that 
one class be added in a school whenever the class size exceeds the predetermined threshold of 
40
85
. Thus, the authors use the discontinuities in the relationship between total school 
enrolment and class size according to Maimonides’ rule to identify the causal effect of class 
size on scholastic achievement.  
 
Coming to the identification strategy of the study, recall that in Equation (18), the formula for 
the generation of expected school starting age, the discontinuity is induced by the cut-off date 
regulation for enrolment. That is, when the student’s month of birth exceeds the 
predetermined threshold c , EiA  jumps up by 11 months (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  
3.4 Estimation results 
3.4.1 PIRLS – OLS results 
Table 3.3 reports the parameter estimates for the OLS regressions for the entire sample and 
the subsamples split by gender and parental educational background respectively for the 
PIRLS.  
 
The OLS coefficient estimates are negative and significantly different from zero (other than 
for the subsample with the academic parental background). Therefore, the OLS estimation 
results indicate a negative relationship between Reading test scores and actual school starting 
age for the full sample and for all of the subsamples.  
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 The class size function derived from Maimonides’ rule captures that if total enrolment equals 40, one class 
will be formed, and if total enrolment equals 41 – 80 two classes will be formed etc..  
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Although the key parameter of interest is the age effect on Reading performance, the effect of 
the other control variables is worth commenting on. First, boys, on average, attain a lower 
score in Reading than girls at the fourth grade level, by approximately 14 points, which 
corresponds to around 22 percent of the standard deviations in the PIRLS scores for the full 
sample. Moreover, parental education plays a significant role in educational success, that is, 
there is a “score premium” associated with the additional degree levels of the parents. For 
instance, the incremental (mean) Reading score for children whose parents (at least one 
parent) hold (s) a high school degree relative to those whose parents at most finished primary 
school is around 54 points for the entire sample, which corresponds to 89 percent of the 
standard deviation. Those children whose parents do not own a car score lower on the 
Reading test, by around 15 points for the full sample, which corresponds to 25 percent of the 
standard deviation. Finally, as expected, the number of siblings is a significant determinant of 
Reading scores. For example, for the full sample of students, those who have more than two 
siblings score around 28 lower relative to only children, which corresponds to 46 percent of 
the standard deviation. Note that the effect of these latter two variables remains stable in sign 
and magnitude across the subsamples.  
3.4.2 PIRLS – Control function approach results 
Table 3.4 reports the parameter estimates for the control function approach for the full sample 
and the subsamples split by gender and parental educational background respectively for the 
PIRLS. The coefficient estimates for the other covariates not reported, as they are similar in 
sign and magnitude to the OLS coefficient estimates. 
 
First, note that the first-stage coefficient estimates are significant for the full sample and all 
the subsamples under analysis. Second, the control function approach, which estimates the 
ATE, switches the sign of the estimated age effect from negative to positive for the full 
sample and for all of the subsamples considered. Hence, the control function approach 
indicates that the estimated age effect of the simple OLS regression of Reading scores on 
actual school starting age is downward biased. For the full sample, the ATE estimate for the 
age effect is around 6 points, which corresponds to 10 percent of the standard deviation in the 
Reading scores for the full sample. The subsample analysis reveals that the ATE estimate for 
the age effect is the highest for boys, around 13 points, which corresponds 21 percent of the 
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standard deviation in the Reading test scores for the sample of boys. (Note however that the 
point estimates for the age effect are not significant.) 
3.4.3 TIMMS, Mathematics – OLS results 
Table 3.5 reports the parameter estimates for the OLS regressions for the entire sample and 
for the separate samples of boys and girls respectively for the TIMMS, where the outcome of 
interest is the Mathematics score for the fourth graders. 
 
The OLS coefficient estimates are negative and significantly different from zero, thereby 
indicating a negative relationship between Mathematics test scores and actual school starting 
age for the full sample and for the subsamples of boys and girls.  
 
In terms of the other explanatory variables it is worth noting that, the (average) gender 
achievement gap is in favor of boys, unlike for Reading, which amounts to approximately 7 
points, corresponding to 10 percent of the standard deviation in the TIMMS Mathematics 
scores for the full sample of fourth graders. Turning to the variable which serves as a proxy 
for household income, those children whose parents do not own a VCR, score lower on the 
Mathematics test, by 26 points for the full sample, which corresponds to 36 percent of the 
standard deviation. Moreover, family size is a significant determinant of Mathematics 
performance. For example, for the full sample of students those students from households 
with more than five people score around 35 points lower relative to only children (or two 
children with single parents), which corresponds to 47 percent of the standard deviation, 
which reaffirms the notion that children in larger families possibly receive less educational 
resources / attention than single children. Finally, note that the effect of these latter two 
variables remains similar in sign and magnitude across the subsamples of boys and girls.  
3.4.4 TIMMS, Mathematics – Control function approach results 
Table 3.6 reports the parameter estimates for the control function approach for the full sample 
and for boys and girls respectively for the TIMMS, where the outcome of interest is the 
Mathematics score. The coefficient estimates for the other covariates not reported, they are 
similar in sign and magnitude to the OLS coefficient estimates. 
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First of all, the first-stage coefficient estimates are significant for the full sample and for the 
subsamples of boys and girls. Second of all, the ATE estimates of age effect are above the 
corresponding OLS estimates for the full sample and for the subsamples of boys and girls. 
3.4.5 TIMMS, Science – OLS results 
Table 3.7 reports the parameter estimates for the OLS regressions for the entire sample and 
for boys and girls respectively for the TIMMS, where the outcome of interest is the Science 
score for the fourth graders. 
 
The OLS coefficient estimates are negative and significantly different from zero, indicating 
(as for Reading and Mathematics achievement) a negative relationship between Science test 
scores and actual school starting age for the full sample and boys and girls separately.  
 
The (average) gender achievement gap in favor of boys is similar to that in Mathematics: 
approximately 10 points, which corresponds to 13 percent of the standard deviation in the 
TIMMS Science scores for the full sample of fourth graders. Not surprisingly, the effects of 
the other covariates on Science performance are similar in sign and magnitude as for the 
Mathematics performance. Namely, those children whose parents do not own a VCR are 
found to have a lower score on the Mathematics test by around 26 points for the full sample, 
which corresponds to 35 percent of the standard deviation. For the full sample of students, 
those students from households with more than five people score around 33 points lower 
relative to only children (or two children with single parents), which corresponds to 45 
percent of the standard deviation. Finally, note that the effect of these latter two variables is 
robust across the subsamples of boys and girls.  
3.4.6 TIMMS, Science – Control function approach results 
Table 3.8 reports the parameter estimates for the control function approach for the full sample 
and for girls and boys respectively for the TIMMS, where the outcome of interest is the 
Science score. The coefficient estimates for the other covariates not reported, as they are 
similar in sign and magnitude to the OLS coefficient estimates. 
 
The coefficient estimates confirm the same picture for Science performance as for 
Mathematics and Reading performance: (1) the first-stage coefficient estimates are significant 
for the full sample and for the subsamples of boys and girls and (2) the ATE estimates of the 
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age effect of the control function approach exceed the corresponding OLS estimates for the 
full sample and the subsamples of boys and girls. For the full sample, the point estimate of the 
age effect is around 17 points, which corresponds to 19 percent of the standard deviation in 
the Science scores for the full sample. (Note however that the point estimates for the age 
effect are not significant.)  
 
Note that for all datasets and all subsamples an additional specification is estimated which 
includes interactions between the month of birth and the instrument in order to control for the 
fact that, as demonstrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the compliance rate for children born in the 
first six months of the year differs (i.e. is somewhat lower) from that of those born in the latter 
half of the year. Table 3.9 reports the estimated age effects based on the control function 
approach for the full sample and the subsamples separately for the PIRLS and TIMMS, where 
the outcome of interest is the Reading score, the Mathematics score and the Science score 
respectively. Comparing the parameter estimates to the corresponding OLS estimates 
indicates again that the ATE estimates exceed the corresponding OLS estimates for the full 
samples and for all of the subsamples considered.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This study examined the relationship between school starting age and academic performance 
for grade four students in Reading, Mathematics and Science in Hungary. The challenge in 
estimating the effect of school starting age on academic performance arises due to the fact that 
there is choice regarding enrolment decisions, and subsequently it is a non-random sample of 
students who start school earlier / later than dictated by the cut-off date regulation for 
enrolment. That is, whereas early entrants may well be higher ability children and children of 
ambitious parents who want an early start (regardless of the child’s ability), the late starters 
come from the pool of lower ability children and potentially from wealthier families (for 
whom the burden of additional childcare costs may be irrelevant). Given this non-random 
selection, late starters may be, on average, lower ability children. Subsequently, regressing 
academic performance on actual school starting age by OLS may generate a downward biased 
estimate of the age effect on academic performance. In order to overcome the problem of non-
random selection in countries where the cut-off date regulation is not exogenous, the 
empirical literature has concentrated on instrumental variable estimation, exploiting the 
exogenous variation in school starting age driven by (1) the cut-off date for enrolment and (2) 
the children’s month of birth, which generates the “expected school starting age” as an 
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instrument for “actual school starting age”. It is important to note that the IV approach 
identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE), that is, the average causal effect of 
school starting age on academic performance for the group of “compliers”, who are defined as 
those individuals whose school entry age is affected by the instrument used (introduced by 
Imbens and Angrist (1994)).  
 
Similarly to the existing literature investigating the effect of school starting age on schooling 
outcomes, this study uses “expected school starting age”, defined as the age when the child is 
supposed to start school according to the cut-off date regulation and his / her month of birth as 
an instrument for actual school starting age. However, unlike the existing studies, this study 
uses the control function approach, motivated by Garen (1984) and Heckman and Robb 
(1985), to estimate the effect of school starting age on early academic achievement. The 
advantage of the control function approach is that it extends the standard IV approach to 
estimate the effect of age on scholastic achievement to incorporate the individual 
heterogeneity of the age effects. Whereas the IV approach estimates the LATE: the age effect 
for the “compliers” (those individuals whose school entry age is changed by the instrument), 
the control function approach estimates the average treatment effect (ATE): the effect of age 
on test score for a random individual.  
  
Turning to the results, the OLS coefficient estimates suggest a negative relationship between 
school starting age and academic performance, for all three subjects and for all the 
subsamples under analysis, split by gender and parental education. The ATE estimates of the 
age effect of the control function approach exceed the corresponding OLS estimates for all the 
samples and subsamples considered, thereby suggesting a downward bias of the OLS 
estimate. Put differently, (the ATE estimates indicate that) there is no significant negative 
effect of (later) school starting age on academic performance for fourth graders.  
 
It is important to note that the OLS estimates are in line with of the international evidence. 
Among others, Frederikkson and Öckert (2005) for Sweden, Puhani and Weber (2007) for 
Germany and Bedard and Dhuey (2005) for a number of OECD countries (for example, for 
Austria, for the Czech Republic and for Portugal) find evidence from OLS regressions for a 
negative association between academic achievement and actual school starting age, attributing 
this to the non-random selection of early / late school starters who differ in unobserved 
academic ability.  
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Furthermore, the majority of the international literature finds evidence for a positive age 
effect using the IV strategy, with differences in the magnitude across countries and as well as 
age groups under analysis. One point must be reemphasized, namely, that the IV approach of 
these studies yields the LATE estimate, which is equivalent of the age effect for the group of 
“compliers” and is not directly comparable to the estimates of this study, which yield the ATE 
estimates. Nevertheless, the estimated age effects from the papers which analyse the same age 
group, namely, grade four students, and the same datasets (but differ somewhat in the 
covariates included) merit comment. For example, Puhani and Weber (2007) find the 
estimated age effect (for the group of “compliers”) based on the PIRLS data for German grade 
four students to be around 40 percent of the standard deviations of the Reading test score in 
the full German sample. The authors further conclude that German males benefit more than 
females from later school entry at the grade four level as far as Reading performance is 
concerned. Moreover, the evidence by Bedard and Dhuey (2005) based on the TIMMS data 
for a number of OECD countries also suggests a positive age effect for fourth graders in 
Science (for the group of “compliers”), differing in magnitude across the countries, ranging 
from around 18 percent to 37 percent of the international standard deviations for the Science 
test score for Canada and New Zealand respectively.  
 
Although the center of interest is the effect of school starting age on academic performance, 
the effect of the other explanatory variables (which remain similar in sign and magnitude 
across the subjects and subsamples considered), especially gender, parental education and 
family size also merit comment. First, as expected, the (average) gender achievement gap at 
the fourth grade level is in favour of girls for Reading and in favour of boys in Mathematics 
and Science. Whereas, on average, boys attain a lower score in Reading than girls, by 
approximately 23 percent of the standard deviations in the Reading scores for the full PIRLS 
sample, they attain a higher score in Mathematics and Science by around 10 and 13 percent of 
the standard deviation in the Mathematics and Science scores respectively. This is in line with 
the international evidence explicitly focusing on the effect of gender on academic 
performance. For instance, Strøm (2004) finds evidence for a gender achievement gap in 
favour of girls in Reading in Norway using the PISA 2000 data covering 15 – 16 year old 
students (approximately 33 percent of the standard deviation of the international PISA 
Reading scores), which is robust across specifications.  
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Moreover, parental education plays a significant role in educational success in Hungary. For 
instance, the incremental (mean) Reading score for children whose parents (at least one 
parent) hold (s) a high school degree relative to those whose parents at most finished primary 
school is around 89 percent of the standard deviation of the Reading scores. In addition to 
other factors, this may be driven by the fact that children from highly educated families are 
more likely to be engaged in activities that promote academic success. Although the direct 
impact of such parental input on test scores is difficult to pin down, there are numerous 
variables in the PIRLS dataset that indicate a positive association between parental education 
and home activities which promote academic success. For example, whereas approximately 
58 percent of the students with parents having at most primary school degree reported that 
they are often told stories at home, the corresponding figure for students with parents who 
possess a college or university degree is 83 percent. Among others, Elder and Lubotsky 
(2006) for the US and Fertig and Kluve (2005) for Germany find evidence for the importance 
of parental education for schooling success. The latter two authors, based on the “Young 
Adult Longitudinal Survey” covering 18 – 29 year old individuals, find that in both former 
East and West Germany, children from low educated families (whose parents at most 
completed the Hauptschule) are less likely to attain a high school degree (Abitur) and the 
opposite is true for their counterparts from high educated families (whose parents completed 
more than Hauptschule). Another piece of evidence which shows the importance of socio-
economic background for academic success in Hungary from another perspective merits 
comment: the comparative analysis of OECD countries implies that the relationship between 
(15 year old) students’ socio-economic background and their expectations to complete tertiary 
education is the strongest in Hungary among OECD countries (Education at a Glance 2007 
(2007)).  
 
Finally, as expected, the number of siblings is a significant determinant of test scores, 
irrespective of the subject and subsample considered. For example, those students who have 
more than two siblings score around 46 percent of the standard deviation of the Reading tests 
lower relative to single children. This finding (a) is supportive of the notion that, on average, 
families with fewer children have greater endowments in their children’s human capital and 
(b) confirms the international evidence. For instance, Strøm (2004) finds evidence that the 
number of siblings has a negative effect on the Reading test score using the PISA 2000 data.  
 
 
 180 
 
 
 
 
 181 
3.6 References 
Angrist, J. D. and V. Lavy (1999) Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class 
Size on Scholastic Achievement. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 533 – 
575. 
Bedard, K. and E. Dhuey (2005) The Persistence of Early Childhood Maturity: International 
Evidence of Long-Run Effects. Working Paper. Department of Economics, 
University of California, Santa Barbara.  
Behrman, J. R. and P. Taubman (1986) Birth Order, Schooling and Earnings. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 4(3), 121 – 145.  
Bound, J., D. A. Jaeger, and R. M. Baker (1995) Problems with Instrumental Variables 
Estimation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory variable in Weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
90(430), 443 – 450.  
Card, D. (1999) The causal effect of education on earnings. In: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card 
(Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, 3 (pp. 1801 – 1863). Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Elder, T. E. and D. H. Lubotsky (2006) Kindergarten Entrance Age and Children’s 
Achievement: Impacts of State Policies, Family Background, and Peers. University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign – Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations (ILIR) 
Working Paper Series.  
Fertig, M. and J. Kluve (2005) The Effect of Age at School Entry on Educational Attainment 
in Germany. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).  
Frederikkson, P. and B. Öckert (2005) Is Early Learning really More Productive? The Effect 
of School Starting Age on School and Labor Market Performance. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 1659, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).  
Garen, J. (1984) The returns to schooling: a selectivity bias approach with a continuous 
choice variable. Econometrica, 52, 1199 – 1218. 
Gonzalez, E. J. and A. M. Kennedy (Eds.) (2003) PIRLS 2001 User Guide for the 
International Database. Chestnut Hill: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, 
Lynch School of Education, Boston College.  
Haegeland, T. (2001) Changing returns to Education Across Cohorts: Selection, School 
System or Skills Obsolescence? Discussion Papers No. 302, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department.  
 182 
Heckman, J. J. and R. Robb (1985) Alternative methods for evaluating the impact of 
interventions. In: J. J. Heckman and Singer B. (Eds.), Longitudinal Analysis of 
Labor Market Data, Econometric Society Monographs No. 10 (pp. 156 – 245). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist (1994) Identification and Estimation of Local Average 
Treatment Effects. Econometrica, 62(2), 467 – 475.  
Leuven, E., M. Lindahl, H. Oosterbeek, and D. Webbink (2004) New evidence on the effect 
of time in school on early achievement. HEW 0410001, Economics Working Paper 
Archive at WUSTL.  
Martin, M. O. (2005) TIMSS 2003 User Guide for the International Database. Chestnut Hill: 
TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, Lynch School of Education, Boston 
College.  
Puhani, P. A. and A. M. Weber (2007) Does the Early Bird Catch the Worm? Instrumental 
Variable Estimates of Educational Effects of Age of School Entry in Germany. 
Empirical Economics, 32, 359 – 386. 
OECD (2007) Education at a Glance 2007. at www.oecd.org/edu/eag2007. 
Staiger, D. and H. J. Stock (1997) Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica, 65(3), 557 – 586. 
Stipek, D. (2002) At What Age Should Children Enter Kindergarten? A Question for Policy 
Makers and Parents. Social Policy Report, 16(2), 3 – 20. 
Strøm, B. (2004) Student Achievement and Birthday Effects. CESifo / PEPG Schooling and 
Human Capital Formation in the Global Economy. CESifo Conference Center.  
van Klaauw, W. (1997) A Regression-Discontinuity Evaluation of the Effect of Financial Aid 
Offers on College Enrollment. Working Papers 97-10, C. V. Starr Center for 
Applied Economics, New York University.  
Vágó, I. (2005) Felfelé Terjeszkedő Òvodáztatás – Stagnáló Hozzáférés. Educatio, 14(4), 742 
– 761.  
 
 
 
 183 
3.7 Appendix  
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics, PIRLS, 2001 
PIRLS (2001) 
Variable   
Average reading score  
Overall  544.97  
Boys 537.79 
Girls 551.80 
Academic parents 579.30 
Non-academic parents  529.03 
Parental education  (%) 
Primary school or less 7.95 
Vocational degree   42.59  
High school degree  12.83 
College or university degree  28.11   
Missing  8.53 
Number of sibling (%) 
Zero 14.84  
One 50.74   
Two  20.66 
More than two 8.85  
Missing 4.90 
Gender (%) 
Male  48.71  
Female 51.29 
Car (%) 
Yes   67.73  
No  32.27 
Mean observed school starting age  6.97  
Mean expected school starting age  6.80 
Number of observations 4,508 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics, TIMSS, 2003 
TIMSS (2003) 
Variable  
Average mathematics score  
Overall  530.42  
Boys 532.45 
Girls   528.37 
Average science score   
Overall  531.49 
Boys  535.04 
Girls 527.90 
Number of people at home (%)  
Two or three 18.81 
Four 42.23  
Five 21.66  
More than five 14.27 
Missing 3.02 
Gender (%)  
Male 50.23  
Female  49.77 
VCR  (%)  
Yes  71.03  
No 28.97  
Mean observed school starting age   7.02 
Mean expected school starting age  6.80 
Number of observations 3,222 
Notes on Tables 3.1 – 3.2:  School starting age is measured in years. 
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Figure 3.1 Actual school starting age vs. expected school starting age (PIRLS 2001) 
Actual school starting age vs expected school starting age (PIRLS 2001)
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3.7.2 Estimation results, PIRLS 
Table 3.3 OLS regression results, PIRLS, 2001 
OLS estimates, PIRLS (2001) 
 
Entire 
sample Boys Girls Academic 
Non- 
Academic 
School starting age -16.35 -19.30 -13.64 -5.75 -22.12 
 (2.61) (3.13) (3.91) (6.26) (2.94) 
Male  -13.69   -10.57 -15.10 
 (1.85)   (3.88) (2.09) 
No car -15.22 -9.95 -20.10 -12.31 -19.27 
 (2.16) (3.07) (2.88) (4.78) (2.59) 
Number of siblings      
One -3.18 -5.27 -0.77 1.28 -5.80 
 (2.33) (3.49) (3.66) (4.70) (3.17) 
Two -10.19 -13.65 -6.35 2.20 -17.76 
 (3.18) (4.21) (4.31) (5.21) (4.23) 
More than two -27.85 -30.33 -24.84 -13.60 -36.36 
 (4.98) (7.44) (5.49) (8.60) (5.67) 
Missing -25.58 -28.81 -21.21 -16.04 -32.92 
 (4.45) (6.48) (6.37) (8.37) (5.99) 
Parental education       
Vocational degree 30.56 30.70 30.96   
 (3.85) (6.49) (4.28)   
High school degree 54.10 54.94 53.85   
 (4.68) (7.36) (5.21)   
Tertiary degree  76.17 80.70 72.30   
 (4.56) (6.40) (5.65)   
Missing 18.07 23.32 13.10   
 (4.90) (6.50) (6.18)   
Constant 650.32 650.56 636.82 642.12 732.32 
 (19.25) (23.34) (28.49) (40.69) (20.65) 
Observations 4,508 2,232 2,276 1,142 3,003 
Notes: 1) School starting age is measured in years. 2) The reference group among the parental 
education categories is “Primary school or less”. 3) The reference group for number of 
siblings is “Zero”. 4) Standard errors are in parentheses. 5) Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at school level. 
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Table 3.4 First-stage and second-stage regression results, PIRLS, 2001 
Control function approach, PIRLS (2001) 
 First-stage estimates Second-stage estimates 
 
2  2  
Entire sample  
(N = 4,508) 
0.42 
(0.03) 
6.25 
(7.79) 
Boys  
(N = 2,232) 
0.36 
(0.04) 
13.29 
(13.35) 
Girls  
(N = 2,276) 
0.47 
(0.04) 
1.62 
(9.12) 
Academic  
(N = 1,142) 
0.43 
(0.03) 
10.31 
(15.15) 
Non-academic  
(N = 3,003) 
0.44 
(0.05) 
   4.15 
 (9.38) 
Notes: 1) School starting age is measured in years. 2) Control variables included in the 
regressions are reported in Table 3.1. 3) Standard errors are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at school level. 5) Standard errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap 
replications for the second-stage regressions. 
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3.7.3 Estimation results, TIMMS, Mathematics 
Table 3.5 OLS regression results, TIMSS, Mathematics, 2003 
OLS estimates, TIMSS, Mathematics (2003) 
 Entire sample Boys Girls 
School starting age -23.73 -22.97 -24.07 
 (3.75) (3.86) (5.87) 
Male 7.01   
 (2.82)   
No VCR -26.00 -21.26 -30.91 
 (3.71) (4.14) (5.26) 
Number of people at home 
Four -2.63 3.83 -9.87 
 (4.36) (6.14) (4.82) 
Five -14.10 -6.21 -22.85 
 (4.49) (5.99) (5.35) 
More than five -34.51 -20.71 -48.82 
 (6.24) (7.62) (7.99) 
Missing -82.01 -83.32 -76.34 
 (8.66) (11.58) (9.62) 
Constant 738.63 727.94 754.33 
 (25.54) (27.95) (40.78) 
Observations 3,222 1,609 1,613 
Notes: 1) School starting age is measured in years. 2) The reference group for number of 
people at home is “Two or three”. 3) Standard errors are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at school level. 
 
Table 3.6 First-stage and second-stage regression results, TIMSS, Mathematics, 2003 
Control function approach, TIMSS, Mathematics (2001) 
 First-stage estimates Second-stage estimates 
 
2  2  
Entire sample  
(N = 3,222) 
0.27 
(0.03) 
-2.61 
(17.09) 
Boys  
(N = 1,609) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
12.32 
(39.34) 
Girls  
(N = 1,613) 
0.38 
(0.04) 
-9.78 
(16.00) 
Notes: 1) Variables included in the regressions are reported in Table 3.2. 2) Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at school level. 4) Standard 
errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap replications for the second-stage regressions. 
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3.7.4 Estimation results, TIMMS, Science 
Table 3.7 OLS regression results, TIMSS, Science, 2003 
OLS estimates, TIMSS, Science (2003) 
 Entire sample Boys Girls 
School starting age -21.49 -18.94 -23.98 
 (4.08) (3.93) (6.15) 
Male 10.02   
 (2.87)   
No VCR -25.97 -22.58 -29.18 
 (3.22) (4.13) (4.50) 
Number of people at home 
Four -7.69 -1.57 -14.21 
 (3.76) (4.98) (4.75) 
Five -14.30 -13.21 -16.59 
 (4.28) (5.76) (5.37) 
More than five -32.50 -22.90 -42.13 
 (5.27) (6.63) (7.09) 
Missing -91.24 -93.71 -84.83 
 (9.13) (10.77) (13.72) 
Constant 724.62 708.15 750.63 
 (28.02) (27.59) (42.54) 
Observations 3,222 1,609 1,613 
Notes: 1) School starting age is measured in years. 2) The reference group for number of 
people at home is “Two or three”. 3) Standard errors are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at school level.  
 
Table 3.8 First-stage and second-stage regression results, TIMMS, Science, 2003 
Control function approach, TIMSS, Science (2001) 
 First-stage estimates Second-stage estimates 
 
2  2  
Entire sample  
(N = 3,222) 
0.27 
(0.03) 
17.18 
(17.28) 
Boys  
(N = 1,609) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
16.77 
(40.22) 
Girls  
(N = 1,613) 
0.38 
(0.04) 
17.24 
(16.98) 
Notes: 1) Variables included in the regressions are reported in Table 3.2. 2) Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 4) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at school level. 5) Standard 
errors are computed by 1000 bootstrap replications for the second-stage regressions. 
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Table 3.9 Control function approach regression results with interaction terms between 
expected school starting age and month of birth for PIRLS (2001), TIMSS, Mathematics 
(2003) and  TIMSS, Science (2003) 
Control function approach, PIRSL (2003), TIMSS, Mathematics (2001), TIMSS, Science 
(2001) 
 PIRLS TIMMS 
Mathematics 
TIMSS Science 
 
2  2  2  
Entire sample 8.12 
(6.84) 
7.98 
(12.58) 
13.68 
(13.10) 
Boys  
 
9.59 
(9.12) 
-12.85 
(17.10) 
-12.21 
(17.39) 
Girls 2.98 
(8.00) 
11.42 
(14.68) 
22.52 
(14.21) 
Academic 6.89 
(11.00) 
  
Nonacademic 7.78 
(8.28) 
  
Notes: 1) Variables included in the regressions are those reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the 
PIRLS and TIMSS datasets respectively plus the interaction terms between expected school 
starting age and month of birth. 2) Standard errors are in parentheses. 3) Standard errors are 
computed by 1000 bootstrap replications. 
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